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Abstract 
 
Melissa Schnyder 
 
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: MIGRANT 
INCLUSION ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ACROSS 
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
This project explores why similar organizations located in similar countries in the European 
Union (EU) working on behalf of similar interests will undertake very different strategies to 
achieve their policy goals. I focus on organizations working toward a migrant inclusion policy 
agenda across twenty EU countries, and compare their political activities across levels of 
governance. I develop an interconnectivity model based on group ties to explain activity. In 
particular, I examine how an organization’s ties with a range of other actors shape activity levels 
and activity choice, as compared to more traditional social movement explanations. A broad 
range of activities are examined, including lobbying, protest, judicial action, media use, and 
collaborative efforts with others.  
The findings support the proposition that the nature and strength of an organization’s 
connections strongly influences its political activity across each level of governance. At the 
national level, increasingly strong connections to other like-minded actors serve to increase and 
moderate activity. Moreover, groups that maintain strong connections with actors beyond the 
state are more likely to expand their activities across levels of governance, including the EU 
level. In addition, I find evidence of a “solidarity effect” among networks of NGOs across levels 
of governance that increases the likelihood of collaborative activity. Interesting findings also 
emerge with respect to the other predictors. For example, I find evidence that the more radical 
groups, while not excluded from EU political processes, tend to resort to “back door” strategies 
whereby they target less visible institutions. Moreover, these groups tend to be excluded from 
collaborations at the national level, forcing them to look beyond their nation-states for partners. 
Overall, the findings lend strong support to the interconnectivity model developed in this 
 viii
dissertation, suggesting that the nature of group ties helps to not only explain the choice of 
activity but also the target. This study is based on original data collected through the Survey of 
European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations. In general, the sample of groups included is 
broadly representative of the population, lending confidence to the conclusions drawn from this 
study.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction: Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations in Europe 
 
“Migration scholars are increasingly realising the importance of immigrant organisations,” 
Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005.  
 
“Since the 1990s and the uprising of the extreme right parties, it’s gotten more difficult to defend 
the rights of asylum-seekers and immigrants in general,” Representative from the Flemish 
Refugee Council in Brussels. 
 
 
The newspaper headlines presented in Table 1.1 are just a small sample from a single European 
country over a ten year period, yet they illustrate the growing salience of immigrant-related issues 
and suggest the presence of a very active and contentious movement on behalf of migrants and 
refugees. In a sense, this should not come as a surprise, because since the 1970s and 1980s issues 
of immigration, asylum, and migrant integration have increased in importance throughout Europe 
(Joppke 1999; Koslowski 2000). At the same time that intolerance appears to be on the rise in 
Europe and beyond (Rohrschneider and Peffley 2003), public interest in many of the broad issues 
that the migrant inclusion movement is concerned with, such as anti-racism, anti-discrimination, 
and human rights, has also reached new heights over the past decade (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ireland 1994). As a result, these issues are increasingly recognized as 
part of the political debate in most European Union (EU) democracies. However, in order to 
affect the political process, groups must successfully coordinate and mobilize their support base. 
To that end, the migrant inclusion movement has, over the past decades, developed organized 
groups that direct the actions of the movement. Social movement research emphasizes that once a 
movement reaches this stage of formal organization, it becomes important to study the behavior 
of its groups (Dalton 1994). 
 In examining organized migrant inclusion interests, one puzzle that emerges is why 
similar groups based in similar countries working toward similar goals choose to engage in 
different activity patterns and target different levels of governance. The basic theoretical 
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argument I develop in this dissertation is that the European migrant inclusion movement is linked 
to and influences the political process through connections of interest groups and other relevant 
stakeholders in the anti-discrimination lobby, broadly defined. Consequently, who groups know, 
and how well they know them, is a factor that can be expected to shape political action and its 
effectiveness, as well as where that action is directed. In addition to group ties, social movement 
research has shown that other factors, such as organizational resources, group identity, and the 
political opportunity structure that groups face also shape political activity. Thus, these will also 
be examined.  
A focus on pro-migrant and refugee organizations is important because they provide an 
organized base for the movement’s actions. Because policy influence in advanced industrial 
democracies necessitates the formal representation of interests, groups must work at the local, 
national, transnational, and EU levels to monitor legislation, maintain close contact with 
bureaucratic allies, network, maintain a lobbying presence to present the views of pro-migrant 
organizations, and educate and mobilize supporters. As pro-migrant forces pursue these activities, 
they define the agenda and political direction of the movement. These groups also send signals to 
the public regarding which policies are important nationally and supranationally, and which 
strategies should be utilized to achieve the movement’s goals. 
THE POLICY CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION ISSUE IN EUROPE 
Issues of immigration have risen in importance across Europe in recent decades (Guiraudon 
2000a). As Chapter 2 explains in detail, this development can be traced back to the post World 
War II period when many European governments began importing “guestworkers” to rebuild 
their societies. These guestworker programs benefited both Europe in allowing it to rebuild 
quickly after the devastation of the war, as well as individuals from the sending countries, where 
employment was likely scarce or sporadic. At the same time, however, European governments 
regarded this imported workforce as temporary. The prevailing view was that upon completion of 
their work, migrant laborers would return to their countries of origin (Wallace and Wallace 2000). 
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By the 1970s it was becoming clear that the idea of guestworkers as temporary residents was far 
from reality, although many governments had yet to acknowledge this fact.  
 As European societies were becoming more heterogeneous, native populations often 
reacted negatively against migrants, whom they viewed as competitors for jobs and as general 
“outsiders” who did not belong and could not acclimate to the predominant norms, values, and 
ways of life (Ireland 1994). In short, as migrants became more numerous and thus more visible to 
native populations, they began to represent a threat to the predominant societal norms and values. 
Thus, because of this perceived threat, European citizens began to advance claims that migrants 
were not only taking their jobs, but also eroding their culture. This viewpoint is expressed in the 
rhetoric of far-right political parties, whose anti-immigration platforms began to garner wide 
support in the 1980s and 1990s. At this time, immigration and asylum became highly politicized 
issues (Koslowski 2000). Table 1.2 illustrates the more recent activity and success of the far-right 
in various countries of the EU.     
 These developments culminated in issues such as xenophobia, racism, intolerance, and 
discrimination adopting a prominent place in the public debate of many European societies by the 
1990s. At this point, the notion that the relationship between migrants and native citizens was at 
the root of many social problems associated with the phenomenon of immigration began to 
solidify. The conflict over migrant assimilation into the values of the host society versus cultural 
integration in which the norms and values of native and non-native residents co-exist side by side 
found an outlet as debates about how migrants should be incorporated into their host societies 
took hold (Koslowski 2000). Migration continued to be blamed for a wide variety of social 
problems, such as crime, violence, theft, unemployment, drug use and, more recently, terrorism.    
  In light of this brief background, Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and Table 1.3 establish the policy 
context of migration and asylum in the EU today. First, Figure 1.1 provides a picture of migration 
to the EU as a whole over time from 1960 through 2005. It shows that particularly since the early 
1980s, net migration has generally increased, with certain ebbs and flows in the overall trend. 
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Although net migration decreased slightly into 2005, the trend has shown a steep and marked 
increase since approximately 2000. In examining the crude net migration rates in 2005 by 
country, shown in the first half of Figure 1.2, it is evident that migrants constitute a significant 
proportion of the overall population across many Western and Eastern European member states, 
as well as across the Eurozone countries, the EU-15 and the EU-25 as a whole.1 Moreover, the 
second half of Figure 1.2 shows that although crude net migration increased in specific countries 
from 2004 to 2005, including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
and the European Free Trade Area as a whole, the change in percentage points was negative 
across the Eurozone, EU-15, and EU-25.   
 As in many other advanced democracies, asylum is a particularly contentious aspect of 
migration in the member states of the EU. Figure 1.3 displays the number of asylum applications 
lodged in the EU as a whole in 2005 by country of origin. The overwhelming majority of asylum 
applications to the EU come from Russia and Serbia/Montenegro, which are relatively close in 
geographic terms. Following this, a considerable number originate from Turkey and Iraq, likely 
reflecting the result of ethnic conflict in those countries. Moreover, between 1,000 and 2,000 
asylum applications in 2005 came from Iran, China, Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. 
In each of these countries, respect for human rights is relatively low and/or significant conflicts 
are taking place, no doubt prompting waves of asylum-seekers into Europe.  
Table 1.3 paints a more detailed picture of the asylum situation by providing a 
breakdown of asylum applications to each European country in 2005 by country of origin. The 
numbers reflect that, by far, asylum-seekers are targeting Western Europe in particular. More 
specifically, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK receive 
significantly large numbers of asylum applications from many countries. Moreover, Cyprus 
receives a relatively large number of overall applications for its size, Poland receives a large 
                                                 
1 The Eurozone refers to those EU countries taking part in European monetary union (the common 
currency), the EU-15 refers to the 15 member states of the EU before the latest round of enlargement in 
2004, and the EU-25 refers to the EU as a whole including the old and new member states.  
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number from Russia, and Ireland receives a significant proportion from Nigeria. Taken together, 
these tables and figures reflect the migrant and refugee policy context across the EU as a whole, 
as well as within specific member states. Overall, they illustrate the growing significance of these 
issues and their implications for tolerance, incorporation, and integration.                         
 This policy context is associated with a host of public opinion issues and practical 
problems that migrants and refugees face, such as discrimination, social exclusion, and a strained 
relationship between migrants and native citizens. In general, organizations that work on behalf 
of migrants and refugees were largely established to address these issues and work for 
improvement (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Although a few such groups originated in the 
1970s (a time when family reunification was prevalent and help with basic services for migrants 
was needed), many more were established in the 1980s and, especially, 1990s and 2000s when 
net migration to the EU surged upward (see Figure 1.1). These organizations work on a wide 
variety of practical issues that promote migrant integration and inclusion, such as language 
acquisition, employment issues, housing, health care, psychological care, legal rights, voting and 
political participation, fighting discrimination and intolerance, and providing education. 
Moreover, although the groups concerned with these issues typically target any type of migrant 
that needs assistance, many groups focus on assisting migrants of a particular ethnicity or 
nationality, women, and youth. Much more will be said about these organizations and their work 
in the forthcoming chapters. For now, it is important to emphasize that the developments in and 
changes to European societies that have occurred over the past decades underscore the 
importance of pro-migrant and refugee organizations that work for remedies to many of the 
problems that migrants face, as well as the relationship between migrants and their host societies.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the assumption that a variety of factors influences the political behavior of an organization, 
the main research questions guiding this study attempt to paint a picture of how a movement for 
migrant inclusion, based on the activities of pro-migrant and refugee organizations, is developing 
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not in a specific country or handful of countries, but throughout the EU as a whole across various 
levels of governance. The broad research questions are as follows: 
• What political activities do migrant inclusion groups choose to engage in at each level of 
governance? 
• What factors influence participation in these activities? 
• Why do groups choose certain political activities or levels of governance over others? 
 
In order to explore the domestic, supranational, and transnational activities of pro-migrant 
and refugee groups and the determinants of those activities, I adopt a focus on an organization’s 
“interconnectivity” as an important determinant of group behavior. In this research, 
interconnectivity or group ties are defined as connections to specific actors including other social 
organizations (encompassing both pro-migrant groups and other types of non-governmental 
organizations), and “members of the polity” (Tilly 1978) such as business associations and labor 
unions both at home and abroad. I focus on interconnectivity as part of an integrative approach to 
political behavior that incorporates other aspects of the most important social movement theories: 
political opportunity structures, ideology, and organizational resources. Each of these theoretical 
perspectives will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.   
 In addressing the guiding research questions stated above, this project makes several 
important contributions to the fields of comparative politics and international relations. First and 
foremost, it will add to the social movement literature by examining how organizations embedded 
in a movement that promotes electorally unpopular issues (Geddes 1998) act to achieve their 
policy goals. Because the migrant inclusion movement lacks a wide popular base of support, there 
is reason to expect that groups may either behave differently or have different determinants of 
action compared to more popular movements, such as environmentalism.  
This study will also add to the literature on the political behavior of movement 
organizations by going beyond the traditional focus on protest politics. Although migrant 
 6
inclusion is often presented by the media as a contentious movement as illustrated in Table 1.1, 
social movement scholars emphasize that the vast majority of movement politics likely reflects 
less spectacular tactics (McAdam et al. 2001). In disaggregating political behavior into various 
types of conventional and unconventional political action, this study presents a more nuanced 
investigation of social movement activity. Furthermore, in examining activities that span levels of 
governance, this project will bridge the literatures on supranational governance and the activities 
of the EU with the social movement literature. It also adds to the field of comparative politics by 
comparing activity not across countries as is common practice, but rather across levels of 
governance. In addition, this research not only focuses on activities, but also the effectiveness of 
those activities. While previous research tends to infer that those factors that influence SMO 
activities also lead to effectiveness, this study explicitly addresses this question. Finally, this 
study will contribute to the literature on immigration and migrant inclusion interest groups by 
investigating the political activities of a wide array of pro-migrant and refugee organizations 
active across Europe.  
 Thus, this study moves beyond existing research by focusing in-depth on migrant 
inclusion actors across 20 of the 25 current EU member countries. To date, no study has 
comprehensively and systematically analyzed the activities of a large number of such groups 
across many countries. In collecting data from 114 groups throughout the EU with the Survey of 
European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations, this study is uniquely positioned to 
systematically address many research questions about the activities of the migrant inclusion 
movement. Accordingly, this study moves beyond yet compliments case study research by 
applying statistical techniques to analyze the determinants of group activity across levels of 
governance. Thus, it will ultimately enable us to make generalizations about patterns of action 
within the migrant inclusion movement and situate them in the broader theoretical context of 
social movement politics.  
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 Based on the guiding research questions posited above, this project will examine the 
various factors that influence groups to engage in a range of activity types. Moreover, it will 
investigate how and under what conditions groups take their issues beyond their national borders 
and target the EU. In addition, it will assess the conditions under which groups engage in 
cooperative activity with a range of actors domestically, supranationally, and transnationally. 
These concerns suggest an inter-related set of more specific research questions which the 
empirical chapters of this dissertation will address. First, what activities do pro-migrant and 
refugee groups engage in at the national level? What drives participation in different modes of 
conventional versus challenging activity and their effectiveness in the domestic arena? Second, 
what activities do groups rely on at the supranational level? What factors prompt groups to go 
beyond their nation-states and target the EU? Finally, to what extent do groups engage in less 
visible “behind the scenes” collaborative activities with different types of actors? What factors 
lead groups to collaborate with others at the domestic, transnational, and EU levels to achieve 
their policy goals?  
 Finally, this research pursues two larger theoretical goals. First, the broad scope of this 
dataset provides a basis on which to test theories about the various factors that affect groups’ 
choice of activities and their effectiveness. To this end, this study aims to contribute to social 
movement theory by being the first to engage in a systematic treatment of actor connectivity. 
Both the social movement and migrant inclusion literatures recognize the importance of group 
ties to social movement behavior and success (Guiraudon 1998, 2000a, 2001: Imig and Tarrow 
2001; Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2000), yet to date no study has 
formally incorporated these ties as predictors of activity or effectiveness. To this end, this study 
analyzes the effects of interconnectedness on participation in a wide array of activities across 
levels of governance. In addition, this research will assess the predictive power of resource 
mobilization theory, group identity explanations, and political opportunity structures. By 
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including variables from each approach in a single model, it is possible to isolate the influence of 
each set of factors on political behavior while controlling the others.  
ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
The chapters that follow will address several topics. Chapter 2 provides a contextual background 
by discussing the literature to date on pro-migrant actors and migrant inclusion, and how this 
study builds on and contributes to this body of work. Chapter 3 discusses group ties in more 
depth and develops a connectivity model of political behavior applicable across levels of 
governance. It also offers a theoretical overview of the other social movement theories that guide 
the empirical analyses, and places the migrant inclusion movement in the context of these 
theories. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee 
Organizations, the main data source on which this study is based. It details the process of data 
collection and provides basic descriptions of the data. The empirical analyses begin in Chapter 5. 
This chapter examines the patterns of activities used by pro-migrant and refugee groups in the 
national arena. It also assesses the determinants and effectiveness of different activity types. 
Chapter 6 investigates the activity patterns of groups in the supranational arena, and analyzes the 
factors that cause groups to shift their focus from the national to the EU arena. Chapter 7 focuses 
on collaborative activity among pro-migrant groups and different types of actors both within and 
beyond the nation-state. In addition to examining the extent and nature of collaborative activity, it 
analyzes the factors that shape cooperation at the domestic, transnational, and supranational 
levels. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of this study. It summarizes its key themes and 
findings, develops the broader implications, and suggests avenues for future research.  
 The following chapters set out on an exploration of the European migrant inclusion 
movement and its political activities. Throughout this study, the primary focus will be on the 
factors that impact political behavior and policy effectiveness. I examine these issues with an 
original data source that spans organizations in 20 countries. This research project will add to our 
knowledge of social movement politics by focusing on a broad set of actors in the migrant 
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inclusion movement, investigating a range of political activities, and drawing comparisons across 
several levels of governance.     
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Chapter One: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1.1  Net Migration, EU-25, 1960-2005. From Eurostat, Statistics in Focus,  
Population and Social Conditions, 1/2006. 
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Figure 1.2  2005 Crude Net Migration Rates, and Changes in Percentage Points of Crude 
Net Migration Rates from 2004-2005.  From Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and 
Social Conditions, 1/2006. 
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Figure 1.3 Asylum applications lodged in the European Union* by origin, first quarter of 2005 to 
third quarter 2005 (*All current EU members, except Italy for which no data are available). Source: 
UNHCR Statistics 2005. 
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Table 1.1 Selection of Newspaper Headlines in France, 1991-2001 
“Marchers protest against tyranny, neocolonialism” (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 2/24/01) 
“Illegal immigrants seek regular status” (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 11/26/00) 
“Protestors defend rights of immigrants in France” (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 12/15/00) 
 “Appel national pour le regularization des sans papiers (National call for the regularization of 
illegal immigrants)” (Collectif St. Denis, 4/25/00) 
“Illegal immigrants march in Paris to call for residency papers” (Associated Press, 4/4/99) 
“Banlieue Babylon” (The Observer, 7/25/99) 
“Attitudes to hunger strikes start to thaw” (Le Monde, 11/15/98) 
“Protesters clash with police over expulsion of Turk” (Agence France Presse, 10/19/98) 
“Art world comes to aid of immigrants” (Le Monde, 7/5/98) 
“Bikers, immigrants in Paris day of protest” (Agence France Presse, 5/16/98) 
“Controversial French immigration bill passes Parliament” (Agence France Presse, 4/8/98) 
“Air France upset about immigrant expulsions” (Agence France Presse, 4/8/98) 
“French film makers denounce gov’t policy on immigration” (Agence France Presse, 4/7/98) 
“Protests against expulsions of immigrants mount in France” (Agence France Presse, 4/6/98) 
“Thousands protest French draft immigration law” (Agence France Presse, 11/22/97) 
 “Forty facing deportation go on hunger strike” (Agence France Presse, 8/26/97) 
“Thousands march in Paris demanding papers” (Associated Press, 7/5/97) 
“Paris protesters put pressure on Jospin” (Daily Telegraph, 6/11/97) 
“Protest over immigration crackdown” (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 3/9/97) 
“French arts leaders join in protest of immigration bill” (Los Angeles Times, 2/17/97) 
“Paris march demands change to immigration laws” (Agence France Presse, 9/29/96) 
“Immigrant protest ended by police” (Facts on File World News, 9/5/96) 
“Illegal immigrants in France step up their protest” (The Independent, 8/14/96) 
“30,000 protest over Moroccan’s death” (The Independent, 5/4/95) 
“Intolerance of immigrants growing in France” (Inter Press Service, 3/21/95) 
“Hundreds of students protest ban on Muslim scarves at school” (Associated Press, 9/30/94) 
“Thousands protest against new immigration laws in Paris” (Xinhua News Service, 2/5/94) 
“Thousands protest against anti-immigration bill” (Agence France Presse, 6/19/93) 
“Riots test new French government” (The Independent, 5/12/93) 
“Riots in Reims after verdict” (Irish Times, 11/19/92) 
“Killing of French youth raises debate on discrimination” (Associated Press, 5/28/91) 
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Table 1.2         
Success and Activity of the Far-Right in Europe       
Country Party 
Time 
Period Activity           
Austria 
Freedom 
Party 
Jun-
99 
Won 23.2% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
  Oct-99 Won 27.3% of the vote in Austrian general elections   
  Oct-99 Is second biggest party in Vienna and second in Austria   
  
Feb-
00 Became partner in coalition with Austrian People's Party  
  2002 Won 10.2% of the vote in national elections    
  
Feb-
03 
Invited to take part in new right-wing coalition with Austrian 
People's Party 
  2003 Sat in 8 of 9 regional parliaments in Austria    
  2004 
Won 6.33% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections  
    2004 1 candidate elected to European Parliament   
Belgium 
Vlaams 
Belang 
Jun-
99 Won 9.2% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections  
  
May-
03 Won 11.6% of the vote in the Belgian general elections   
  
May-
03 Took 18 seats in Belgian federal parliament    
  
May-
03 Front National Party won 1.92% of the national vote   
  
 
2004 
Won 23.16% of all Flemish votes in European parliamentary 
elections 
  2004 3 candidates elected to European Parliament   
  2005 
Commanded support from 17.9% of the electorate in Flanders 
region 
    2005 
Commanded support from 30% of the electorate in 
Antwerp  
Denmark 
Danish 
People's 
Party 
Jun-
99 Won 5.8% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections  
  2001 Won 12% of the vote in Danish national elections   
  2004 Won 6.8% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections  
  2004 1 candidate elected to European Parliament   
    2005 
Controls 22 national parliamentary seats and is 3rd largest 
party in Denmark 
Finland 
True 
Finns 1995 Formation of True Finns     
  2003 
Party member and former wrestler Tony Halme won 40% of 
party's entire vote in general election 
    2005 
Occupies 3 seats in Finnish parliament, representing 1.7% of 
national vote 
France 
Front 
National Apr-02 Won 17.9% of the vote in national presidential elections  
  Jun/02 Won 11.1% of the vote in the general election   
  2004 
Won 9.81% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections  
  2004 7 candidates elected to European Parliament   
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Table 1.2 (continued)       
Germany 
National 
Democratic 
Party, 
Mar-
96
Republican Party won 9% of the votes in in Baden-
Wurttemburg regional election 
 
German 
People's 
Union, 
Apr-
98
German People's Union won 13.6% of the vote in 
Saxony-Anhalt regional election 
 Republicans 2001
Federal government appealed to Constitutional 
Court for National Democratic Party to be outlawed 
  2003 Court rejected this request 
  2004
National Democratic Party won 0.9% of the vote in 
European Parliamentary elections 
    2004
Republican Party won 1.9% of the vote in European 
Parliamentary elections 
Greece 
Golden 
Dawn 
Movement, 1999
Front Line party formed, led by Holocaust denier 
Kostas Plevris 
 
Hellenic 
Front 
Oct-
02
Hellenic Front won 1.5% of the vote in municipal 
and prefecture elections, the highest for a 
nationalist party in 20 years 
    2004
Golden Dawn alliance won 0.17% of the vote in 
European Parliamentary elections 
Italy 
National 
Alliance, 
Mar- 
Dec 
1994 
National Alliance is part of Berlusconi's first 
coalition government 
 
Northern 
League 
Apr-
95
National Alliance won 14.1% of the vote in regional 
elections 
  
Jun-
99
Fascist candidates received 16.9% of the vote in 
European elections  
  2001
National Alliance won 12% of the vote in general 
elections, forming part of Berlusconi's coalition 
government 
  2004
National Alliance won 11.5% of the vote in 
European Parliamentary elections 
    2004 9 candidates elected to European Parliament 
Netherlands 
List Pim 
Fortuyn 
2001-
2002 
Rise of Fortuyn's anti-Islamic, anti-refugee 
movement 
   
After Fortuyn's assassination, List Pim Fortuyn 
entered parliament at its first attempt 
   
List Pim Fortuyn became part of coalition 
government 
  
Jan-
03
List Pim Fortuyn lost all but 8 of its 26 seats in 
regional election 
    2004
Won 2.6% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
Portugal 
Popular 
Party 
Mar-
02 Won 8.75% of the vote in general election 
    2005
Occupied 14 seats in 230-seat parliament and was 
a junior party in Portuguese coalition government 
Spain 
Independent 
Liberal 
Group, 
Jan-
03 Frente Espanol founded, a new fascist party 
 
Frente 
Espanol 2004
Frente Espanol won 0.09% of the vote in European 
Parliamentary elections 
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Table 1.2 (continued)         
Sweden 
Sweden 
Democrats, 
Sep- 
02 
Sweden Democrats won 1.4% of the vote in general 
election 
 National Democrats They also won 50 seats on local councils 
   
National Democrats polled 4,000 votes in ballot for 
national parliament 
   
They also polled 7,000 local council votes across 
Sweden 
  2004
Sweden Democrats won 1.13% of the vote in European 
Parliamentary elections 
    2004
National Democrats won 0.29% of the vote in European 
Parliamentary elections 
UK 
British National 
Party 2004
Won 4.9% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
Hungary 
Life and Justice 
Party 2004
Won 2.35% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
Latvia 
For Fatherland 
and Freedom 2004
Won 29.82% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
    2004 4 candidates elected to European Parliament 
Malta Imperium Europa 2004
Won .59% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
Poland 
League of Polish 
Families 2004
Won 15.92% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
  2004 1 candidate elected to European Parliament 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovak National 
Party 2004
Won 2.01% of the vote in European Parliamentary 
elections 
Slovenia 
Slovene 
Democratic Party, 2004
New Slovenia won 23% of the vote in European 
Parliamentary elections 
 New Slovenia 2004 1 candidate elected to European Parliament 
  2004
Slovene Democratic Party won 17% of the vote in 
European Parliamentary elections 
    2004 1 candidate elected to European Parliament 
Sources: www.united.non-profit.nl, www.cre.gov.uk, www.bbcnews.co.uk, 
www.stopthebnp.org.uk, www.osce.org, various government websites. 
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Table 1.3           
Asylum Applications to Europe by Country of Origin, 2005 
  
Russia 
2005 
Serbia & 
Mont. 
2005 
Iraq  
2005 
Turkey 
2005 
China 
2005 
 Iran 
2005 
Nigeria  
2005 
Afghan
istan 
2005 
Pakist
an 
2005 
Haiti 
2005     
Austria 3,004 2,917 392 762 391 230 680 682 343        0     
Belgium 1,000 972 1034 310 165 366 83 187 173 0     
Bulgaria 7 0 44 5 0 5 0 305 31 0     
Croatia 10 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0     
Cyprus 313 0 594 176 184 497 5 51 425 0     
Czech Rep. 203 15 28 21 259 0 64 0 0 0     
Denmark 109 234 282 33 50 90 44 110 38 0     
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     
Finland 168 343 252 70 19 69 51 170 0 0     
France 2,236 3,047 169 3427 2,224 73 831 100 422 4,359     
Germany 1,268 3,671 2005 2178 453 673 403 511 397 0     
Greece 311 0 822 98 214 130 301 324 880 0     
Hungary 26 189 26 50 117 12 64 10 38 0     
Ireland 37 13 137 0 67 93 1038 116 49 0     
Latvia 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     
Lichtenstein 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     
Lithuania 61 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0     
Luxembourg 45 164 35 0 0 35 31 0 0 0     
Malta 0 8 17 5 0 0 43 0 8 0     
Netherlands 182 191 1312 207 255 343 98 592 49 0     
Norway 411 369 619 84 28 196 49 366 17 0     
Poland 3,448 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 33 0     
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0     
Romania 0 0 98 40 33 23 6 0 16 0     
Slovakia 721 25 23 20 179 0 5 81 127 0     
Slovenia 0 423 5 181 0 0 194 0 9 0     
Spain 91 39 45 14 5 18 397 0 0 0     
Sweden 752 2,140 1810 309 111 345 338 332 48 0     
United 
Kingdom 135 145 3955 740 1,280 2560 570 1210 1770 0 
    
Total 14,543 14,920 13710 8737 6,034 5758 5323 5147 4878 4,359     
Source: UNHCR Statistics 2005.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Focus on Migrant Inclusion 
 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS MIGRANT INCLUSION? 
Traditionally, states conceptualize policies that deal with migration in one of two areas: 
immigration control or immigrant integration. Whereas the former addresses admission into the 
country, including who and how many are granted the right of entrance, the latter deals with 
incorporating the migrants already living in the country and thus addresses citizenship and 
naturalization issues (see Money 1999). I use migrant inclusion as a concept that incorporates 
both of these policy areas, among others.  
Migrant inclusion is broad enough to deal not only with issues of how many and who 
may enter the country, and the requirements for attaining citizenship, but also with the practical, 
day-to-day issues that affect migrants’ level of rights or quality of life, such as access to housing, 
health care issues, language acquisition, employment, education, and fighting intolerance and 
discrimination. Thus, the concept applies to organizations whose work involves legal issues (e.g., 
facilitating immigration procedures, naturalization requirements, work permits, voting issues, 
etc.) as well as quality of life or cultural adjustment issues (e.g., learning the national customs and 
language, psychological adjustment, health care, fighting discrimination, etc.). At the same time, 
the concept of migrant inclusion is narrow enough to exclude those organizations whose main 
interests do not touch upon migrant- or migration-related issues. This serves the function of 
incorporating a broad and diverse sample of organizations that address a variety of policy issues.       
 In addition, this dissertation conceptualizes migrant inclusion organizations as social 
movement actors, complementing the body of literature that uses the social movement framework 
for analyzing the politics of migration and ethnic relations (Guiraudon 2001; Koopmans et al. 
2005; Koopmans and Statham 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Statham 1999). 
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Social movement organizations are distinct from traditional interest groups in that they espouse 
quality of life issues (Inglehart 1997), such as improving the environment and women’s rights, as 
opposed to traditional economic issues that concern business associations and labor unions. As 
migrant inclusion groups address policy issues that deal with rights acquisition, solidarity, and 
life quality concerns (as discussed above), they fall under the rubric of social movement 
organizations. Moreover, some social movement research argues that social movement 
organizations are distinct in that they tend to employ disruptive political tactics as opposed to 
more conventional lobbying strategies, as the media headlines in Chapter 1 illustrate with respect 
to migrant inclusion actors. However, others have challenged this proposition and have found that 
social movement organizations behave much like traditional interest groups in terms of the 
political tactics they employ (Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003).     
 In sum, migrant inclusion is a broad concept used throughout this dissertation to describe 
the types of issues that most concern the groups included in this study. It includes immigration 
control and integration issues, as well as rights acquisition and cultural adjustment issues. Further, 
migrant inclusion organizations are social movement actors mainly because of the nature of the 
issues they espouse. Rather than focusing on economic or business concerns, these groups devote 
their attention to solidarity and quality of life among other issues. The tactics they use to address 
these concerns are an empirical issue that this dissertation will address.   
ESTABLISHING THE TOPIC 
This study is concerned with the patterns and determinants of political behavior of the migrant 
inclusion movement not in a specific country or region of Europe, but across the EU as a whole. 
At least three major developments provide the foundation for a focus on migrant inclusion. First, 
changing patterns of international migration over time have created pressures for closer 
cooperation among EU member states in the area of immigration and asylum, prompting the rise 
of movement groups with political claims (for migrant inclusion and exclusion) in this policy 
domain. For example, the migration flows from southern to northern Europe that characterized 
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the 1950s and early 1960s eventually gave way to increasing flows from beyond Europe’s borders 
in the late 1960s and 1970s; at the same time, slower economic growth and rising unemployment 
within the EU sharpened resistance to immigrant labor (Wallace and Wallace 2000). Secondly, in 
the 1980s, tightened controls on immigration coincided with a global rise in the number of 
refugees, which resulted in a surge in the number of asylum-seekers arriving in Western Europe 
(Wallace and Wallace 2000); this increased the public visibility of the migration issue across the 
European Union. Finally, the success of the 1992 internal market program in facilitating the free 
movement of goods across internal borders focused increasing attention on the remaining controls 
on people at the internal frontiers of the EU (Wallace and Wallace 2000).  
Taken together, these developments have prompted some pro-migrant and refugee NGOs 
to contend that the underlying purpose of policy development in the area of immigration is to 
fashion a “Fortress Europe,” virtually excluding certain outsiders from beyond the external 
borders of the EU. As will be explained in subsequent sections, some scholars argue that these 
restrictive tendencies tend to occur at the level of the nation-state in an attempt to maintain 
control over borders. When they do occur at the EU level, they tend to be expressed through 
actors that represent nation-states. Some scholars argue that this provides an incentive for pro-
migrant actors to target EU institutions or take cooperative action with others in the transnational 
sphere as an alternative to national action. This situation, which is related to developments both 
within individual nation-states and the European Union, has created an agenda for pro-migrant 
and refugee groups to become involved in the political process across levels of governance.     
 More recently, from the 2005 suburban riots in France to the church occupations, sit-ins 
and hunger strikes of the early 1990s, immigrant-related issues have received increasing media 
attention as problems of migrant integration come to the fore. Consequently, over the past few 
decades the migrant inclusion movement has developed and expanded throughout virtually every 
EU country. Pro-migrant and refugee organizations undertake a broad range of work on issues 
that affect third country nationals in Europe. Groups attempt to influence policymakers to enact 
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policy reforms to reduce barriers to migrant integration and promote active involvement with the 
host society.  
Despite their proliferation across Europe and lobbying presence in Brussels, however, no 
social movement study has systematically analyzed a broad range of activities and effectiveness 
of pro-migrant and refugee organizations across the EU as a whole. Moreover, previous migrant 
inclusion research has not focused explicitly on both action and effectiveness at various levels of 
governance (Guiraudon 1998; 2003), has tended to emphasize the contentious aspects of migrant 
inclusion or has not fully examined a range of both conventional and challenging political 
strategies (Geddes 1995; 1998; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 2000b), and has not 
systematically explored the full range of theoretical causal factors that could possibly structure 
the action patterns of organized interests in different arenas (Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans and 
Statham 1999b, 2000b). In analyzing the political behavior of pro-migrant and refugee 
organizations, the social movement literature achieves an important step toward greater coherence 
and comparability in understanding a range of social movements. Moreover, we gain a broader 
and more nuanced understanding of the relationships between the factors that mobilize political 
activity, different methods of influence at the domestic and supranational levels, and policy 
effectiveness. Thus, through filling in some of these gaps we may use the migrant inclusion 
movement to expand our theoretical knowledge of social movements. Taken together, the ensuing 
chapters will help to build a more complete, more robust, and more finely tailored understanding 
of social movement behavior. 
WHAT WE KNOW FROM PRIOR RESEARCH 
Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe. In postwar Europe, new immigrants were 
imported in the framework of “guestworker programs” to fill employment demands. The 
intention of the guestworker programs was to bring in new labor, rebuild and expand 
economically, and then return the immigrant laborers to their home countries. However, as 
Massey et al. (1998) has shown, once a migration flow is created it is virtually impossible to stop, 
 22
as inevitably some migrants will choose to remain in the host country and, under international 
human rights law, can send for their families to join them. Ultimately, this results in a 
phenomenon whereby settled and prospective migrants forge connections between the host and 
sending countries, which facilitates future migration and perpetuates a “migration network.” In 
Europe, these networks were created when migrant guestworkers were reunited with their 
families in their new societies but retained extended family and other ties to the home country. 
Ultimately, once a migration network is created, one can expect to observe continued flows from 
sending to receiving societies. Thus, although European governments for a long time refused to 
view their societies as “immigration countries,” these were precisely what were developing over 
time.  
 The first waves of immigrant labor around 1945 came mainly from southern Europe 
toward the industrialized Center-North (Martiniello 1995). From the 1960s onward, Europe also 
experienced colonial, post-colonial, and other migration from beyond Europe. Migration policies 
during this period were largely a part of employment policy and thus failed to anticipate large-
scale settlements of ethnic minorities (Martiniello 1995). Later, in the early- to mid-1970s, the 
zero-immigration doctrine was put into place in many European countries as they officially halted 
the recruitment of new migrant workers from abroad (Martiniello 1995). From the mid-1970s 
until the end of the 1980s, labor migration continued but on a smaller scale, family reunification 
became much more common, Southern Europe began to experience increasing migration, and 
refugee flows into Europe became much more pronounced (Martiniello 1995). During this period, 
immigration policies were fashioned to promote return migration, border controls were 
strengthened, and attention began to shift somewhat toward migrant integration (Wallace and 
Wallace 2000). From 1989 through roughly 2004, Europe witnessed the explosion of the so-
called “asylum crisis,” a sharp rise in illegal immigration, and the association of migration with 
internal security (Martiniello 2005). Policies at this time incorporated de facto restrictions to 
asylum, an emphasis on security and border control to fight illegal immigration, an increase in 
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deportations and expulsions, an increased focus on integration and citizenship policies, and a 
linkage of migration and development policies (Martiniello 2005). At present, although the 
nation-state continues to be the primary actor in migration politics, some scholars have argued 
that Europe’s approach to migration is becoming increasingly supranational with an emphasis on 
the creation of more balanced policies (Martiniello 2005).   
 Besides knowing that migration networks perpetuate continued migration flows, we 
know that migration into most European countries has been increasing over time. This is 
occurring for several reasons and has numerous implications. First, globalization creates 
pressures to migrate. At the most basic level, the media highlight the gap between the world’s 
rich and poor and implant a desire to better one’s standard of living. At the same time, labor 
market structures in both Europe and beyond are such that they create a demand for low-skilled 
labor to fill many types of jobs that native populations refuse to perform; this is particularly acute 
in certain industries such as construction, automobiles, and hospitality (Favell and Hansen 2002). 
Because of this need for labor, many businesses in Europe actively lobby their governments for 
less restrictive immigration control policies (Favell and Hansen 2002). Thus, most migrations 
occur for economic reasons (Martiniello 1995).  
 Research has shown that once pressures associated with supply and demand create a 
migration market, government action that aims to place restrictions on the number of immigrants 
it will allow into its borders, or conditions on the types of migrants it will allow, tends to be 
ineffective (Favell and Hansen 2002). Government attempts to control migration and close off 
avenues for entry prompt prospective migrants to select alternative means of entry which are 
often illegal. Thus, in periods of economic growth or in the face of labor market demand, illegal 
migration tends to persist even when governments enact restrictive migration control policies 
(Hansen et al. 2001). Alternatively, family reunification is another means by which prospective 
migrants can gain entry.      
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 In addition to economics, however, demographic factors play a role in structuring 
increasing migration to Europe. For example, Franco Frattini, the European commissioner for 
justice, security, and freedom, recently drafted a proposal identifying migration as a tool for 
addressing Europe’s labor needs in light of the fact that the populations of many EU countries are 
projected to either fall or grow at a low rate over the next few decades (European Voice 2005). 
The birth rate for many EU countries is currently below the replacement level, meaning that 
parents are not producing enough children to replace them after they die. For example, France has 
one of the highest fertility rates in Western Europe at 1.9 children per woman, yet approximately 
2.1 children per woman is necessary to attain or maintain economic growth (Population 
Reference Bureau 2005). Such low birth rates will likely cause Europe’s workforce, and therefore 
its economies, to shrink (Journal of Employee Assistance 2005). In order to sustain their labor 
force and economies into the future, European countries will likely have no choice but to depend 
on migration to some extent to fill labor market demand.  
Moreover, geographic factors play a role in encouraging migration to Europe. Europe’s 
southern countries, such as Spain and Italy, are situated in close proximity to North Africa, where 
countries such as Algeria and Morocco channel many poor and unskilled migrants into Europe. It 
is not uncommon for prospective migrants to travel from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, 
where they are transported relatively easily (and often illegally) to Europe (EU Observer 2005). 
Moreover, the new member states of Eastern Europe serve as a prospective access point for many 
migrants seeking to make their way to Western Europe where they can earn higher wages. 
In sum, Europe’s guestworker programs, combined with human rights law allowing 
family reunification, started a wide-scale phenomenon of migration in the post-war period. Once 
the first waves of migrants decided to settle permanently in their host countries, migration 
networks served to facilitate more migration, ensuring a virtually continuous flow from the 
sending to receiving societies. Government policies that seek to restrict migration are often futile, 
as migrants tend to find other (often illegal) means of entry. Migration into Europe has thus 
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increased, and is expected to continue increasing over time. Although the nation-state retains a 
stronghold on migration politics, the policy approach to migration in Europe is arguably 
becoming increasingly supranational combined with the search for more balanced policies. 
Globalization and the structure of Europe’s labor markets ensure a steady flow of unskilled 
workers. Moreover, Europe’s low birth rate combined with its geographic proximity to many of 
the major sending countries makes continued migration a virtual certainty.      
Toward a Comparative, Politics-Oriented Paradigm  
The following paragraphs outline a brief synopsis of the main academic traditions of migrant and 
ethnic minority politics spanning the apolitical analyses to the important developments that have 
moved research toward a more comparative, politics-oriented paradigm in the 1990s to the 
MERCI project of the late 1990s-early 2000s. The discussion informs this dissertation’s use of an 
integrative theoretical framework that draws on several social movement approaches.  
 Much of the pre-1990s literature on migration and ethnic relations can be grouped into 
one of three research camps: migration studies and immigration/integration policy approaches, 
migrant associations and collective action, and extreme right politics and intolerance. Whereas 
intolerance is discussed in the following section on the national context, the former two 
approaches are elaborated below. It is surprising that, given their obvious areas of common focus, 
these research traditions have remained largely separate.  
 The focus of research in the migration studies tradition tends to adopt an apolitical 
perspective on the structural, socio-economic, and demographic aspects of migration flows. This 
research often employs statistics from official sources and is frequently used to collect 
information for government bodies. Migrants tend to be viewed as the passive subjects of policies 
for incorporation into the host society. Moreover, it holds that migration patterns are strongly 
determined by economic and demographic trends and cycles such as those of the labor market, 
housing, or education (see Koopmans and Statham 2000b). The social and economic aspects of 
migrant integration in a welfare state perspective tends to constitute the main research focus. In 
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this context, there is little consideration given to non-elite actors or the general political processes 
in which migrants are embedded.   
 Research on migrant political participation and migrant associations attempts to address 
some of these shortcomings by adopting a focus on the relationship between migrants, collective 
action, and the host society. The two main camps in this tradition are the class paradigm, and the 
race/ethnicity paradigm (see Ireland 1994). The class paradigm views ethnicity and race as 
mainly class identities; thus the political participation of migrants is taken as evidence of an 
emergent class consciousness of migrant workers (e.g., Castles and Kosack 1974, 1985; Miles 
1982; Miles and Phizacklea 1977, 1984). This approach moves beyond previous research by 
focusing on the migrants themselves and positing a relational theory that connects them to the 
host society. Yet besides being overly-deterministic, there is little theory on the relationship 
between migrants and the political institutions that affect them. Moreover, any focus on political 
processes is limited to largely descriptive case studies that adopt class as the primary explanation 
for collective action. 
 Although the race/ethnicity paradigm is similar to that of class (see e.g., Rex and 
Tomlinson 1979; Miller 1981, 1982), it takes the ethnic and racial identities of minorities, rather 
than class, as the basis of collective action. In other words, shared experiences of racism and 
discrimination in the host society are presumed to promote and strengthen ethnic and racial 
identities which mobilize collective action independently from class. An important element in this 
perspective is its view of ethnic differences as one basis for societal cleavages. At the same time, 
however, “such approaches have a tendency to replace the socio-economic determinism of class 
by the cultural characteristics of the group itself…as the determinant of behavior,” (Koopmans 
and Statham 2000b). Importantly, this approach also ignores the relationship between migrants 
and the political-institutional framework of the state. In general, both class and race/ethnicity 
approaches fail to systematically relate migrant collective action to the political process. 
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 In contrast to theories of class and ethnicity/race which focus importantly on migrants 
and their collective action, another research tradition forges a more direct link between social 
structure and collective action by emphasizing relative deprivation. This theoretical perspective 
relies on models of socio-economic change and ethnic competition between migrants and the host 
society population to draw conclusions about how occurrences such as urban riots and 
xenophobic violence signal social disintegration (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). According to 
this perspective, migration impacts the economy in such a way as to generate certain pressures 
which create psychological frustrations among the “losers” of globalization processes (Heitmeyer 
et al. 1992). Violent mobilization becomes the response to increasing social inequalities. 
Perceptions of relative deprivation among different ethnic groups are used to explain violence 
over ethnic differences, which is often presented as evidence for a break down of the “social 
order” (Koopmans and Statham 2000b).    
 This type of explanation is often seen in the media and in public debates over riots 
perpetuated by minorities or violent reactions against them. In addition, this approach is quite 
salient in academic and policy responses to race riots and periods of ethnic urban violence 
(Koopmans and Statham 2000b). In addition, it has been widely used in research on extremism, 
influencing much of the literature on xenophobic mobilization and support for extreme right 
political parties. In the work addressing extreme right voting, supporters of the far-right are seen 
as reacting to losses generated by processes of modernization and globalization (see Betz 1994). 
Moreover, some scholars have explained Islamic extremism in Germany, for example, by the 
estrangement of Turkish youth caused by a lack of social integration (Heitmeyer, Schroder, and 
Muller 1997). The same logic serves as the foundation of the “ethnic competition” approach 
which uses perceptions of relative deprivation among white lower classes that must compete with 
migrant labor to explain urban ethnic conflict (Husbands 1994; Olzak 1992; and see Koopmans 
and Statham 2000b).     
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 In short, prior to the 1990s, research on migration and ethnic relations was dominated by 
research focusing on class, race/ethnicity, relative deprivation, and far-right politics. Overall, it 
failed to systematically account for the political process in its explanatory approaches. Moreover, 
class and race/ethnicity theories of collective action are strongly influenced by country-specific 
national integration models, a characteristic which promotes insulation and prevents cross-
national or cross-level comparative learning. 
  By the early 1990s, the migration literature faced several weaknesses. For example, 
research tended to be overly-descriptive with an inward focus on specific nation-states. There was 
a true lack of systematic, cross-national research. As trans-European academic exchanges became 
increasingly popular, the 1990s saw an increase in cross-national research. The first wave of 
scholarship that this produced was largely descriptive edited volumes focusing on the extreme 
right and migration and ethnic relations; it was common for experts from different countries to 
author single-country case studies (on ethnic relations see: Rex and Drury 1994; Wrench and 
Solomos 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Thränhardt and Miles 1995 in relation to 
Europe; on extreme right see Husbands 1994). Cross-national reflection remained quite limited, 
although general theoretical observations did emerge from some of these case studies (e.g., Rex 
1994; Cornelius, Hollified, and Martin 1994) which informed the subsequent group of researchers 
who concerned themselves with fashioning a more systematic comparative research agenda. 
Three main perspectives characterize this emergent agenda: studies of citizenship and 
conceptions of nationhood, political opportunity perspectives, and studies that focus on post-
national and European developments that transcend the nation-state. Whereas the first of these is 
related only tangentially to this dissertation, the latter two perspectives inform its theoretical 
approach and empirical focus. Thus, the political opportunity structure will be discussed further 
in the following two sections, while the post-national and European literature will be discussed in 
the section on the European context.  
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 Before turning to that discussion, however, it is important to detail the recent evolution of 
the migrant inclusion literature to systematic, cross-national comparative research. The 
Mobilisation over Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration (MERCI) project was 
established in 1994 as a collaborative effort between the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), 
the University of Leeds, the University of Geneva and the University of Amsterdam. The MERCI 
project uses newspaper events data to compare the contentious politics of migration and ethnic 
relations in five European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland) over a seven-year (1992-1998) time period. As such, it has produced the first 
systematic, empirical, and comparative body of research on migration politics in Europe. 
Moreover, it is among the first to place migrant inclusion in a social movement and collective 
action theoretical framework.   
 Many important findings have emerged from this research which will be discussed in the 
following sections. For example, pro-migrant actors use many methods to press their claims 
(Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Further, connections among pro-migrant actors are a strong 
characteristic of the movement that facilitates political action in many arenas (e.g., Koopmans 
and Statham 2001). Moreover, the POS of the nation-state plays a strong role in shaping claims-
making (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). Finally, identity is an important factor in claims-making 
that must be accounted for (Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 2001).      
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
That migration is increasing, that the majority of Europe’s migrants are unskilled workers, and 
that government policies to restrict migration often result in more illegal immigration produce 
many tensions at the national level associated with the phenomenon of migration. A persistent 
issue, for example, is that of intolerance. Sniderman et al. (2000), Kitschelt (1997), Gibson and 
Gouws (2000), Maddens et al. (2000), Fetzer (2000), Weldon (2003), Lahav (1997a and 2004), 
Citrin et al. (1997), and Quillian (1995) have all examined intolerance of immigrants by national 
citizens. Taken together, these studies confirm that both economic and cultural factors lead to 
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intolerance. In general, the more economically marginalized the individual, the more susceptible 
they are to intolerance. Thus stems the perception of immigrants as “stealing” the jobs of native 
citizens. Moreover, individuals with a strong national or cultural identity are more prone to 
intolerance. Thus, immigrants also tend to be blamed for rising crime and the loss of cultural 
identity. 
The implications of public intolerance, whether warranted or not, is that it is reinforced 
through the media since it attracts public attention and “sells,” and constrains national 
policymakers in that they are less able to enact open or liberal policies to accommodate market 
demand. Moreover, it leads to increasing support for far-right extremist political parties that 
espouse anti-immigrant platforms. This has been a problem throughout Europe, particularly in 
Austria, Denmark, France, and the Flanders region of Belgium. Overall, tendencies toward 
intolerance are so strong that policymakers cannot ignore them, despite the need to do something 
to counterbalance declining population levels across Europe. If they do, they risk losing power to 
the far-right in many cases. Because of these issues, most pro-migrant and refugee groups that I 
surveyed have an active public relations campaign to target the media and to educate citizens 
about the benefits of migration and living in a diverse society.   
 Related to intolerance is the persistence of slow economic growth and high overall 
unemployment across many European countries. For example, one forecast for 2003 predicted 
that European economies would grow by only 0.5 percent on average, and unemployment would 
remain around 8 percent or 9 percent (The International Herald Tribune 10/31/03). More recent 
data paint a slightly more optimistic picture: the forecast for economic growth in 2006 is 2.1% 
although it decelerated in the first half of 2005, and the unemployment rate remains relatively 
high at over 8.5% due to persistent labor market rigidities (European Commission 2005). 
Unemployment also makes individuals more susceptible to the claims of far-right parties that 
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blame immigrants for national economic problems (Kitschelt 1997). This is evidenced by Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s2 famous phrase: “two million immigrants, two million unemployed.”    
In addition to intolerance, there is a perception among elites that increasing immigration 
signals an erosion of control on the part of the nation-state (see Sassen 1999; Guiraudon and 
Lahav 2000). At a time when goods, services, technology, etc. cross borders freely, national elites 
are more apt to focus attention on maintaining a stronghold on who may enter their borders. 
International human rights norms and the freedom of movement required by a global economy 
and regional markets are two characteristics of a liberal regime that undermine the sovereignty of 
nation-states. Moreover, since 9/11 immigration has increasingly been viewed as an internal 
security issue. From this perspective, it is a matter of national security for elites to maintain 
control over who enters their borders. Thus, states fight hard in order to control matters of 
immigration within their borders. This control is also important to national policymakers who 
seek to counterbalance developments toward the “Europeanization” of migrant integration 
policies.   
That the nation-state remains a strong actor in migration politics, together with the 
increased awareness of the political dimensions of migration, helped to produce a body of 
scholarship emphasizing the political opportunity structure (POS) of the national institutional 
environment. The goal here was to produce systematic research connecting migrants to their 
political-institutional setting. This research tends to use the POS to explain differences in national 
migration policies (e.g., Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Freeman 1992, 1995; Ireland 
1994; Joppke 1997, 1998), the success of extreme right political parties (Kitschelt 1997; 
Koopmans and Statham 1999), and the political participation of migrants at the individual level 
(Ireland 1994). These studies tend to focus on the broad aspects of the POS elaborated by Tarrow 
(1994), and neglect the “issue-specific” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) aspects of the POS most 
                                                 
2 Le Pen is the long-time leader of the extreme right Front National in France, and is also a member of the 
European Parliament.  
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relevant to migrant inclusion. Moreover, research has tended to neglect other important social 
movement theories, such as resource mobilization and organizational identity, in studies of group 
action.     
 The preceding issues suggest, and research confirms, that most politics plays out in the 
national context (see Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Koopmans and Statham 1999b). In 
working to influence policy, groups develop connections with political elites, other policy 
stakeholders, and NGOs both within their country and beyond. Nevertheless, migrant inclusion 
research has tended to focus on transnational and supranational ties at the expense of those at the 
domestic level. For example, Virginie Guiraudon (2001) discusses the activities of a network of 
ethnically specific migrant organizations and how their differences hampered their efforts at the 
EU level. Moreover, pro-migrant lobbies have established an NGO network on European refugee, 
asylum, and immigration policy (Geddes 2000b). Thus, we also know that ties among pro-
migrant groups exist and function at a minimum in the transnational and EU arenas, and possibly 
in the national context as well. In this study, such connections will be used as the basis for 
comparative research not across countries, but across levels of governance.     
 In sum, at the national level certain phenomena associated with migration produce public 
intolerance toward immigrants. Citizens tend to blame immigrants for a range of national 
problems, including unemployment, crime, and the loss of cultural identity. Widespread 
intolerance is reinforced through the media, ties the hands of governments in fashioning more 
inclusive migration policies, and leads to increasing support for extremist parties. Moreover, 
globalization, international norms, and European integration produce a sense of a loss of national 
control over immigration that is made more acute by the national security dimension of 
immigration that has increased since 9/11. These represent formidable obstacles for pro-migrant 
and refugee organizations that seek a more inclusive and less restrictive policy regime. Pro-
migrant interconnectivity exists at various levels and is important in addressing these issues. Over 
time, the POS has emerged as a dominant approach to studying migration politics, but has rarely 
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been applied to a large cross-section of migrant organizations throughout the EU, has neglected to 
examine issue specific opportunities, and has been used at the exclusion of other important social 
movement theories.  
THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
The preceding discussion illustrates an extremely unfavorable national environment for pro-
migrant and refugee NGOs that work for migrant inclusion. Such an environment has led one 
scholar to describe the goals of such groups as “electorally unpopular” (Geddes 1998), and has 
spawned a literature on migrant inclusion organizations that is heavily biased toward the EU and 
transnational levels,3 where opportunities for influence are hypothesized to be more forthcoming.  
 A prominent theme in the literature on migrant inclusion and the EU is the political 
opportunity structure (POS) of the EU. Scholars such as Andrew Geddes (1995, 1998, 2000b) and 
Virginie Guiraudon (1998, 2001, 2003) argue that the POS of the EU affords pro-migrant lobbies 
certain avenues of influence for pressing their claims that do not exist at the national level. For 
example, Guiraudon (2000a) finds that the democratic deficit, or the closed venue of debate at the 
EU level, can lead to more inclusive policies since public opinion is absent from the 
policymaking equation. Geddes (2000b) finds that the structure of EU policymaking provides 
political allies for groups in the Commission and European Parliament in particular. What these 
studies have in common is the assumption that groups will turn to the EU level in the absence of 
opportunities at home, although this is often implicit and never explicitly tested across levels of 
governance.  
 In general, the literature argues that the EU POS may be more open to pro-migrant 
lobbies because of the mission of EU institutions to expand their competencies, or what Cram 
(1997) calls “purposeful opportunism.” This implies that the Commission, Parliament, and 
                                                 
3 Note the contrast with the national-level literature which tends to use the POS to explain differences in 
national immigration policies, support for far-right political parties, and the political participation of 
migrants at the individual level. At the level of the EU, in contrast, literature uses the EU POS to explain 
the activities of specific migrant inclusion organizations or campaigns that operate at the supranational 
level, and neglects to incorporate the national POS as an explanatory factor.  
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European Court of Justice (ECJ), for example, champion migrant inclusion issues not because 
they necessarily favor the issues at hand, but rather because it provides a plausible means of 
expanding their policy jurisdiction relative to the national level. When the ECJ rules on a matter 
of immigration or asylum, for example, it sets a precedent to hear further cases of a similar nature 
and thus expands its competencies in this area. Overall, it is relatively well-established that the 
EU affords migrant inclusion actors opportunities for influence and represents an alternative 
arena for political action.            
 In addition to the many national organizations, pro-migrant lobbies have been particularly 
active at the EU level since the 1990s (Geddes 2000b). Groups such as the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, and the Migration 
Policy Group operate at the level of the EU and receive financial support from the EU. This 
implies that there are likely important resource differentials between these “Eurogroups” and 
those at the national level. However, because the existing research is heavily biased toward POS 
explanations, it has failed to account for how resource differentials may affect political action and 
effectiveness. At the same time, European pro-migrant lobbies are small compared to other types 
of interest groups, such as women’s, consumers, and environmentalists. Geddes (2000b) points 
out that the “one door, four doorbells” problem highlights this predicament. Behind one door in a 
Brussels office building one can easily find four pro-migrant organizations. It is common for staff 
to perform activities across organizations (Geddes 2000b), which again highlights the important 
function that connections among pro-migrant interest groups likely play.   
  In sum, at the EU level the focus of research has been on the POS, and the avenues for 
influence it affords pro-migrant actors, to the exclusion of other relevant theoretical explanations. 
Both the democratic deficit and the logic of “purposeful opportunism” can structure an 
environment for more favorable policies. Moreover, there are many pro-migrant lobbies 
organized at the EU level. These bodies are funded by the EU, thereby creating resource 
differentials between local and national groups on the one hand, and EU groups on the other. 
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However, staff is in short supply, creating a disadvantage compared to more established interest 
groups and underscoring the importance of interconnectedness.  
WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW FROM PRIOR RESEARCH 
 Although cross-national studies are now more common, the literature on migration and migrant 
inclusion is replete with assumptions and hypotheses that have yet to be empirically tested. This 
is particularly the case with respect to the literature on migrant inclusion interest groups, as very 
little empirical research exists on this topic. The research that does exist tends to be case studies 
of EU-level or ethnically specific organizations which, while important, cannot be used to 
generalize across a range of organizations, countries, or levels of governance. Thus, we are left 
with many unknown factors about organizations that comprise the migrant inclusion movement 
and their political activities across the EU as a whole. 
 Although we do know from the more qualitative studies that migrant inclusion groups 
work on a range of issues and policy concerns (Geddes 1998, 2000b), we do not know precisely 
which political activities the movement as a whole utilizes, and in what combinations, to address 
its concerns. In addition, although the more recent literature that has come out of the MERCI 
project has gone a long way toward documenting the political activities of migrants, the dataset 
explicitly does not document lobbying, an important tactic of organized pro-migrant interests, and 
only includes data from five countries, all of which are in Western Europe. When we include a 
broader sample of groups from across the entire EU, can they be expected to rely mainly on 
protest, as some social movement theorists and media reports suggest should be the case?  
Moreover, we know from qualitative research that these organizations act in different 
arenas, including not only the national level but also across countries in transnational 
arrangements (Danese 1998) and at the level of the EU (Geddes 1995; Guiraudon 2001, 2003), 
but we do not know if their methods of influence differ at various levels of governance. For 
example, does the structure of national versus EU policymaking encourage the use of certain 
activities over others? In addition, the MERCI project, among other research, has shown that 
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migrant inclusion groups are strongly connected to other actors. However, it remains unknown 
what these group ties look like, how strong they are, whether they differ at the national versus the 
transnational or EU levels, and what effects they have on the choice of political activity or the 
arena in which activity is undertaken. Moreover, among pro-migrant and refugee groups, we do 
not know what proportion of overall activity networking activities account for. Although the 
literature treats these ties as important, it fails to fully investigate their characteristics, scope, and 
effects.  
By nature of its design, this study can answer these questions by employing a survey 
instrument. The survey is useful in that it can be used to systematically obtain information 
directly from the groups involved, and can be administered to a large number of groups. 
Moreover, it allows for groups in different countries and of varying types to provide information 
on the same structured questions. It can thus correct for the some of the shortcomings of event 
data analysis by asking groups about their lobbying activities (which the MERCI data excludes) 
and a range of other types of behavior. Newspaper data is not useful in examining a wide range of 
both conventional and contentious activity because reports are biased toward claims-making that 
occurs in the public sphere. For this reason, prior research has been unable to examine lobbying 
activity as well as less public activity that occurs at the local level, for example. The survey 
corrects for this by asking groups about their actual use of a wide range of political activities, 
both conventional and challenging. It also asks them to report on a variety of activities and their 
effectiveness at various levels of governance, spanning the local, national, transnational, and EU 
levels. Furthermore, an entire section of the questionnaire is devoted to asking groups about their 
actor connectivity (whom do they consistently ally with and how strong are these alliances) and 
their networking activities (what cooperative actions do they take with others) at each level of 
governance. This study uses statistical techniques to assess patterns of overall activity and 
effectiveness across levels of governance.     
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 Besides these descriptive traits, there is an extreme dearth of knowledge when it comes to 
causal relationships among various factors, as no statistical studies exist on the activities of 
organized migrant inclusion interests as an EU-wide movement. Those cross-national studies that 
do exist tend to examine migrant political actors in a handful of Western European countries, are 
biased toward more contentious forms of activity, are biased toward POS approaches, and do not 
focus predominantly on organized interests (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2000c, 2001b; Kriesi et 
al. 1995). Thus, although studies have shown that these groups act at various levels of governance 
including the EU to press their claims, we do not know what factors besides the POS influence 
different political methods at different levels of governance. It is one thing to state that migrant 
inclusion interests lobby the EU, but it is another to provide empirical evidence about the range of 
factors that increase or decrease lobbying the European Parliament, Commission, Council of 
Ministers, contacts with the Economic and Social Committee, etc. Moreover, although existing 
research emphasizes that groups have a choice when it comes to the arena in which they act, and 
that the EU represents an alternative arena for influence, it has not shown under what conditions 
migrant inclusion groups will shift the focus of their efforts from the national level and act at the 
level of the EU or the transnational level.  
This study can address these shortcomings. Again, the survey instrument allows data 
collection on numerous types of political activities in both the national and EU arenas. The 
relationships among these variables are then analyzed using statistical techniques, making causal 
inference possible. For example, the survey data allow the construction of a variable that 
measures activity targeted at the national versus the EU level. Binary logistic regression 
techniques can then be used to assess the factors that cause groups to shift their attention from the 
national to the EU level. This clearly goes beyond the existing research that simply focuses on 
activity in one arena or the other.   
 Despite the heavy bias toward POS-oriented research, some studies on migrant inclusion 
organizations implicitly assume that resources enable political activity. Geddes (2000b), for 
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example, discusses resources that EU-level groups enjoy being funded by the EU. In addition, the 
MERCI project confirms the importance of a multi-dimensional approach to studying social 
movements that includes resource mobilization. However, this has never been empirically tested 
while controlling for the effects of other factors, such as the identity of the group. Moreover, 
although resource mobilization theory claims that the source of an organization’s resources is 
important in shaping its activity, it remains unknown whether EU funding encourages certain 
methods of political influence while discouraging others, or if it increases policy effectiveness. If 
EU-funded groups are no more active or effective than other organizations, we can question the 
value added of EU administered grants. By using the survey to directly ask groups about their 
sources of funding and other resources, this study can deliver an answer to the question of 
whether and how much resources matter, and whether EU funding shapes certain political 
strategies, particularly when other factors such as the political-institutional environment are 
controlled.   
 In addition, as mentioned earlier, virtually every recent study of migrant inclusion interest 
groups discusses interconnectivity among actors, and assumes that these ties are important in 
facilitating political action and effectiveness. For example, a platform of EU-level groups was 
successful in influencing the Commission on numerous occasions (Guiraudon 2001; Geddes 
1998, 2000b). Other types of connections have been successful with the European Court of 
Justice (Guiraudon 1998). Yet few, if any, studies examine connectivity among actors within the 
nation-state, where most political activity takes place. Beyond lacking basic descriptive data on 
organizational ties, their effects are never empirically tested due to the small-N nature of this 
body of research. Thus, we do not know how ties among migrant inclusion work, if EU and 
transnational ties are the most important, or if national ties also impact activity and effectiveness 
and how they might do so. This study can address these issues by using a survey instrument to 
directly ask groups about their connections with a range of actors. Moreover, statistical 
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techniques are applied in order to assess the causal effects of interconnectedness on various 
methods of influence across multiple levels of governance.      
 Finally, existing research is heavily biased toward examining ethnically specific, Western 
European, or EU-level migrant organizations. This causes numerous problems when it comes to 
making inferences and generalizations, as one cannot be sure if the findings of such studies are 
applicable beyond those types of organizations. By adopting a broad focus on migrant inclusion 
actors across the EU as a whole, this study is able to include a wide variety of organizations that 
function at the national, international, and EU levels and address multiple policy concerns. 
Because the sample is relatively large and diverse, I can analyze different dimensions of migrant 
inclusion identity and use statistical techniques to assess the causal effects of identity on action 
and effectiveness.   
 In sum, the existing body of research on migrant inclusion organizations has numerous 
shortcomings when it comes to making causal inferences or generalizations about the movement 
as a whole. These include: a small N or case study approach, implicit assumptions, untested 
propositions, a biased sample and a single theoretical approach. This study is well-positioned to 
address each of these shortcomings by: using a survey instrument to directly ask groups many 
questions about their political activities and policy effectiveness, asking about (and thus 
collecting data on) multiple methods of influence including both conventional and challenging 
tactics, including a wide range of groups in the sample from all regions of Europe that vary on 
numerous characteristics, and employing a range of descriptive and, more importantly, inferential 
statistical techniques to assess patterns and address issues of causal inference. Thus, this study 
will add to existing research by answering many of the questions that have heretofore remained 
implicit or unknown. The following chapter expands upon this discussion of migrant inclusion 
groups as social movement organizations by explaining the theoretical arguments and 
propositions that the empirical chapters will test with the survey data.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Actor Connectivity and Social Movement Theory 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the European migrant inclusion movement’s political behavior and political 
effectiveness. As such, it is situated in the tradition of more recent new social movement 
literature in that it relies on an integrative theoretical model to explain cross-national and cross-
level activity and effectiveness of pro-migrant actors across Europe. For example, it asks: What 
do the broad patterns of migrant inclusion political action look like across Europe as a whole at 
different levels of governance? More relevantly, which factors best predict participation in and 
effectiveness of each political tactic at each level? What factors prompt migrant inclusion actors 
to shift the arena of activity from one level to another? In addressing these research questions, 
this study integrates and builds on aspects of various theoretical approaches to studying social 
movements.  
Early studies of social movement behavior often relied on a single theoretical paradigm. 
For example, throughout the 1970s and 80s, much research was driven by New Social Movement 
(NSM) theory (Dalton 1994: 5-6). This view argues that the new social movements that emerged 
in the 1960s, such as the women’s, environmental, and peace movements, are unique in that their 
participants are not defined by class boundaries but by a common concern over social issues 
(Pichardo 1997). These concerns typify a set of values and ideologies that have been linked to 
other new social movements. NSMs are characterized by their ideological opposition to the 
established political order, presumably leading them to employ disruptive tactics over other, more 
conventional, means of influence. Thus, the NSM approach suggests that the challenging identity 
of social movements is the driving force behind their contentious political behavior.   
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In the 1990s, however, scholarship began to reflect the view that the NSM approach 
alone is analytically incomplete. With its narrow focus on contentious behavior, it ignores the 
possibility that social movement organizations (SMOs) employ a range of political tactics. For 
example, many studies that examine a wide scope of action including not only confrontational 
behavior but more conventional methods as well have shown that social movements tend to 
behave similar to other organized interest groups in that, for the most part, their tactics reflect 
efforts to work inside established political channels and employ conventional strategies to effect 
change (e.g., Dalton 1994; Dalton et. al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Protest, in 
contrast, is generally a relatively minor part of a movement’s overall political strategy. This 
tendency broadly holds for the migrant inclusion movement in certain Western European 
countries as well, in that actors have been shown to use the media extensively in addition to more 
contentious forms of action (Koopmans and Statham 1999b).  
Even if the identity of an SMO leads it to rely on contentious tactics, this fact alone may 
not indicate the absence of more conventional methods of influence because the underlying 
sources of action may be varied. In this view, an organization’s tactics may not depend solely on 
its NSM identity, but also on other group characteristics and exogenous factors. For example, a 
host of factors beyond those emphasized by NSM theory have been shown to influence the 
likelihood of conventional versus challenging tactics, such as group resources and the structure of 
political opportunities that movements face (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994).  
Thus, over the past decade NSM scholarship has increasingly relied on an integrative 
approach that incorporates various theoretical explanations of movement activity and success 
(McAdam et al. 1996, and see Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001; Tarrow 1994; for the migrant inclusion movement see Koopmans and Statham 2001). At a 
minimum, such an integrative approach incorporates dimensions of the group identity, resource 
mobilization, and political opportunity structure paradigms. Studies have found that an integrative 
approach performs quite well in explaining variation in the types of political tactics used by social 
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movement groups (Dalton 1994; Dalton et. al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Koopmans 
and Statham 2001), although relatively few, if any, studies have used it to explain political 
effectiveness of SMO actors.  
  In developing an integrative approach, a unique contribution of this study is its treatment 
of “actor connectivity” as an explanation of movement behavior and effectiveness. 
Interconnectedness among actors in the movement can be thought of as a more enduring form of 
alliance patterns conceptualized as sustained relationships or ties with other policy actors, 
including other NSM organizations, business associations, labor unions, and EU-level groups that 
I argue facilitate political action as opposed to more isolated pro-migrant organizations. For a 
given group, ties can exist at the domestic, international, and/or European levels. Actor 
connectivity is measured by the strength or intensity of ties with specific actors. Although a good 
portion of both the social movement and migrant inclusion literatures underscore the importance 
of alliances and group ties to SMO behavior, research has yet to systematically assess how 
connections among organized migrant inclusion actors are structured and how they affect political 
activity and effectiveness. This study is the first to use data from pro-migrant and refugee 
organizations to systematically address these questions.   
In addition to group ties, the integrative approach incorporates and builds on more 
traditional social movement theories, such as the political opportunity structure (POS). Its basic 
premise is that a country’s political-institutional context enhances or inhibits the prospects for 
mobilization, and thus influences the type of action employed (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; 
McAdam et al. 1996; Rucht 1996; Guiraudon 2001). In migrant inclusion studies, POS has been 
the dominant approach (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2000b, 1999b; 
Geddes 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; Danese 1998). Yet besides not giving other theoretical factors 
due attention, these studies tend to focus strictly on the broad aspects of the POS elaborated by 
Tarrow (1994), and ignore the “issue-specific” opportunities most relevant to a given movement 
(see Meyer and Minkoff 2004). An innovative aspect of this study is its attempt to refine the POS 
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concept by examining not only the traditional broad aspects, but also the issue-specific “policy 
context” specific to the migrant inclusion movement. Incorporating both of these elements 
constitutes a more robust test of how the POS structures political behavior.  
Another theoretical approach focuses on group identity. In contrast to the institutional 
focus of the POS, social movement researchers such as Zald (2000) and Dalton (1994) have 
employed the framework of ideologically structured action, an argument which centers on an 
organization’s political values to explain behavior. The few studies of migrant inclusion actors 
that control for identity at all tend to focus on the individual ethnic identity of the migrant, rather 
than organizational identity (e.g., Statham 1999). This raises several problems which I discuss in 
greater detail below. This study addresses gaps in group identity research by being the first to 
systematically explore the ideological dimensions of pro-migrant and refugee organizations, 
conceptualizing and providing evidence for three distinct types: political/legal, services/care-
giving, and asylum.  
Resource Mobilization (RM) represents the final social movement theory. RM theory not 
only argues that an organization’s resources structure its behavior patterns (McCarthy and Zald 
1977, 1987), but also that the sources of those resources play a role in structuring action (Lowe 
and Goyder 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Despite their significance and the importance 
ascribed to integrative models, no study of the migrant inclusion movement has systematically 
tested the effects of an organization’s resources, or the source of those resources, on action and 
effectiveness. For example, although many pro-migrant groups receive EU funding, its effect on 
movement behavior has never been assessed. To test RM theory in the context of the migrant 
inclusion movement, this analysis examines how the resources that any group controls, as well as 
the supranational source of those resources, relate to patterns of action and political effectiveness. 
 Beyond integrating actor connectivity and building on the more traditional theoretical 
arguments, a novel aspect of this study is its focus on political behavior across levels of 
governance. While the MERCI project has collected newspaper events data on pro-migrant 
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activities at different levels, it focuses on a handful of Western European countries and virtually 
ignores the local level (Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Moreover, subsequent research has not 
employed statistical techniques to assess the factors that drive groups to bypass one level for 
another. This study corrects for this by adopting a large and broad sample, and asking: How is 
group action structured at the local, national, transnational, and supranational levels? Which 
factors prompt groups to move beyond their nation-states to target other levels? Although many 
social movement analyses focus on a single level, this research attempts to expand this analytical 
focus by examining movement behavior from the local to the supranational domains.  
Finally, a major contribution of this study is its focus on a broad range of migrant 
inclusion organizations across all regions of the EU. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
migrant inclusion research has become more systematic and explicitly comparative over the past 
decade. However, research is still biased toward actors in Western Europe rather than across the 
EU as a whole, and does not focus on a broad range of organizational actors. In studying the 
behavior of pro-migrant organizations and considering the evidence of this study with that of 
other social movement research, we can begin to assess which aspects of social movement theory 
can be applicable across different contexts. These steps will allow us to build fuller, more robust, 
and more finely tailored explanations of movement behavior. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT BEHAVIOR 
In integrating the possible explanations for social movement behavior into a single model, I begin 
by discussing actor connectivity, which, although theoretically important, has received scant 
empirical attention in social movement research. Following this, I elaborate on the more 
traditional approaches (e.g., the POS, identity and resources), discussing their contributions and 
unresolved shortcomings, and how this study will address them.  
Actor Connectivity: What Is It and Why Is It Important? 
Actor connectivity, or group ties, is a concept that reflects specific actors with whom an 
organization is connected through regular interactions, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (more on 
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Figure 3.1 follows), and thus serves as a measure of “interconnectedness” to other actors in the 
movement. Similarly, Klandermans (1990) refers to interconnectivity as ties and consistent 
interactions that link organizations to other social and political actors. These other social and 
political actors are tied to the migrant inclusion movement through their relationships with pro-
migrant and refugee NGOs.  
Charles Tilly (1978) argues that such ties can be valuable in developing and maintaining 
a movement. For example, business associations, labor unions, and other social groups can 
contribute finances, personnel, expertise, and the basis for collaboration. Further, ties with 
strategic actors can create a platform for the exercise of political influence by connecting 
organizations to potential affiliates and allies within the political establishment. Thus, actor 
connectivity can exist at the domestic, international, and/or European levels, and potentially 
impact participation in different political activities and their effectiveness.  
Organizations may opt to form ties in order to more effectively challenge the political 
establishment. Charles Tilly (1978), for instance, argues that citizens’ groups which may have 
little in common have a tendency to band together to confront the political status quo. Thus, pro-
migrant and refugee organizations may establish links with environmental, women’s, or human 
rights groups, since each of these movements shares a common critique of the established 
political order. Other pro-migrant and refugee organizations are also important potential partners 
since the movement’s expansion over the last few decades has increased the potential resource 
base for action (see Chapter 4). Thus, the potential for the formation of group ties exists; there are 
good reasons for SMOs to target a variety of actors. 
What We Know about Interconnectedness 
The literatures on new social movements and migrant inclusion emphasize the importance of 
interconnectedness and alliances to SMO behavior (e.g., Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 
2002; Dalton et al. 2003; Ward and Williams 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999; Risse-Kappen 
1995; Diani 1995; Guiraudon 1998). Theory, therefore, tells us much about the ways that specific 
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ties may encourage political behavior. At the individual level, for example, social movement 
participants maintain ties to labor unions, churches, political parties, other groups, etc. These 
multiple attachments establish a connection between the social movement and these other actors. 
Research has shown that personal affiliations are important when it comes to mobilizing new 
participants and influencing the behavior of individual members (Klandermans et al. 1988). Other 
scholars have shown that adherents of a given movement tend to overlap considerably with 
supporters of other movements (Kaase 1990; Kriesi 1988; Kitschelt 1989). Although the multiple 
connections that have been shown to influence behavior were originally applied to the individual 
level, the same logic can be applied to the group level as well.   
At the group level, actor connectivity performs several functions that may serve to 
mobilize political action and increase the efficacy of that action. First, by definition, it connects 
groups to one another and, secondly, by doing so increases exposure to different perspectives on a 
given issue, deepening understanding of a given policy problem. Thus, group ties can facilitate 
dialogue, discussion, and ultimately common action (Danese 1998; Karim 1999). This is likely to 
occur if a group’s connections are not only extensive, but also diverse in that they include a range 
of different policy actors.4 Thus, extensive patterns of connectivity that include a diversity of 
actors may not only increase the overall political activity of groups simply by providing more 
opportunities for action, but the fact that groups are exposed to a range of viewpoints on an issue 
may also serve to diversify their tactics (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Beja Horta 2002). For 
instance, expanding one’s ties to include business and labor may result in the group not only 
engaging in protest or media campaigns, as many SMOs do, but also lobbying specific actors in 
the national government. In general, then, we can expect that the more allies an SMO has, the 
more likely it becomes that it will be called upon by others to act, or will itself call upon others to 
act.  
                                                 
4 In contrast, narrow connection patterns with a single type of actor are not likely to expose groups to 
varying perspectives and may instead promote “groupthink.” 
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In general, then, an SMO’s level of activity and effectiveness should be related to its 
degree of connectedness to a range of other movement actors. In contrast, groups with few or no 
connections may be afforded fewer opportunities to act in different venues, and may find it harder 
to mobilize. Isolation raises the costs of collecting information, and makes resource constraints 
more acute. The absence of ties may thus increase the costs of action.    
Relatedly, groups may strategically develop their ties in order to pool resources to better 
influence political action. In this sense, “alliances within the movement may create a support 
network that single groups can draw upon,” (Dalton 1994: 168). Thus, interconnectedness can 
facilitate organization and mobilization by providing a venue that links actors to one another 
(versus single groups that need to find one another to mobilize), and can increase action of many 
types by expanding the opportunities to act and by expanding groups’ perspectives on a given 
issue. Finally, group ties can also impact movement success. One scholar writes “the importance 
of alliance patterns is illustrated by research indicating that the number of organizational allies 
supporting an SMO is a significant predictor of success,” (Dalton 1994: 151 in reference to 
Gamson 1975; Steedly and Foley 1979; Turk and Zucker 1984).  
 In addition, interconnectedness can prompt groups to expand their political tactics beyond 
the national level. If allies for pro-migrant forces are scarce at the national level, an alternative 
strategy is to build alliances with actors in other countries or levels of governance. Keck and 
Sikkink (1998), for example, find the emergence of transnational policy networks as a response to 
closed national environments. In addition, much migrant inclusion research has examined 
transnational (Kastoryano 1998, Beja Horta 2000; Danese 1998; Guiraudon 2001; Karim 1999) 
and supranational (Geddes 1998, 2000b) networks. Of these connections, one scholar writes that 
they “assist the activists in working out strategies that reach beyond state systems,” (Kastoryano 
1998: 8). Thus, as migrant inclusion actors expand their range of connectivity to include actors 
from beyond the home country, one might expect their political activity to shift from the national 
to other levels as well.    
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 In sum, scholarship has shown that interconnectedness is important to movement 
behavior and effectiveness in many ways. The diverse ties that individuals maintain forge a 
connection with the social movement and serve as a mobilizing influence. At the group level, ties 
connect groups to one another and other policy actors, expose groups to different perspectives, 
engender discussion, and ultimately facilitate common action. In connecting groups to others, 
organizational ties increase the opportunities for action and mobilize activity by creating a 
common basis of support. Links with actors outside of the group’s home country can serve to 
mobilize activity at the transnational and EU levels.      
What We Do Not Know about Interconnectedness 
Although a rich theoretical literature exists on alliances and connections among groups, very little 
empirical research has been done on how this affects SMOs. As discussed above, much of the 
research that analyzes group ties in the migrant inclusion movement either tends to be case 
studies or is biased toward analyses of transnational or EU networks at the expense of those at the 
domestic level. Thus, we know very little about groups’ connections at the national level. 
Moreover, the small-N nature of the case study research makes it impossible to assess the effects 
of group ties on movement activity and effectiveness while systematically controlling for other 
factors.  
Other SMO research tends to treat the activities of networks as the dependent variable to 
be explained (Guiraudon 1998, 2000a, 2001; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider 
and Dalton 2002). Thus, although these studies tell us a great deal about the factors that shape 
networking activity, we do not know how connections with other actors impact overall political 
activity. In addition, we do not know how this might vary at different levels of governance. In 
short, no study has systematically evaluated how connections with a range of other policy 
stakeholders structure an SMO’s choice of tactics or its political effectiveness.  
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Figure 3.1 outlines the theoretical argument relating connections with specific actors to 
certain types of activity and effectiveness.5 It begins with an organization, which can create links 
with other SMOs, business associations, labor unions, and EU groups. First, in the national arena, 
links with other SMOs are expected to mobilize contentious forms of activity, such as protest and 
court action. This is because these groups are said to embody goals and political values that 
challenge the established order of advanced democracies. Although research has shown that 
contentious action comprises a minor part of SMOs’ political repertoires, strong ties with like-
minded civil society groups may nonetheless encourage the confrontational tactics for which 
social movements are so well-known (Tilly 1978). Regardless of their tactics, SMOs by definition 
are part of a movement to challenge socio-political norms. For example, women’s, 
environmental, peace, and migrant inclusion groups all seek to effect some degree of social or 
political change. Thus, when they band together, the common NSM ideology may dominate, 
which would then be reflected in their political tactics.  
In contrast, as groups expand their national-level ties to include business and labor 
interests, they may be likely to experience a moderation of tactics. This is because in Europe’s 
corporatist system, business and labor share a privileged position with policymakers. These actors 
routinely lobby governments and are formally consulted for the purposes of policy input. Thus, 
business and labor can create a de facto link between pro-migrant groups and policymakers by 
increasing groups’ political connections or at least by channeling their demands to national 
policymakers. With facilitated access to members of the polity, pro-migrant groups have little 
reason to protest. Additionally, as SMOs interact more with business and labor, they may simply 
                                                 
5 I posit in this model that interconnectedness influence activity rather than activity influencing 
interconnectedness. Although the latter relationship is not impossible, I argue that it is improbable and the 
more likely scenario is that connections shape activity patterns among groups. If social movement research 
as a whole (including POS, identity, and resource mobilization research) has shown us anything, it is that 
groups do not act in a vacuum. Rather, groups select activities based on various factors. I argue that group 
ties are one of those factors. In other words, a group is unlikely to choose to lobby the European 
Commission, for example, if it has no contacts with actors at the EU level. Once certain contacts are in 
place, certain activities then become more likely to occur.   
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choose to adopt similar methods of influence. Thus, lobbying and other conventional activities 
should become more common.     
The last set of relationships in Figure 3.1 illustrates that as ties develop beyond the 
domestic sphere, groups likely shift the target of their activities beyond the nation-state. For 
example, connections with an EU-level organization may lead a group to lobby certain EU 
institutions in addition to, or instead of, its national government. Because many EU-level pro-
migrant groups are tied to the Commission, for instance, including them in networks may increase 
the likelihood that organizations will engage in contacts with the Commission. Moreover, 
business and labor are routinely and formally consulted in matters of EU policymaking. 
Connections with business and labor interests across many countries may thus make groups more 
likely to capitalize off of their influence and target the EU.        
 In sum, this study is the first to use data from a survey of pro-migrant and refugee 
organizations to systematically address these questions. The above arguments suggest that 
organizations’ political behavior is closely related to the types of connections they maintain; these 
arguments are empirically tested in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In this study, group ties are measured by 
the strength or intensity of interactions with other SMOs, business associations, labor unions, and 
EU groups at the domestic, transnational, and EU levels. By analyzing information on these 
connections, the following chapters will build theory about how being connected to specific 
policy actors can be expected to shape political behavior. 
Political Opportunity Structures 
The political opportunity structure (POS) approach focuses on factors exogenous to the SMO to 
explain its behavior. Tarrow defines the POS as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to take 
collective action by affecting their expectation of success or failure,” (1994: 85). Thus, the 
structure of political opportunities in the environment in which the SMO operates affects the 
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strategies and methods it chooses to employ, as well as its political effectiveness (McAdam 1982; 
Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 1996).  
 There are certain shortcomings with the existing POS research. First, social movement 
studies are biased toward analyzing the broad aspects of the POS, such as elite alliances, political 
openness, degree of state repression, etc, while ignoring what Meyer and Minkoff (2004) call 
“issue-specific opportunities.” Moreover, migrant inclusion research is heavily biased toward the 
POS of the EU, while very few studies examine how the national POS shapes action. Virtually all 
studies that do analyze issue-specific factors at the national level focus on citizenship to the 
exclusion of other relevant factors. This study is positioned to address these shortcomings by 
examining a range of issue-specific opportunities in addition to the broad POS and theorizing 
how they are likely to affect SMO behavior. Moreover, the analyses focus primarily on the 
national environment as opposed to the EU POS. Each of these is discussed in turn below. 
Issue-Specific Opportunities.  Issue-specific opportunities are important given the fact that 
recent research has attempted to refine the POS concept in response to the criticism that “the 
concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every 
aspect of the social movement environment,” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). To this end, 
Meyer and Minkoff (2004) separate the conceptualization of the POS into broader aspects of the 
political system versus “issue-specific” factors relevant to a particular social movement. Those 
general aspects of the political system are what much of the existing social movement literature 
emphasizes (e.g., Oberschall 1978; Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1989), and typically include such factors 
as the relative openness of the political system to the goals of a social movement, and the 
presence or absence of political allies. In contrast, issue-specific aspects represent those elements 
of the political-institutional environment most likely to affect the movement in question, such as 
federal government action against discrimination against women (Costain 1992) in the case of the 
American women’s movement. This study refers to these “issue-specific” factors as the “policy 
context.”  
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The heart of Meyer and Minkoff’s (2004) argument is that institutional openness can vary 
across social movement issues and constituencies. For example, some movements may mobilize 
in response to certain aspects of system openness or closure, while these same aspects may be 
completely irrelevant for other movements. The activities of the migrant inclusion movement, for 
instance, are unlikely to be affected by environmental regulations, yet would almost certainly be 
influenced by family reunification policy. Analytically, then, it is important to separate the 
broader aspects of system openness from those specific to the migrant inclusion movement.  
The migrant inclusion literature recognizes this to the extent that institutional studies of 
immigrant mobilization and the POS tend to focus either on access to national citizenship (Ireland 
1994; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 1999c, 2001, 2005), or how the POS of the EU shapes 
opportunities for migrant inclusion actors (Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001). However, that 
it is easier and more common for groups to mobilize within their nation-states (see Imig and 
Tarrow 2001) combined with the purported significance of issue-specific opportunities highlights 
a theoretical void in existing research. This gap can be filled by examining how a broad range of 
issue-specific aspects of the domestic environment, in addition to the broad aspects of the POS, 
shape activity, including that which transcends the nation-state.        
To this end, this study uses new data from the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion 
Index to examine five policy areas that comprise the issue-specific POS most relevant to migrants 
and refugees: labor market inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, 
and anti-discrimination. Where this “policy context” is relatively open to migrant inclusion 
interests, one would expect groups to use conventional participation strategies, such as formal 
meetings and lobbying. Such a policy setting affords groups with opportunities to express their 
political interests through traditional national channels, making protest unnecessary. Moreover, it 
suggests that groups have little need to bypass their nation-states in search of a more open POS at 
the EU level.  
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In contrast, societies with more stringent regulations enact de jure and de facto barriers to 
migrant integration. Thus, the POS remains relatively closed where the national policy context is 
more stringent. In such cases groups may resort to challenging tactics or activity that bypasses the 
nation-state as the available options for influence become constrained. EU countries vary widely 
in their policy stringency toward migrant inclusion. The European Civic Citizenship and 
Inclusion Index can thus provide a thorough and robust test of how the issue-specific institutional 
context affects political action. 
Broad Aspects of the POS.  Prior research has shown that those broad aspects of the POS 
elaborated by Tarrow (1994) are also important in shaping movement activity. Thus, they must be 
included if only as controls. Many migrant inclusion studies commonly adopt the POS approach 
in explaining political behavior (e.g., Danese 1998; Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; 
Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b). This body of research has left little doubt that states 
influence political activity. Overall, the POS has been shown to facilitate or constrain certain 
strategies according to the extent to which available access points for influence exist. Two broad 
elements of the POS may be important in explaining the action repertoires of pro-migrant and 
refugee groups: the relative openness of the political system and the presence or absence of 
political allies. Each is discussed in turn below. 
First, social movement research finds that the degree of openness of a political system to 
the tactics and goals of a movement influences the tactics the SMO chooses (Eisenger 1973; 
Tarrow 1989, 1994; Kitschelt 1986). Relatively open systems create more opportunities for 
SMOs to focus their political action through conventional participation channels, whereas closed 
systems tend to encourage more challenging tactics. Alternatively, closed systems may encourage 
groups to turn away from the national setting and toward the EU. Many studies find that in the 
context of an open political system, groups tend to employ conventional tactics, such as lobbying 
and participating in formal and informal meetings with government officials, but in closed 
systems, when conventional channels of influence are less available, disruptive tactics such as 
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civil disobedience and protest become more frequent (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Imig and 
Tarrow 2001). In the following chapters, the relative openness of the political system is 
operationalized in terms of the country’s competitiveness of participation (i.e., the extent to which 
non-elites can access institutional channels of political expression), and whether or not the 
country has a federal political system.  
 In addition to the degree of political system openness, social movement theory 
emphasizes the presence or absence of elite political allies in explaining social movement 
behavior (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). When an SMO has allies within the political process, it is 
more likely to rely on conventional activities since the structure of political opportunities is 
relatively favorable. However, when such connections do not exist and avenues to influence 
become more constrained, groups tend to resort to unconventional and mobilizing tactics or they 
may act at the level of the EU. Previous research suggests that Left-leaning governments tend to 
be more receptive to social movement issues (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995). 
Moreover, multiparty systems increase the odds that an SMO will find political allies in 
government (Lijphart 1999; Dalton et al. 2003). Thus, the ensuing analyses operationalize 
political allies as whether the country has a Left-leaning chief executive or government 
legislature, and the number of political parties in the country.  
 In sum, this discussion suggests that the POS influences the tactics that groups are likely 
to select, and thus structures their political behavior. In the ensuing chapters, issue-specific 
opportunities are measured using the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and a 
battery of four questions from the survey that tap groups’ perceptions of the migrant/refugee 
policy context. The broader aspects of the POS are measured by competitiveness of participation, 
a federal versus centralized system, a Left-leaning chief executive, a Left-leaning government, 
and the number of political parties in the country. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 evaluate how the POS 
shapes the political tactics and effectiveness of pro-migrant and refugee organizations in the 
national, EU and transnational arenas, respectively.  
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Ideology 
Whereas POS theory focuses on the exogenous environment, RM and identity theories focus on 
aspects of group characteristics to explain social movement behavior. The ideological structured 
action framework emphasizes group identity as the key factor in explaining movement behavior 
(Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). An organization’s ideology “provides a framework for organizing and 
interpreting the political world; it defines the core values and peripheral concerns,” (Dalton 1994: 
12). Thus, group identity is expected to structure how SMOs perceive migrant inclusion issues, 
and influences the types of political strategies they utilize to confront problems that conflict with 
their core values. An organization’s identity influences the forms of action it considers 
appropriate in view of its perceptions of the current social and political order, independent of 
which method will most likely achieve the desired result. 
The main shortcoming of identity research in the migrant inclusion literature is that when 
studies control for identity at all, it is conceptualized as either the individual ethnic identity of the 
migrant or the group category to which the migrant belongs, such as Asian, Muslim, black, Turk, 
etc. (e.g., Statham 1999; Armstrong 1998; Favell and Martiniello 1999; Parkin 1999). While 
useful for studies of immigrant ethnic mobilization, this conceptualization presents problems with 
respect to interest group studies. For one, it fails to get at a conception of identity at the 
organizational level that transcends simple ethnic, racial, or religious categorizations. Secondly 
and relatedly, it fails to relate identity to the issue priorities of the organization. As Dalton (1994) 
shows, the issue priorities of groups shape their unique political ideology, and thus their tactics. 
Therefore, what is needed is a conception of group identity related to migrant inclusion groups’ 
issue priorities and theory regarding how group identities structure political behavior.   
Because this study encompasses a broad sample of organizations from 20 EU countries 
that work on a wide range of issues, it provides a basis for creating categories of organizational 
identity in the migrant inclusion movement. To this end, a factor analysis of group identity is 
conducted in Chapter 4. Following Dalton (1994), it generates group identity measures based on 
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the nature of the issues SMOs espouse. Three distinct dimensions of group identity emerge: 
services/care-giving, political/legal, and asylum. I argue that in SMO research it is more 
appropriate to conceive of identity along a continuum from less to more challenging, as opposed 
to a dichotomous view of non-challenging versus challenging, since all pro-migrant organizations 
are part of a social movement which by definition seeks some level of political change. The 
following paragraphs thus categorize each type of group along a continuum, and explain how the 
identity of each is expected to structure its political activity.     
Organizations that focus on services/care-giving have concerns that center on providing a 
needed social service to immigrant communities as opposed to calling for changes in the existing 
system. Thus, these groups often pursue their goals with little challenge to the dominant political, 
social, or legal paradigms. Their issues of focus include: creating programs to improve societal 
tolerance of foreigners, creating educational programs to or about migrants (these are often 
implemented in schools and aimed at the young), job training services, helping migrants learn the 
national language and customs, providing housing services for immigrants, providing health care 
services to migrants, and implementing psychological adjustment programs for migrants and 
refugees that may have been victims of torture or that otherwise need treatment.  
 Because services-care organizations have issue priorities that tend not to pose a large 
threat to the established order, their values should be less challenging. These groups generally 
accept the dominant socio-political order and attempt to integrate migrants into it. In turn, their 
identity should shape the political options open to them. Thus, because they are more likely than 
more challenging groups to receive support and build alliances with members of the social and 
political establishment, services-care groups are more likely to act conventionally, and may be 
more apt to adopt a range of tactics, perhaps spanning multiple levels of governance.   
In contrast, groups with a political/legal identity adopt concerns that may require changes 
in existing legal, social, or political relations. For example, they espouse changes in existing 
political-legal structures throughout the EU and generally seek to improve the legal rights of 
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resident third country nationals to reflect a more inclusive system. Thus, political/legal groups 
tend to focus on the types of migrant inclusion issues that call for an alternative paradigm, or 
vision of society, such as: facilitating free movement for migrants and refugees within the EU for 
work, allowing migrants and refugees to vote in local, national, and European elections, 
extending the benefits and responsibilities of European citizenship to resident migrants and 
refugees, and generally improving migrants’ legal rights.  
Finally, groups with an asylum identity hold similar political-legal concerns, but are 
distinct in that they focus on issues of particular importance to refugees – a specific classification 
of migrant. For example, asylum-seekers often encounter stringent legal criteria for gaining 
classification as a refugee and thus face serious legal obstacles to remaining in the country of 
asylum. Moreover, asylum-seekers are often held in detention centers pending a judge’s decision 
whether or not they may remain in the host country, which can take years; this type of holding 
system ignites issues of a political nature to refugee groups. Overall, asylum groups are 
concerned with such issues as facilitating national procedures for obtaining asylum, facilitating 
procedures for legal refugees to obtain visas and work permits, and facilitating access to national 
citizenship.       
Because the issue priorities of political/legal and asylum groups tend to pose a greater 
threat to existing social and political-legal relations, their values should reflect a more challenging 
identity. Both group types reject the dominant order of relations between migrants and refugees 
on the one hand, and state and society on the other. They attempt to bring about social, political, 
and legal change. It may thus be harder for such groups to find elite allies and they may have to 
look instead to other movement groups. Because their identity may limit their options for action, 
these groups may be likely to resort to protest and other confrontational tactics. Moreover, they 
may be blocked from accessing EU institutions, which exhibit a preference for conventional 
lobbying (Imig and Tarrow 2001).   
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In sum, the ideological approach generates a set of expectations that relates pro-migrant 
and refugee organizations’ political behavior to their identity. Here, organizational identity is 
related to the nature of the issues that groups prioritize. This reflects a set of values among the 
group which contribute to its unique political identity and shape its tactics. In the following 
analyses, group identity is measured by the three classifications discussed above: services/care-
giving; political/legal; and asylum. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 evaluate how group identity structures 
political behavior and effectiveness in a range of settings.  
Resource Mobilization Theory 
American sociologists are largely responsible for the development of RM theory throughout the 
1970s and 80s (Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 
1983; Zald and McCarthy 1987). RM theory views the formation and subsequent behavior of a 
social movement to depend mainly on formal organizations and movement entrepreneurs that 
mobilize resources in pursuit of the movement’s goals; thus the relative level of organizational 
resources determines the activities and success of the movement. According to this perspective, 
organizational needs and opportunities – rather than the individual beliefs and political values of 
the movement members – are the driving force behind SMO formation and action. Thus, RM 
theory places the analytical focus on the organizational features of a movement rather than its 
mass base. In general, the resource needs of any SMO influence its structure, goals, activities, and 
alliance patterns (Zald and McCarthy 1987; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam et al. 1988).     
 There are two main shortcomings with existing research as it pertains to RM theory. First, 
RM theory stresses that not only group resources, but also the sources of those resources, shape 
activity. However, the social movement literature tends to focus on the level of resources and 
generally ignores their sources, even though they are theorized to impact activity. An important 
exception is Dalton (1994), but in focusing on the national-level sources he fails to account for 
the influence of EU-level funding on groups’ activities. This is a serious weakness of existing 
research, since the EU actively funds interest groups and thus likely shapes their behavior to some 
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extent. Moreover, although research on migrant inclusion actors has recognized the importance of 
accounting for resources (Statham 1999), data limitations and/or research design have prevented 
it from doing so.  
This study can correct for these weaknesses by including information directly from a 
relatively large number of organizations on funding from the EU. EU funding is theorized to 
shape group action in several ways. First, “transnationality” is a criterion for receiving a grant 
from the European Commission, meaning that group projects must be transnationally 
collaborative in nature. Thus, groups with EU funding likely engage in more cooperative 
activities with others abroad than non-EU funded groups. Moreover, EU funding may serve to 
connect groups with European actors in the major institutions, including the Commission, 
Parliament and Council. Thus, these organizations are likely to act at the EU level. In general, EU 
funded groups may be less likely to limit their tactics to the national arena, making them more 
likely to engage in transnational and EU-level activities.            
 In addition to the source of funding, the amount of resources that groups possess must 
also be included in the study, at least as controls. Resources can work in two different ways to 
structure activity. First, in general, groups with more resources are better-positioned to engage in 
a broad range of political actions and to participate at higher levels in those activities. Thus, 
groups with more resources are likely more politically active and effective, regardless of the 
activity type or level. Underlying this logic is the assumption that group participation in both 
conventional and challenging modes of action requires planned efforts that are organized and 
financed by the group. Organizations need resources when they meet with government officials to 
provide research, technical knowledge, and expertise. Alternatively, groups can utilize their 
resources to organize a demonstration or protest. Studies of other SMOs document that 
organizational resources influence groups’ overall levels of political activity across a range of 
activity types (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and 
Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003). 
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  Alternatively, resources could differentially affect a group’s choice of activities. For 
example, a large professional staff may lead to a preference for activities that reflect 
organizational maintenance rather than more confrontational actions. A paid staff may also be 
more likely to cultivate and sustain relationships with other social groups, political elites, and 
other actors, thereby providing the group with long-term stability and effectiveness. 
Consequently, groups with more resources and a professional staff are more likely to engage in 
conventional modes of action, including lobbying and mobilizing the public (Oberschall 1993; 
Milofsky 1988). In contrast, SMOs with few or limited resources often take advantage of their 
pool of volunteer activists; such groups may be more prone to confrontational strategies such as 
protest (Piven and Cloward 1977). Their inability to appeal to a broad-based membership, 
combined with the need to mobilize potential members and draw attention to their causes, may 
make organizations with few resources and a small staff more prone to challenging activities.  
 The organization’s age may also indicate its level of resources and political orientation. 
As an SMO develops over time, it increases its legitimacy as well as its links to established social 
and political institutions. Institutional access and influence may also serve to increase a 
movement’s allure among the public. Younger organizations, in contrast, may lack experience 
and the networking base to exert political influence through more conventional means, making 
them more prone to actions that challenge the political status quo or to limit their activities to the 
national arena. Consistent with this logic, Dalton (1994: 204) demonstrated that older groups 
engage more often in conventional modes of action whereas younger organizations are more apt 
to engage in protest-based tactics. 
 In sum, the tenets of RM theory lead one to expect that pro-migrant and refugee 
organizations’ patterns of political action are closely related to the resources they possess as well 
as the source of those resources. In the following chapters, resources are measured by several 
variables: group age; number of full-time staff; part-time staff; volunteers; annual budget; an 
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increasing annual budget; whether or not the group has received funding from the European 
Commission; and its membership size.  
 To summarize thus far, this study integrates several theoretical models of social 
movement behavior in the context of the migrant inclusion movement. The traditional approaches 
emphasize how organizational resources, ideology, and the structure of political opportunities 
impact SMO behavior. I add several elements to this picture. First, I explicitly incorporate group 
ties into assessments of SMO behavior. In the following chapters, group ties are used as 
independent variables to predict activity and effectiveness. Secondly, I refine the concept of 
political opportunity by examining not only its usual broad aspects, but also by incorporating the 
issue-specific “policy context” most relevant to migrants and refugees. Third, I create categories 
of organizational identity based on groups’ primary issue concerns, rather than ethnic or racial 
characteristics. Fourth, I not only systematically account for groups’ resources, but also for the 
supranational source of those resources. The following section foreshadows the topics of the 
upcoming empirical chapters by moving from a discussion of the various factors that influence 
SMO behavior to a discussion of the different activity types and locales where political behavior 
occurs.    
PREVIEW OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TYPES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
This study focuses on a broad range of activities in order to correct for the shortcomings of prior 
research. Although the studies that have come out of the MERCI project are the most systematic 
research to date on pro-migrant mobilization, they nonetheless leave gaps that this study can fill. 
First, by admission, in relying on content analyses of newspapers the MERCI data is biased 
toward more controversial forms of claims-making or forms that occur in the public sphere. Thus, 
it does not include lobbying activity or informal meetings, for example, even though part of its 
focus includes organized interests. Moreover, although the data purports to cover a variety of both 
conventional and challenging tactics, upon closer scrutiny the only non-challenging activities it 
covers are “public statements” and other uses of the media.       
 62
Because groups can use a variety of tactics to influence politics, any framework for 
analyzing group activity patterns should include a broad range of relevant activities that pro-
migrant interests engage in. In this project, they span the conventional to the more 
confrontational, the more visible to the more “behind the scenes,” from the local to the 
supranational level, and include: contacts with local government; formal and informal meetings 
with civil servants or ministers; contacts with political parties; contacts with Parliament; 
participation in government commissions and advisory committees; contacts with the media; 
demonstrations, protests and other direct actions that target the national government; legal 
recourse to the national courts or other judicial bodies; contacts with the European Commission; 
European Parliament; Council of Ministers; the Economic and Social Committee; and 
COREPER; demonstrations, protests and other direct actions that target the EU; legal recourse to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ); and sharing information, expertise, resources, and 
collaborating in projects at the national, transnational, and EU levels. 
 The concept of political effectiveness is also captured across levels. For each activity 
mode mentioned above, a corresponding question in the survey asked respondents to rate that 
activity’s effectiveness in achieving the organization’s policy goals.  
 Because groups can undertake activity alone or with other movement actors, chapter 7 
explores the factors that lead groups to engage in domestic and non-domestic cooperation, such as 
sharing information and collaborating on common projects. In addition, activity can occur in 
multiple arenas, including the national and EU levels. Therefore, chapter 6 examines the 
conditions under which groups will expand their activities from the realm of the nation-state 
upward to the EU. Rather than examining each level in isolation, it focuses on how changes in the 
independent variables influence the propensity to act in one arena versus the other. Thus, it looks 
at activity in one setting relative to another. Chapter 5 leads off the empirical investigation by 
assessing the factors that prompt groups to use conventional versus challenging tactics in the 
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national sphere. Before turning to the empirical investigations, however, the following chapter 
discusses the main data source in greater detail.  
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Chapter Three: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3.1 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Overview of the Data: The Survey of European Pro-Migrant and 
Refugee Organizations  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the data collection process and a descriptive 
account of the basic organizational characteristics of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) groups 
throughout the EU. This type of factual information is important, in part, because it sheds light on 
the nature of the organizations that serve as the basis for analyses in the subsequent chapters. For 
example, comparing the age of the sample to that of the known population of PMR groups 
provides information about how representative the sample is. Moreover, in examining other group 
characteristics, such as membership, finances, and personnel, it becomes possible to assess the 
amount of variation within the sample itself. Thus, the information presented here describes the 
process of data collection, introduces the groups I surveyed, describes many important 
characteristics of the sample, and, where possible, attempts to compare certain elements of the 
sample to the known universe of PMR groups across the EU.           
The main data for this study primarily come from an original survey of organized PMR 
interests, as these groups deal with issues that affect migrants and refugees in Europe on a regular 
basis. As with any data collection method, surveys have advantages and disadvantages. One limit 
of surveys is that they rely on self-reporting, which may be problematic insofar as the respondent 
must make judgments in recalling past events or predicting future events. In this survey, groups 
are asked to make judgments about the relative degree of time they spend on given activities 
(often, sometimes, rarely, or never). A related limitation here is that there is no precise definition 
of what constitutes “often” as opposed to “sometimes,” etc. Therefore, one group may consider 
lobbying ten times a year as “often,” while another group may assess this as “rarely.” The survey 
 66
also asks respondents to assess the effectiveness of their political tactics. A similar issue arises in 
that there are no precise meanings of “very effective,” “somewhat effective,” etc. Instead, each 
group must make a judgment which can potentially vary considerably between groups for a given 
response category. Finally, survey data is not suited to drawing inferences about trends over time; 
rather, it is best used to capture a “snapshot” of activity at a given point in time.    
At the same time, however, surveys have great advantages that are particularly well-
suited to address the research questions in this study. First, they are a systematic means of 
collecting first-hand data directly from the source. This survey asks group representatives what 
political methods they use at various levels of governance, allowing an explicitly comparative 
analysis across levels. Moreover, this survey served the important goal of generating a relatively 
large sample. In this study, I conducted in-depth interviews in many cases before administering 
the survey, which allowed me to begin this project with detailed information. Using this 
information, I was able to design the questionnaire in a manner that focused on obtaining the 
most relevant information from the largest possible number of groups. The Survey of European 
Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations is thus the first systematic effort to collect data directly 
from migrant inclusion groups throughout all regions of the EU on a variety of topics. In part, the 
questionnaire asked representatives to provide factual information on a variety of group 
characteristics. This chapter will show among other things that the sample is broadly 
representative.  
The first step in constructing the dataset was to identify the known universe of non-
governmental actors that work on behalf of migrants and refugees throughout the EU. After 
identifying this population and constructing a master list of groups, I administered several rounds 
of the survey questionnaire. In addition, I conducted interviews with a variety of different actors 
in Brussels and London in order to gain supplemental information not readily available through 
the survey. The outcome of these efforts is an original dataset of pro-migrant actor attitudes and 
activities in 20 EU countries. This chapter discusses each step of the data collection process.  
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THE UNIVERSE OF PRO-MIGRANT AND REFUGEE INTERESTS 
In researching PMR groups throughout the EU, this study aims to represent the diversity of actors 
and group characteristics that comprise the migrant inclusion movement. Accordingly, the 
universe consists of a wide range of actors. Although this study is mainly concerned with the 
political activities of mass-membership organizations, the migrant inclusion movement (like other 
social movements) likely behaves much like an industry that interconnects mass-membership 
groups, research institutes, foundations, religious institutions, political lobbies, and small 
associations of elites. Thus, any comprehensive study of the movement should aim to include as 
many of these elements as possible.  
The Universe  
Before administering the questionnaire, the first step was to identify the population of relevant 
pro-migrant actors throughout the EU and create a master list.6 Because there is no official 
directory of such organizations, it was necessary to begin with a short list of organizations in each 
of 15 EU countries and expand it from there. Accordingly, I began by compiling an inventory of 
relevant organizations from the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) website. ENAR is a 
platform of about 600 national NGOs organized at the European level that work to combat 
various forms of racism and discrimination in all EU member states. A portion of their website is 
dedicated to National Data Sheets, which list the relevant anti-racist organizations in each 
member country.  
 From the ENAR website, I obtained an initial listing of NGOs in 15 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. After eliminating those organizations whose 
work does not involve migrants or refugees from beyond the EU (such as strictly pro-Jewish 
                                                 
6 I adopted a broad definition of a pro-migrant organization so that it would be possible to compare 
behavior across different elements of the movement. The complete listing of known pro-migrant and 
refugee groups in Europe can be accessed at www.united.non-profit.nl and looking through the European 
Address Book Against Racism. 
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organizations or narrowly-defined anti-fascist groups), the remaining list comprised about 15-30 
relevant groups per country. In order to be considered relevant, the group had to satisfy the 
following minimum criteria: it must work to some extent on behalf of migrants and/or refugees 
from beyond the EU, it must be an active organization in the EU country where it is 
headquartered, and it must be independent from government. For most such organizations, the 
address and a website or e-mail address was provided along with the group’s name. However, 
about 20-25% of groups on the ENAR listing represent smaller, grass-roots efforts which do not 
have a website or e-mail, leaving only a street address.       
 From this initial list, I examined the websites of each group (where available) in every 
country in order to increase the catalog. In nearly all cases, these sites contained links to, or 
addresses of, other PMR organizations active in that particular country. After collecting 
preliminary information on such groups and researching their missions to ensure that they 
conformed to the parameters of the study, I added them to the list. By supplementing the list in 
this manner I was able to increase representation of smaller, grass-roots, and unconventional 
groups, as well as larger, more prominent organizations. Using this “snowballing” method of 
identifying additional groups from the websites of previously-identified NGOs, I compiled an 
initial master directory across 15 countries with a median of 29.5 groups per country,7 and a total 
of 390 groups.  
 In May 2005, I came across the closest approximation to a formal directory of PMR 
organizations in the EU. The European Address Book Against Racism is a directory of many 
different types of organizations in the 25 EU countries and beyond, including those that work in 
support of migrants and refugees. The data in the Address Book is collected and compiled by 
United for Intercultural Action,8 a non-profit organization headquartered in the Netherlands that 
works for the rights of refugees and migrants. In total, the directory contains data on over 3,000 
                                                 
7 Some of the smaller countries, such as Greece and Luxembourg, had fewer groups.  Nonetheless, the 
target for each country was about 30 groups.  
8 www.united.non-profit.nl 
 69
different organizations throughout the world. Incorporating this into the universe I already 
identified using the method above, I was able to compile an additional listing of 1,347 
organizations whose work (either broadly or narrowly) involves migrant or refugee issues and 
add 10 more countries to the analysis: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Malta. This more comprehensive universe encompasses 
both smaller grass-roots and larger more resource-rich groups, conventional and unconventional 
groups, and includes groups from all 25 current EU member states.  
To summarize the procedures for generating the master list, I compiled a catalog of as 
many such organizations as possible in each EU country based on prior Internet research and 
several extensive published and online directories of NGOs.9 In order to be included, each group 
had to meet specific criteria including: status as an established pro-migrant and/or refugee group, 
an active agenda on behalf of migrant and refugee issues, and be headquartered in a member state 
of the EU. Groups were excluded whose human rights or anti-discrimination work touched only 
negligibly on migrant inclusion, as well as groups with a purely anti-fascist or anti-nationalist 
agenda. Groups from the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe and other new EU 
member states are included.  
DATA COLLECTION 
In describing the stages of data collection, the following sections discuss the process of 
administering each of three rounds of the survey and conducting interviews with organizations 
and EU actors. The resulting data lay the foundation for this study by providing the basis for the 
empirical analyses.   
Survey Round I 
                                                 
9 I relied on various sources of information to identify relevant groups: pro-migrant and refugee 
organization websites, online links to other such organizations, the European Network Against Racism 
(ENAR) membership list, and the European Address Book Against Racism. 
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The first round of the survey was conducted from September 2004-February 2005. During these 
months, I mailed a questionnaire to a total of 390 organizations in 15 countries and asked each to 
return it by mail upon completion. Among these, a total of approximately 60 questionnaires were 
returned to sender as undeliverable because the organization had either moved or shut down. In 
total, this first round of mailings yielded an initial sample of 64 groups representing each of the 
15 countries. Thus, taking into account the undeliverable questionnaires, the response rate for the 
first round is slightly above 19%.  
Survey Round II 
After discovering the European Address Book Against Racism in May 2005, I added additional 
groups to the master list for a second round of data collection. The second round was conducted 
online from May-September 2005. I chose to administer this round in the form of an online 
questionnaire for several reasons. First, during the initial mailing, several groups contacted me by 
email to request an electronic copy of the questionnaire, while others explicitly stated a 
preference for completing questionnaires online. Second, the European Address Book Against 
Racism contains email contacts for almost all of the targeted groups, making another round of 
time-consuming mailings unnecessary. Finally, after incurring excessive financial costs to 
administer the first round of the questionnaire by mail, I faced serious resource constraints and 
needed a less expensive alternative. Thus, although the pencil-and-paper survey allowed me to 
target a greater number of small, grass-roots organizations whose only available contact 
information is a street address, overall the online format allowed me to greatly facilitate the 
response process while keeping costs down. 
Before requesting participation in the second round of the survey, I examined in closer 
depth each of the 1,347 groups across the 25 EU countries that I identified from the European 
Address Book Against Racism. By selecting groups whose work most directly involves migrant 
and refugee issues and eliminating groups whose focus was too broad, I narrowed down the target 
sample to approximately 545 groups across each of the 25 EU countries. At this point, I sent each 
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group an email message describing the research project and containing the link to the online 
questionnaire; they were asked to complete it as soon as possible. This yielded an additional 40 
responses. Taking account of the email messages that were returned as undeliverable because the 
organization had either shut down or its mailbox was full, the response rate from the second 
round is approximately 19%. At the end of round II, a comprehensive total of 104 groups 
comprised the full dataset. 
Survey Round III 
Initial planning for a third, more targeted, round of the survey began with a year of field research 
in Brussels, Belgium starting in September 2005. Thus, the third and final round of data 
collection was administered from late September 2005-February 2006. The purpose of this round 
was to increase the overall sample size as much as possible by targeting specific groups that still 
had not participated as of the end of the second round. In countries where response rates were 
particularly low, I selected the most relevant groups from the European Address Book Against 
Racism and contacted them by email and phone to request participation. For each group outside 
of Belgium that agreed, I sent a copy of the questionnaire and a description of the research project 
to the director or other contact person. I then arranged a date to administer the questionnaire by 
phone. For each group within Belgium, I administered the questionnaire in person. This round 
was particularly successful in increasing representation from Eastern Europe and the other new 
EU member states, as I was able to double, and in certain cases triple, the number of participating 
groups in those countries. At the end of this round, the overall response rate stands at about 20% 
and the full dataset comprises 114 organizations. 
Interviews 
In addition to the survey questionnaire, the other aspect of the data collection process involves in-
person interviews. I conducted interviews with group representatives, civil servants of the 
European Commission, and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from October-
December 2004. Whereas the overwhelming majority of the interviews took place in Brussels, a 
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few were conducted in London and a small number were carried out by phone from Brussels to 
another country. In line with procedures used in other interest group studies (Berry 1977; Lowe 
and Goyder 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Dalton 1994), the interviews were conducted 
with a single informed representative from each organization, including the organization’s 
director, deputy director, or public information officer. The goal of the interview data is to 
supplement the survey with more in-depth information.  
To this end, the interview questions10 cross-cut several important themes, including: the 
rationale for the group’s chosen strategies; the reasons for and the importance of collaborations, 
including those that that cross policy sectors; the rationale for employing methods of influence 
that cross levels of governance; and assessments of EU versus national-level actors on matters of 
immigration and asylum. The group interviews lasted an average of one hour. In total, I 
conducted 18 group interviews: 3 in-person interviews in London, 12 in-person interviews in 
Brussels, 1 phone interview from Brussels with a group in Germany, 1 phone interview with a 
group in the Netherlands, and 1 phone interview with a group in Sweden.  
I also conducted interviews with EU actors in order to obtain their views on the political 
behavior of PMR organizations, and to provide evaluations of the current and future state of the 
migrant inclusion policy sector. The questions focused mainly on the nature of the Commission’s 
interactions with civil society groups that work on behalf of migrant inclusion, the importance of 
such interactions to migrant inclusion policy, and why these relationships are important to the 
Commission. These meetings lasted an average of approximately one hour. In total, I conducted 9 
Commission interviews with representatives from DG Justice and Home Affairs and DG 
Employment and Social Affairs, unit D/3 Anti-Discrimination and Civil Society and unit E/3 Free 
Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes.  
 Finally, the MEP interviews were conducted in Brussels and were prompted by 
comments received in several of the Commission interviews. Specifically, several civil servants 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for a list of questions that structured the group and EU actor interviews.  
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commented that strategic relationships between civil society groups and MEPs have the potential 
to be extremely effective in terms of obtaining concrete policy outcomes. These comments led me 
to interview MEPs about several themes, including: their interactions with pro-migrant and 
refugee NGOs, the impact these NGOs have on the policy process, and the European Parliament 
as an avenue for influence for civil society groups. On average, these meetings lasted 
approximately 20-30 minutes. I interviewed a total of 10 MEPs.    
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Accounting for all waves, I administered the survey to group representatives from September 
2004-February 2006.11 The English-language questionnaire is divided into five sections: I. 
Background Information; II. Cooperation and Collaboration; III. Activities; IV. Effectiveness; 
and V. Personal Information. The questions cover a variety of topics including: the organizational 
characteristics of the group, their interactions with various national and EU political institutions 
on matters concerning migrants and refugees, their use of a range of political activity types, their 
policy interests, and the extent of the group’s collaborative activities with a range of other actors.  
The survey allowed me to generate a sample of migrant inclusion actors from throughout 
the EU.12 The groups that comprise the sample vary on a number of organizational characteristics, 
as illustrated in Table 4.1. In terms of a broad overview, the mean group is approximately 16 
years old and has over 4,000 members. In addition, it has about 6 full time employees and 18 
volunteers in an average week. In terms of ideology, each of the three dimensions is well 
represented. Two additional variables are group focus and group target, which respectively 
describe the type of disadvantaged group (1=mainly migrants/refugees, 2=equally 
migrants/refugees and other disadvantaged groups, 3=mainly other disadvantaged groups) and the 
type of migrant/refugee the organization’s work is primarily concerned with (1=all 
migrants/refugees, 2=a particular ethnicity, 3=a particular gender 4=a particular age). The group 
                                                 
11 The survey questionnaire is included in Appendix A. 
12 See Table A.4.1 in Appendix B for a complete listing of groups included in the study.  
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focus variable indicates that the average group is mainly concerned with issues that affect 
migrants and refugees, or migrants/refugees and at least one other disadvantaged group. Finally, 
the group target variable indicates that the mean group targets all migrants and refugees without 
any particular distinction. The following sections draw on this and other information to discuss 
the descriptive characteristics of the sample in relation to the different sections of the 
questionnaire and, where possible, compare aspects of the sample with the known population. 
Section I: Background Information 
The section on background information consists of 11 questions about the organization itself. 
Overall, its primary goal is to measure different facets of group resources, ideology, and “issue-
specific” political opportunities in perceptual terms. To begin with, six questions ask about the 
organization’s resources, including: group age, the number of full- and part-time employees and 
volunteers, the annual budget, the group’s income trend over the past year, its membership, and 
grants received from the EU. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
 
Group Age. The pattern in Figure 4.1 reflects the group origins of the sample. It indicates a large 
mobilization wave beginning after the 1975-84 time period and steadily increasing over time to 
the present. Of course, many PMR groups established during this time have subsequently 
dissolved or merged with others, but a total of 27% (N=31) of the organizations in this study had 
their origins in the period 1985-1994, and 50% (N=57) in the period 1995-present. That is, over 7 
dozen groups in this study were established since 1985.  
 In order to ascertain how representative the sample is, Figure 4.2 charts the origins of a 
subset of the known population of migrant inclusion organizations.13 Like the sample, the main 
mobilization waves of the population occurred in the periods 1985-1994 and 1995-present. From 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, the amount of publicly available data on many of the group characteristics is limited, and 
the quality of data that specific groups provide greatly varies. Therefore, based on the consistency of 
information provided on groups’ websites, it is feasible to compare three dimensions of the sample and 
known population: group origins (i.e., age), ideology, and size. That said, these are three important 
dimensions that represent different aspects of group characteristics. 
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1985-1994, 33% (N=63) of the groups were established; 37% (N=70) have been established since 
1995. In contrast, only 2% (N=4) of the groups were established before 1945. A comparison of 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrates that the sample characteristics roughly approximate those of the 
estimated population.     
Unlike the European environmental movement whose organization-building efforts 
peaked between 1965 and 1975 (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Dalton 1994), the migrant inclusion 
movement’s efforts began to peak much later (i.e., in the 1980s), when issues of immigration 
began to adopt a prominent place in the public debate. In fact, the largest portion of the 
contemporary movement originated during this period. Today, new PMR organizations are still 
being formed. Activists created nearly six dozen important national groups after 1995.   
 
Staff Support.  Another important resource is the staff support needed to carry out the everyday 
functioning of the organization. As with other types of resources, the level of staff support can 
vary greatly among groups. On average, most PMR groups operate with a small professional 
staff. The mean number of full-time employees is about six. As Figure 4.3 shows, even if one 
adds part-time staff the employee base of most groups remains fairly small. At the low end of the 
scale, 11% of all organizations operate without any paid employees at all, relying entirely on 
volunteers to sustain the organization. At the other end, about 10% of groups maintain a 
professional staff of more than twenty. Among the groups surveyed, Forum Réfugiés in France 
has the largest professional staff, comprising 90 full-time employees. Most groups also rely on 
volunteers, as shown in Figure 4.4. From time to time, volunteer workers are vital to 
policymaking and operation, but more often they carry out maintenance tasks such as staffing the 
office, processing correspondence, and generally serving the membership.  
 
Financial Resources.  One of the most important resources for any group is money. Unlike 
economic interest groups that can count on a steady stream of financial support from either 
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business or labor, public interest groups must often struggle to raise financial resources and meet 
financial needs. This is partly due to the fact that PMR groups lack a solid base of financial 
support, combined with the fact that influencing the political process can be very costly. 
Moreover, as other studies have pointed out (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Dalton 1994), the 
special value of money is that it can be processed to meet other needed goods such as staff, 
advertising, consultants, public relations programs, and more.  
 Because financial data for the population as a whole is difficult to come by, I use a proxy 
measure of whether the organization is national or international in order to assess the 
representativeness of the sample when it comes to the size of the group. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show 
the proportion of national versus international organizations in the sample (Figure 4.5) and 
overall population (Figure 4.6). The data illustrate the sample is fairly representative when it 
comes to group size. About 21% of the groups in the sample are international compared to about 
18% of those in the overall population. Although these figures are comparable, international 
organizations are very slightly overrepresented in the sample. This suggests that there is a slight 
possibility that the analyses in this study may be more likely to find that groups act across 
countries and/or levels of governance rather than limit their action to within the nation-state. 
However, because there is only 3 percentage points difference between the sample and 
population, the degree of overrepresentation is not large and thus is not expected to pose a major 
problem for drawing inferences.     
 Figure 4.7 illustrates the annual operating budgets of the groups in the sample, excluding 
most government contracts, grants, and other nonrecurring sources of income. Their financial 
resources vary a great deal. About 27% of all groups operate with an annual budget of less than 
50,000 Euros. Often, these are smaller organizations working on behalf of a very specific target 
group, such as RAJFIR in France and AKELIN in Denmark. Such groups depend heavily on 
volunteer support. At the other end of the scale, about 19% of groups have annual budgets over 
500,000 Euros and represent diverse elements of the migrant inclusion movement: refugee advice 
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or help groups (Forum Réfugiés in France, North of England Refugee Service Limited in the 
UK), broader human rights groups (REMDH in Denmark, Bruno Kreisky Foundation for Human 
Rights in Austria), service groups for migrants (LBR in the Netherlands, JCWI in the UK, 
Immigrantinstitutet in Sweden), housing services organizations for migrants (PAIH in the UK), 
groups that provide education for or about migrants (MPG in Belgium, Intercultural Centre in 
Austria, Palet in the Netherlands), and more unconventional groups that work with undocumented 
migrants (OCIV and PICUM in Belgium). The diverse array of well-funded groups illustrates that 
different sectors of the movement are able to successfully mobilize support for their activities.  
 Combining these budgetary figures, the estimated financial resources that PMR groups 
control is well over 80 million Euros a year. Further, Figure 4.8 illustrates that over two-thirds of 
the groups report that even after adjusting for inflation, their incomes have either remained steady 
or increased over the past two or three years. Thus, although the membership base remains fairly 
small, finances are an important indicator of the expansion of the movement across Europe.  
 Virtually all organizations included in this study rely on individual support, which 
underscores the populist base of the movement. Rather than ask groups to recall what percentage 
of their income stems from individuals, which may be difficult for many to do, I instead asked 
representatives to report whether they have or will receive a grant from the European 
Commission. These figures are reported in Table 4.2. The sample is composed of a relatively 
comparable number of groups that do and do not rely on the Commission as a source of financial 
support. For example, roughly 54% of the groups have received or will receive such a grant. At 
the same time, about 46% of the groups claim to receive no such support, perhaps illustrating the 
reservations some groups have about the possible co-optation that can accompany government 
grants, or the difficult and time consuming process of obtaining a grant.    
 
Membership.  For a good number of groups, their primary resource is their membership base. 
Members are important, in part, because they provide a significant potential source of revenue. 
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Many groups also mobilize volunteer work by members to support the group’s activities. 
Although some membership activities are politically neutral, such as making a financial donation, 
members can also serve a latent pool of political activists. For instance, more confrontational 
groups may count on their members as a source for mobilizing a protest or petition. Conventional 
groups also rely on their members when organizing such activities as volunteer community 
projects and letter-writing campaigns to the government and/or media. Public interest 
organizations value their memberships for an additional reason as well, in that a large 
membership base adds legitimacy to the organization that claims to speak for the public interest. 
The more members a group can claim to represent, the better its chances are of gaining entry to 
various government offices.  
 As Figure 4.9 shows, there are many sizes of mass-membership organizations (see Table 
A.4.1 in Appendix B for the membership of specific groups). From the period 1985-1994, the 
average group was composed of about 3,11614 members, but there is a great deal of dispersion 
around this figure. Among the sample, roughly 50% have fewer than 50 total members. At the 
higher end of the spectrum, only five organizations have a membership of 4,000 or more: Union 
of Students in Ireland, Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel of the Netherlands, Liga de Amizade 
Internacional of Portugal, Medicos del Mundos of Spain, and Student Action for Refugees 
(STAR) of the UK. Each of these groups pursues fairly moderate goals and helps other 
disadvantaged groups in addition to migrants and refugees. The mean membership of all PMR 
groups is about 4,302, but if one excludes the three biggest outliers,15 the mean falls dramatically 
to about 318, a number that reflects the small, grass-roots nature of the overall movement.  
 The small single-interest and local organizations that comprise the movement are also 
reflected when we examine group membership in individual nation-states. Although the overall 
                                                 
14 This figure is quite small compared to membership in environmental organizations in the mid-1980s, 
which averaged about 10,000 members (Dalton 1994: 86). 
15 These membership numbers are 130,000 (Dutch Refugee Foundation), 250,000 (Union of Students in 
Ireland), and 75,125 (Medicos del Mundos in Spain).  
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number of groups has increased over time (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2), not all EU countries are 
sharing equally in the development of the movement. In fact, there is substantial cross-national 
variation in the membership base of the groups included in this study, as well as between East and 
West regions.  
Table 4.3 illustrates the overall pattern of these national differences by comparing general 
membership levels in each country included in the study. The combined total membership of 
these organizations reaches substantial levels in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. 
When population size and the presence of large outliers16 are taken into account, the movements 
in Ireland and the Netherlands have an exceptionally large ratio of members.17 The Irish 
movement has experienced a high degree of success developing its membership base. Excluding 
the large outlier,18 its mean membership is very comparable to the movements in Finland and 
France, although the population of Finland is over one-and-a-half times as large, and that of 
France is almost 15 times larger. Similarly, the total membership of the Dutch groups represents 
almost 1% of its total population. Its mean membership is comparable to that of Spain, even 
though the Spanish population is over two-and-a-half times larger.19 Finally, there is a great 
difference in membership means across the old and new member states. Whereas the mean in the 
former reaches 4,873, in the new member states it reaches only 536.       
 In examining the average membership level of the entire sample, it becomes possible to 
analyze country differences in membership compared to the total sample average. The average 
membership level for the sample is about 4,302. However, as discussed above, the presence of 
                                                 
16 Note that the statistics of the Spanish groups are driven by a large outlier. This is why Spain is not 
considered to have an exceptionally large ratio of members represented here.  
17 According to Eurostat data, the population (in thousands) of Ireland is about 4025, and the Netherlands is 
about 16,258. (www.eurunion.org/legislat/agd2000/agd2000.html).  Ireland has only the 14th largest 
populations among the 15 pre-Eastern enlargement EU countries.  
18 The outlier in Ireland is The Union of Students in Ireland, whose membership level reaches 250,000. 
19 According to Eurostat data, the population of Spain (in thousands) is 40,978. 
(www.eurunion.org/legislat/agd2000/agd2000.html).  
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three large outliers drives this figure.20 If those three are excluded, the sample mean membership 
falls to about 318. Table 4.4 illustrates how membership in each country compares to this 
adjusted sample average. Five countries have levels below the sample mean; these are roughly 
evenly distributed between the old and new member states: Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, and Cyprus. The rest of the countries have membership levels above the average, with 
Ireland representing the highest and Luxembourg representing the lowest average membership of 
all countries.  
 
Organizational Identity.  Beyond resources, a set of three questions in the survey tap different 
features of the organization’s identity. From a given list presented to the respondent, they ask the 
group representative to name the types of issues that most concern the organization, to describe 
the type of migrant (if any) towards whom the group’s work is mainly directed, and to indicate 
how important various issues are to the activities and political concerns of the group.  
To develop broad measures of group ideology, I factor analyzed the 17 items in question 
11 that tap groups’ issue concerns. Principal factor analysis identified three dimensions of 
ideology presented in Table 4.5: services/care-giving, political/legal, and asylum. As the previous 
chapter explains, services/care groups pursue goals that are less threatening to the established 
order, whereas the issue priorities of political/legal and asylum groups reflect values that pose a 
greater challenge to the political status quo.  
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the distribution of the three dimensions of identity in 
terms of the sample and known population, respectively. In order to classify groups from the 
population, I used information from the organization’s website regarding its mission, goals, 
objectives, current projects, and/or policy work and made an appropriate classification based on 
                                                 
20 These outliers include three large groups comprising membership levels of 250,000 in Ireland, 130,000 in 
the Netherlands, and 75,125 in Spain.  
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the above criteria. It is possible for a group’s objectives to overlap between the categories; thus 
several groups belong to more than one classification.    
Although fairly similar, the biggest difference in comparing the two figures is the 
proportion of political/legal and asylum groups. In the sample (Figure 4.10), services/care-giving 
organizations represent the majority of groups, and political/legal organizations, although slightly 
fewer, represent a comparable number. Proportionally, asylum groups, although well-represented 
in the sample, account for the fewest groups. Among the known population (Figure 4.11), the 
proportion is slightly different. While, like the sample, services/care-giving groups make up the 
bulk of the population, this is followed by asylum groups and finally political/legal organizations. 
Thus, while still fairly comparable, the sample does not directly mirror the population on each of 
the ideological dimensions.   
There are several implications of the over-representation of political/legal groups in the 
sample. First, the fact that these groups possess a more challenging ideology makes the empirical 
analyses more likely to overestimate participation in contentious forms of activity. Moreover, if 
the nature of their identity limits participation in national or EU-level lobbying, then the analyses 
will also underestimate the extent of these tactics. Relatedly, it also may make the analyses more 
likely to overestimate EU-directed protest. In general, then, the analyses are more likely to 
overestimate contentious tactics versus more conventional forms of influence. Although 
confrontational activity may still comprise a minor part of groups’ political repertoires, the over-
representation of more challenging groups likely increases the proportion of contentious versus 
conventional tactics relative to the overall movement population. Thus, it constitutes a more 
stringent test of the factors that impact conventional activity.    
That said, however, it is important to note that the inclusion of the identity measures 
constitutes a step beyond the existing research. As explained in detail in the previous chapter, the 
literature has yet to conceptualize measures of organizational identity within the migrant 
inclusion movement, instead focusing mainly on simple ethnic, national, or racial classifications. 
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That I have found evidence of three distinct types of organizational identity suggests that 
ideological differences between groups within the movement exist, and may play a role in 
shaping their political behavior.        
 
How Identity Shapes Resource Accumulation.  The survey data allow an examination of whether 
certain groups are likely to be more successful than others in generating resources. To this end, 
Figures 4.12 – 4.18 show how the different dimensions of group identity affect resource 
accumulation in terms of: group age, staff and volunteers, income, income trend, membership, 
and EU funding.  
Figure 4.12 displays the origins of PMR groups by group type. For each type, the trend 
roughly approximates that of the pooled sample (see Figure 4.1). Although there was some level 
of group activity prior to the 1975-1984 time period, after that time many groups of all types 
formed at a higher rate. Overall among the sample, services/care groups have the steadiest 
upward trend after 1975. Political/legal and asylum organizations also exhibit a steady upward 
trend, but their numbers dip slightly in the 1985-1994 time period. However, since 1995 they 
have slightly overtaken services/care groups in terms of their numbers.   
In examining the membership level of each group type, Figure 4.13 shows that each type 
clusters around the low end of the scale. The majority of groups, regardless of the identity, have a 
membership of less than fifty. Moving upward along the scale, services/care and political legal 
groups have a slightly easier time in mobilizing members. In contrast, asylum organizations 
generally mobilize the fewest members with a slight exception at the very high end of the scale, 
likely reflecting a handful of large, international organizations such as Caritas Refugee Service. 
Thus, asylum groups experience the greatest dispersion in terms of membership, as they tend to 
cluster around the extreme low and high ends of the scale.     
When it comes to mobilizing staff resources, Figure 4.14 shows that all group types 
cluster around the mid-range of the scale. Although services/care groups have slightly more 
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success in recruiting higher levels of staff, asylum groups do not recruit staff as effectively, as 
most operate with only 2-5 paid employees. In contrast, services/care and political/legal groups 
operate on average with 6-10 staff members. At the same time, however, a greater proportion of 
political/legal and asylum groups operate with no paid staff at all. In addition, Figure 4.15 shows 
the trend for volunteers. It indicates that services/care groups tend to rely to a lesser extent on 
volunteer support compared to the other group types. This is not unexpected, given that more 
challenging groups tend to face greater difficulties in mobilizing employees and thus rely more 
strongly on their pool of volunteers.         
Figures 4.16 – 4.18 display trends in the ability to mobilize financial resources among 
each group type. In terms of annual income, Figure 4.16 shows that the majority of all group 
types operate with an annual budget of 200,000 Euros or less. Thus, all group types are clustered 
toward the lower end of the scale. In general, there is no clear pattern regarding which group type 
most successfully mobilizes resources, although services/care organizations tend to have a 
slightly easier time across several of the categories. Overall, some level of dispersion exists 
among all group types, as they tend to be clustered on the low and mid-to-high ends of the scale.      
 When we examine groups’ income trend over the past year, Figure 4.17 shows that the 
general trend is the same for all group types, as a virtual equal amount of groups reported an 
increase in income over the past year. At the same time, political/legal groups were the most 
likely of the three to report a decrease, while the income of asylum groups was most likely to 
remain steady with inflation. Across the board, most groups in the sample experienced an 
increase in annual income over the past year.  
 Figure 4.18 shows that services/care groups are slightly most likely to receive a grant 
from the European Commission compared to the other groups. In addition, there is greater 
dispersion among services/care groups in terms of the numbers that have received a grant and 
those that have not. A similar trend holds for political/legal groups, although with slightly less 
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dispersion. Finally, a relatively comparable number of asylum groups have and have not received 
a grant. Moreover, these groups are the least likely of the three to receive EU funding.     
 In summary, the trend for each group types approximates that of the pooled sample when 
it comes to group age. In addition, most groups have relatively low membership levels, although 
asylum organizations show the greatest dispersion. Services/care and political/legal groups tend 
to operate with more employees than asylum groups, and services/care groups depend the least on 
volunteer support. Moreover, most groups operate with a relatively small annual budget, with 
political/legal groups being the most likely to report a decrease in income over the past year. 
Finally, services/care organizations are the most likely to receive Commission funding.    
 
Perceptions of Issue-Specific POS.  Among the final two questions in this section of the 
questionnaire, the one most relevant to the dissertation evaluates how groups perceive their 
national immigration and asylum policy environments with respect to four policy dimensions: 
immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment.  
 When it comes to groups’ perceptions of immigration policy, Figure 4.19 shows that the 
general trend is similar across all types. In other words, all groups, regardless of their identity, 
cluster toward the stringent end of the scale. Asylum groups are slightly more prone than the 
others to categorize national immigration policy as some degree of stringent. In terms of 
citizenship policy, Figure 4.20 shows that, again, all groups cluster toward the stringent end. 
However, asylum groups are less likely than the others to perceive immigration policy as open, 
whereas services/care groups are slightly less likely to view it as very stringent. Figure 4.21 
displays groups’ perceptions of asylum policy. Here there is much less variation, as all groups 
cluster toward the extreme stringency end of the scale. Political/legal groups are most likely to 
perceive asylum policy as very stringent, whereas services/care groups are more apt than the 
others to view it as somewhat open. Finally, there is more variation in perceptions when it comes 
to employment policy, as shown in Figure 4.22. Although all groups cluster toward the stringent 
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end, asylum groups are again more likely to perceive employment policy as very stringent, and 
political/legal groups are more likely to view it as only somewhat stringent.       
  In sum, all groups tend to view each of the four policy dimensions as having some degree 
of stringency, and none sees any as predominantly open. At the same time, asylum and 
political/legal groups are more likely to hold stringent policy perceptions. Although services/care 
organizations also cluster toward the stringent end of the scale, they are slightly more prone than 
the others to perceive any openness in these policies. This trend roughly approximates what one 
would expect given the different group identities. As services/groups tend to espouse issues that 
are inherently less political in nature, they are more likely to grant some level of openness in 
national policies than the other group types.    
Section II: Cooperation and Collaboration 
The section on cooperation and collaboration gets at various ways that PMR organizations may 
work together with other actors to influence policy, and consists of a battery of five questions. 
Each question asks the respondent to indicate the extent to which the group interacts with: a) 
other NGOs within the group’s country, b) NGOs in at least one other country, c) business 
associations and labor unions in the home country, d) business associations and labor unions in at 
least one other country, and e) groups at the EU level in the following activities: exchanging 
information, exchanging advice or expertise, exchanging personnel or other resources, and 
coordinating activities and common projects. In sum, the main goal of this section is to measure 
the degree of interconnectedness with other actors across levels of governance.  
 Table 4.6 displays the results of a principal factor analysis confirming the dimensions of 
interconnectedness used in this study. It identifies six dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 
1.0: national NGOs, national business, national labor, EU groups, NGOs abroad, and business 
and labor abroad.  
Figure 4.23 shows how interconnectedness at the national level breaks down by group 
identity. By far, each group type maintains the strongest links with other NGOs in their country; 
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the first set of bars indicates that political/legal groups are slightly more apt to maintain strong 
connections with these actors. In addition, each group type is slightly more likely to form ties 
with labor unions compared to business associations. However, the middle set of bars indicates 
that asylum groups are slightly more likely than the others to maintain strong connections with 
national business associations. In terms of networks that transcend the national level, Figure 4.24 
shows that the overall pattern is similar across group types, with very little variation. It indicates 
that when it comes to maintaining interconnections, all groups are about equally likely to do so 
with social movement organizations in other countries, EU-level groups, and labor unions in 
other countries. However, again, asylum groups are more likely than the others to connect with 
business associations in other countries. Overall, all groups interact most frequently with other 
NGOs, followed by EU groups, business, and finally labor.     
Figure 4.25 disaggregates links with national-level actors by group income. In general, 
groups with an annual income level below the mean are more likely to maintain strong 
connections with other NGOs as well as labor unions. However, groups with higher incomes are 
more likely to maintain strong links with national business associations. Moving beyond the 
national level, Figure 4.26 shows that low-income groups tend to maintain strong connections 
with other NGOs and EU-level groups. Groups of both income levels are about equally likely to 
forge strong ties with business and labor in other countries.     
 In sum, the interconnectedness of PMR organizations looks remarkably similar across 
group types. At both the national and transnational levels, groups are most heavily connected to 
other NGOs, followed by EU-level groups. This indicates a preference among all groups to 
interact most strongly with other like-minded civil society organizations. At the national level, 
most groups maintain stronger connections to labor unions than business associations, but this 
trend reverses when we move beyond the nation-state. Overall, asylum groups are more strongly 
connected to business associations (across levels) than the other group types. In addition, lower-
income groups tend to maintain the strongest ties with other NGOs across levels, national labor, 
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and EU groups. In contrast, high-income organizations tend to maintain stronger connections with 
national business.      
Section III: Activities 
The third section of the questionnaire asks about different types of political activities used to 
influence policy at different levels of governance, and consists of two questions. The aim of the 
first is to probe how often groups rely on a host of conventional and challenging activities aimed 
at the national government. In addition to inquiring about the use of such tactics as formal and 
informal meetings with civil servants or government ministers, it also asks respondents to indicate 
how frequently their organization uses protest and is in contact with the media. Thus, the primary 
aim of this section is to measure the use of different methods of influence at different levels of 
governance. 
 Whereas the distribution of each activity for the pooled sample is reported in the 
empirical chapters, Figure 4.27 displays the percentage of each group by identity (services/care, 
political/legal, and asylum) that often participate in conventional lobbying tactics at the national 
level. Services/care groups tend to engage most often in local government contacts, informal 
meetings with civil servants and ministers, and contacts with political parties, whereas 
political/legal organizations are the most apt of the three to interact with Parliament. In contrast, 
asylum groups tend to participate the least often in national lobbying activities, with the exception 
of participating in government commissions and advisory committees. In addition, consistent 
with what we would expect, Figure 4.28 shows that political/legal and asylum groups, which tend 
to pose a greater challenge to the established order, participate more often in contentious 
activities such as protest and court cases. In contrast, services/care groups are the most likely of 
the three to use the media.    
Moving beyond the national arena, the second question in this section asks about the use 
of conventional and confrontational methods directed at the EU level. Although it mainly asks 
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respondents to report how often their group has contacts with various EU institutions, it also 
inquires into the use of more confrontational tactics against the EU.  
 Figure 4.29 displays the percentage of each type of group that often participates in 
conventional lobbying tactics at the EU level. The main activities of all groups consist of 
contacting the European Commission and Parliament, with services/care groups most likely to 
engage in the former and asylum organizations most prone to do the latter. Although all group 
types are equally likely to engage with Coreper, services/care and political/legal tend to 
participate more often in engaging with the Council of Ministers and the Economic and Social 
Committee. Overall, the more challenging groups are not generally excluded from EU-level 
lobbying activity.    
 Figure 4.30 shows the distribution of more contentious forms of action by group type. 
Although it accounts for a relatively minor portion of groups’ political repertoires, each group 
type is about equally likely to protest the EU and to use the ECJ. Overall, resorting to the ECJ is 
the least common activity for all groups, since the process can be expensive, complicated, and 
time-consuming.   
 In sum, all groups participate in conventional lobbying activities across levels. In broad 
terms, asylum groups tend to engage the least often in these tactics at each level, with certain 
exceptions. Both services/care and political/legal organizations engage heavily in lobbying 
various institutions. When it comes to more contentious acts, services/care groups are the least 
likely to participate at the national level, but this effect cancels out at the level of the EU, where 
all groups are about equally prone to using such tactics.   
Section IV: Effectiveness 
The fourth section of the questionnaire aims to assess the effectiveness of each activity mentioned 
in Sections II and III; it consists of a series of nine questions. For the purposes of the empirical 
analyses, the relevant questions probe the effectiveness of conventional and challenging activities 
aimed at the national government and EU. The effectiveness of each activity for the pooled 
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sample is reported in the empirical chapters. Overall, the main goal of this section is to assess the 
efficacy of each of the various methods of influence that groups employ at each level of 
governance.  
Overall, the main goal of this section is to assess the efficacy of each of the various 
methods of influence that groups employ at each level of governance. That said, it should be 
noted that this dissertation does not equate policy effectiveness with concrete policy outcomes. 
Outcomes measured in terms of legislation would be problematic in this type of study for several 
reasons. First, although legislation in this area is growing, at this point there are relatively few 
important pieces of legislation to analyze. Relatedly, in analyzing outcomes one would ideally 
want to survey not only organizations, but also the civil servants and policymakers involved in 
order to arrive at unbiased conclusions concerning the impact of migrant inclusion groups in the 
policy process. Outcomes could alternatively be measured in terms of “softer” indicators, such as 
influencing policy debates or agendas. However, this would be very difficult to operationalize 
and accurately measure.  
Given these potential issues, this study examines policy effectiveness, defined as how 
useful a given method of influence is in terms of achieving the group’s most important policy 
goals. Thus, effectiveness can be thought of as an assessment of the political activities the 
organization employs to affect concrete outcomes. Whereas outcomes relate to a specific piece of 
legislation or policy, effectiveness relates to a specific activity or method of policy influence. 
Each organization thus rates a range of activities in terms of their utility in realizing the 
organization’s policy goals.    
Figure 4.31 illustrates how effective each group type considers the range of national 
lobbying activities in achieving its policy goals. In general, services/care organizations report the 
highest levels of effectiveness among all group types, which is consistent with expectations given 
that their goals tend to be less challenging. The only activities for which this is not the case are 
contacts with parliament and participation in government commissions and advisory committees; 
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all groups report an equal level of efficacy for these activities. In contrast, asylum organizations 
tend to report the lowest levels of effectiveness across the range of tactics.  
The same general pattern also holds with respect to challenging and mobilizing activities, 
as illustrated in Figure 4.32. All group types tend to equally report low levels of effectiveness 
when it comes to protest. In contrast, using the courts is seen as significantly more effective, 
particularly among services/care groups. Finally, media contacts are widely regarded as the most 
effective activity, with services/care groups reporting the highest levels of effectiveness and 
asylum organizations reporting the lowest.     
At the European level, Figure 4.33 shows that both services/care and political/legal 
groups are about equally prone to view three of the five lobbying activities as very effective: 
contacts with the Commission, Parliament, and Council of Ministers. Asylum organizations, in 
contrast, are least likely to report these actions as very effective. Moreover, all group types have 
about equally low opinions regarding the efficacy of their interactions with the Economic and 
Social Committee; similarly, contacts with Coreper are widely viewed as ineffective.  
In terms of the more contentious EU-level actions, although each group type is about 
equally likely to participate in EU-directed protest, Figure 4.34 shows that services/care and 
political/legal groups are more prone to view this tactic as effective. In contrast, each group has 
about the same opinion of the effectiveness of using the ECJ, which is widely regarded as the 
more efficacious tactic than protest.   
In sum, when it comes to policy effectiveness, services/care and political/legal 
organizations tend to view the range of conventional lobbying activities across each level as more 
efficacious than asylum groups. The same pattern tends to hold when it comes to the more 
confrontational tactics across levels. Overall, asylum organizations tend to be the least effective 
across both levels of governance.     
Section V: Personal Information 
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The final section of the questionnaire simply asks the group representative to report his or her job 
title. The goal is to have the organization’s director or other senior employee complete the 
questionnaire, since they presumably have the most in-depth and comprehensive knowledge of 
the group’s activities. This section, then, basically functions as a quality control regarding the 
information being supplied by the organization.    
 Figure 4.35 confirms that the organization’s director or other manager has completed the 
vast majority of the questionnaires (about 80%), while other staff members (typically a project 
coordinator) have completed about 20%. In all cases, the respondent worked on migrant and 
refugee issues for the organization. Thus, in no cases did a respondent lack the appropriate 
knowledge or expertise to accurately fill out the questionnaire.      
 
CONCLUSION 
This examination of the data and characteristics of PMR groups attempts to not only describe the 
sample, but also to put the migrant inclusion movement in a broader context. Overall, it indicates 
that the sample of organizations within the movement is fairly diverse; there is no single platform 
representing a monolithic notion of “migrants’ interests.” Instead, groups are organizationally and 
politically varied. Migrant and refugee politics encompasses a wide array of issue interests, 
spanning service/care-giving concerns about discrimination, education, and access to housing, 
social services, and health care to political/legal and asylum concerns that deal with work permit 
regulations, free movement, citizenship, and host country residence, as well as a range of issues 
in between. There are groups that specialize in aiding undocumented migrants, young migrants, 
migrant women, and migrants or refugees of a specific ethnicity. Some organizations strive to 
improve the political rights of settled migrants, whereas others provide physical or mental health 
care to meet the particular needs of new migrant and refugee communities in the host country.  
 In overall terms, this diverse sample appears fairly representative. In comparing the 
sample of groups in this study to the known population on available dimensions, it is evident that 
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in general the sample mirrors the patterns of the known population. The one exception is the 
proportion of political/legal and asylum groups, which appear to differ slightly between the 
sample and population. Thus, in general, the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee 
Organizations offers a reasonable basis on which to make preliminary comparisons and estimates 
about the actions and characteristics of PMR groups active across the EU. The following chapters 
will examine how these group characteristics and other exogenous factors shape the political 
behavior of the movement across Europe.           
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Chapter Four: Tables and Figures 
Figure 4.1 
Year of Formation of Sample
  (Source: Group surveys and websites)
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Figure 4.2 
Year of Formation of Known Population
 (Source: Group Websites)
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 Figure 4.3 
Staff Size   
(Paid employees include both full-time and part-
time employees)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0 1 2-5. 6-10. 11-20. 21+
Number of Employees
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
ro
up
s
 
 
Figure 4.4 
Number of Volunteers 
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Figure 4.5
Proportion of National versus International 
Organizations: Sample
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Figure 4.6
Proportion of National versus International 
Organizations: Population
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 Figure 4.7 
Operating Budget of Sample, 2004-2006 
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Figure 4.8 
Income Trend of Sample
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Figure 4.9 
Membership Size of Sample
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Figure 4.10
 Ideological Dimensions of Sample
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Figure 4.11 
Ideological Dimensions of Population 
(Source: Group Websites)
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Figure 4.12
Group Age by Group Type 
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Figure 4.13
Membership Size by Group Type
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Figure 4.14
Paid Staff by Group Type
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Figure 4.15
Volunteers by Group Type
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Figure 4.16
Annual Operating Budget by Group Type
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Figure 4.17
Income Trend by Group Type
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Figure 4.18
EU as a Source of Funding by Group Type
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Figure 4.19
Perceptions of Immigration Policy by Group Type
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Figure 4.20
Perceptions of Citizenship Policy by Group Type
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Figure 4.21
Perceptions of Asylum Policy by Group Type
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Figure 4.22
Perceptions of Employment Policy by Group Type
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Figure 4.23
National-level Connections by Group Type 
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Figure 4.24
Connections Beyond National Level by Group Type 
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Figure 4.25
National Connections by Group Income
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Figure 4.26
Connections Beyond National Level by Group Income 
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Figure 4.27
Participation in National Lobbying Activities by Group Type
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Figure 4.28
Participation in National Challenging and Mobilizing Activities by Group 
Type
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Figure 4.29
Participation in EU Lobbying Activity by Group Type
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Figure 4.30
Participation in EU Challenging Activity by Group Type
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Figure 4.31
Effectiveness of National Lobbying Activities by Group Type
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Figure 4.32
Effective  of Natio  Challe  M ing A vities 
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Figure 4.33
Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activities by Group Type
at
 
0
.02
0.04
.06
08
0.1
12
iss
ion
M
s
Co
un
cil
Ec
on
 C
mt
e
Co
rep
er
Activi
th e"
0nt or
t
0
 G y 
0.r
o
Ef
0.
up
s tiv
Co
mm
EP
Pe
r R
ce ep
ag
e
 "
 o
f
Ve
r
fe
c
servic s/caree
politic l/legala
/S
oc
ty
asylum
 
 
Figure 4.34
Effectiveness of EU Challenging Acti ity by Group Type
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Figure 4.35
Participation in Survey by T pe of Employee
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Table 4.1       
Eu pean Pro-Migran nd Refugee Organizatio
      
Variable   Obs Me Std. Dev. Mi
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of ro t a ns 
 
an n. Max 
Country   114 10. . 112 5 99  25 
No. groups 114 57 33 1.5 .05  114 
Year founded 114 199 12 19 2004 0 .46 32 
Membership 114 4,302 27,104 0 25 0,000 
Full-time staff 113 6.0 12 07 .18  90 
Part-time staff 112 3.63 6. 059  50 
No. volunteers 113 17. 61 087 .28  500 
Income (in Euros) 96 1,141.36 3,419.49 0 19,000  
Income trend 112 1.6 .7 18 7  3 
EU grant   114 1.5 .5 13 7  3 
Services/Care 114 .5 .32 02  1 
Political/Legal 113 .3 .30 09  1 
Asylum   114 .46 .40 0 1 
Group focus 112 1.6 .7 18 3  3 
Group target 112 1.3 .75 1
aria le is scaled by dividing the group's income 000.  Incom
f income increa ove  past  2 ecre d, and 3 if it 
. The EU Grant va e is d 1 if ro ceiv s from the 
future f nds are ected. The Group Fo aria  code  
 migra s/refug 2= ry foc  m ts/r es and other 
groups, 3= rimary focus is other disadvantaged groups but migrants/refugees are inclu
 is cod d as follows: 1=all migran ug  2=m nts/re es 
thnicity 3=wom igr refug 4= g m ts/ref s. 
1  4 
Note: The Income v
Trend variable is co
b by 1
if it d
 The
ase
e 
ded 1 i
kept pace with inflation
sed r the year,
riabl  code  the g up re ed fund
EU, 2 if it did not, and 3 if u  exp cus v ble is d as
follows: 1=primary focus is nt ees, prima us is igran efuge
p ded. 
The Group Target variable e ts/ref ees, igra fuge
of a particular nationality/e , en m ants/ ees, youn igran ugee
 
 
    
 
 
rce of Inc  for Pro-Migrant and Refugee 
 
  Groups 
 50.88% 
   
Table 4.2   
European Commission as a Sou ome
Groups 
   
    % of 
Have Received Grant 
Will Receive Grant  3.51% 
Received Grant 45.61% Have Not 
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Table 4.3        
National Differences in Membershi ee Groups  
            
Country Membership Groups membership Dev. Min Max 
 
 of 
population 
p of Pro-Migrant and Refug
    
No. Mean Std. 
Membership
as %
Austria 284 7 40.6 44.3 0 120  0.004 
Belgium 893 11 81.2 161.7 0 563  0.006 
Denmark 149 2 74.5 7.8 69 80  0.003 
France 1,203 6 200.5 393.3 0 1000  0.002 
400  0.001 
Greec 1146.
Ireland 252,583 9 28064.8 83226.3 0 250,000  6.3 
0  0.001 
Luxembourg 49 3 16.3 1.5 15 18  0.01 
Netherlands 36027.3 0 130,000  0.81 
Portugal 4,369 3 1456.3 2208.4 29 4000  0.04 
 
6.3 5 2300  0.05 
UK 917. 1 
Hungary 102 4 25.5 36.9 0 80  0.001 
ech Rep. 4,125 3 1375 2274.2 0 4000  0.001 
 0.01 
Cyprus 150 1 150 . 150 150  0.02 
Malta 3100 
Finland 695 3 231.7 252 0 500  0.01 
Germany 1,133 8 141.6 136.6 8 
e 2,030 3 676.7 1 8 2000  0.02 
Italy 429 5 85.8 84.7 9 20
 131,254 13 10096.5 
Spain 75,130 2 37565 53117.9 5 75125  0.18
Sweden 4,635 5 927 97
7,565 19 398.2 8 0 4000  0.0
Cz
Estonia 559 5 111.8 182.8 0 431 
 
3,100 2 1550 2192 0  0.78 
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Table 4.4      
National Differences in up  to 
rship 
     
bo e Average Below Average    
 Membership of Pro-Migrant and Refugee Gro s Compared
Adjusted Average Membe
    
Country A v
Austria  --    
Belgium +     
+     
Germany + 
+ 
    
+     
--    
    
   
    
+     
   
--    
    
   
--    
     
mbership for sample is about 318. 
Denmark  --    
Finland +     
France 
    
    Greece 
Ireland + 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands + 
Portugal +  
Spain + 
Sweden 
UK +  
Hungary  
Czech Republic + 
Estonia +  
Cyprus  
Malta + 
Note: Adjusted average me
 114
 
Table 4.5       
  
Factor Analysis of Group Identity        
     
Variable     Political/Legal Services/Care Asylum  
-.16  .83 .10 Voting-nat'l  
Voting-EU  
Voting-local  
 .78 .08 -.03  
.70 .26 -.05  
.70 .10 -.39  
.70 .10 -.21  
.47 .28 .26  
 
 
.82 -.23  
Psychological t 0 -.21  
0 -.10  
.29 .66 .04  
.40 .61 -.03  
.18 .51 -.14  
.32 .49 .37  
 
 
22 -.65  
Improve asylum es 3 -.54  
 
  
19 
 
13  
riables yields 3 dimensions with 
 solution. 
Facilitate EU citizenship 
Facilitate free movement 
Fight discrimination  
Improve legal rights  .45 .38 -.35 
      
Health care  .07 
adjustmen -.01 .7
.09 .7Housing   
Find employment  
Provide education  
Learn national language/customs 
prove tolerance  Im
      
Improve national citizenship proc. .48 .17 -.66 
Improve visa/w rk permit proc. .33 .o
 procedur .07 .2
 
% variance   
 
58
Note: A principal factor analysis of the 17 group identit  vay
eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Above is the varimax-rotated
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Table 4.6          
Factor Analysis of Interconnectedness             
Nat'l NGOs 
abroad 
Business/ 
labor  
abroad 
Nat'l 
business 
Nat'l 
labor 
EU 
groups Variable       NGOs 
Share info, national NGOs  .67 -.16 -.08 -.13 .14 -.24 
Share advice, national NGOs  .75 -.
.
26 -.17 .01 .09 -.18 
04 -.10 .10 .10 .06 
19 -.19 -.04 .24 -.18 
       
 business .12 -.75 -.21 .10 .08 .18 
   
.11 .09 
-.32 -.79 .14 .06 .11 
-.33 -.35 .10 .04 .20 
 -.25 -.78 .12 .15 .08 
     
-.11 -.07 .83 .16 .09 
.06 -.11 -.11 .85 .25 .14 
.10 .24 
-.05 .85 .19 .15 
          
Share info, NGOs abroad  .09 -.07 -.07 .22 .84 .11 
broad  -.00 .01 .-14 .24 .73 .19 
  
.90 
 .04 .20 .03 .88 
-.26 .03 .05 .05 .81 
4 .03 .03 .03 .83 
-.44 .09 .19 .72 
 -.41 .20 .16 .71 
-.23 -.04 -.19 .07 .04 .77 
.22 -.44 .09 .18 .69 
      
% variance     .18 .08 .07 .04 .13 .40 
Note: A principal factor analysis of the 28 items yields six dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 
1.0. Above is the varimax-rotated solution.  
Share resources, national NGOs  .53 -
Common projects, national NGOs  .54 -.
   
Share info, national business  .17 -.83 -.23 .07 .05 .15 
Share advice, national business  .10 -.84 -.25 .13 .02 .19 
Share resources, national business .04 -.59 -.15 .01 .06 .32 
Common projects, national
       
-.36 -.80 .10 Share info, national labor  .13 
Share advice, national labor  .12 
Share resources, national labor  -.06 
Common projects, national labor  .08
     
Share info, EU groups   -.04 
Share advice, EU groups  
Share resources, EU groups  -.05 .03 -.11 .60 
-.08 -.11 Common projects, EU groups  
Share advice, NGOs abroad  .15 -.11 -.13 .25 .83 .07 
Share resources, NGOs abroad  .06 .12 -.08 .21 .45 .32 
Common projects, NGOs a
        
.04 .10 .07 Share info, business abroad  -.02 -.23 
Share advice, business abroad  .04 -.22
Share resources, business abroad -.13 
Common projects, business abroad -.10 -.2
Share info, labor abroad  .02 .18 
Share advice, labor abroad  -.04 .06
Share resources, labor abroad  
Common projects, labor abroad  -.06 
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Appendix A to Chapter Four 
The survey questionnaire: 
 
SURVEY OF EUROPEAN PRO-MIGRANT AND REFUG EE  ORGANIZATIONS 
ection I.  Background Information: 
p founded?     
 
S
1.  In what year was the grou  
 
2.  About how many members do you have at the present time?          
 
   3.  About how many people work in the central office of the organization?: 
l t m lunteers (in average week) 
 
   4.  What is your annual operating budget (excluding one-time grants or contracts)? 
 
 currency) 
 
   5. up’s income (please type an “X” next to your answer): 
   
            
     ful ime for pay                       part ti e for pay         vo
 (in your
  Over the past 2-3 years has the gro
a.  increased  b.  decreased  c.  kept pace with inflation  
 
.  How would you describe the types of issues that most concern your organization?  
  
    
6
  
 a. Mainly issues that affect migrants or refugees      
     b. Issues that equally affect migrants/refugees and other disadvantaged groups 
  c. Mainly issu  tes hat affect other disadvantaged groups 
 
   7. nts toward whom your group’s work is directed? 
 
 
  How would you describe the migra
  
 a. All migrants or refugees / no particular distinction    
   
  b. Migrants/refugees of a particular nationality/ethnicity  
 (if so, which one? ) 
  c. Migrants/refugees of a particular gender (if so, which one?  ) 
  d an g  a particular . Migr ts/refu ees of age (if so, please describe   ) 
 
ment a project? 
 
8.  Has your group received funds from the European Commission to imple
   a. Yes  b.  No  c.  Will Receive 
 
ion that affect migrants?  
Very    Somewhat  Somewhat     Very       Don’t 
2        tringent=3   Stringent=4  Know=9 
  a
  b
  c
  d. Employment regulations  
 
9. How would you describe current laws in your nat
   Open=1   Open =  S
. Immigration laws  
. Citizenship laws  
. Asylum procedures     
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10. To what extent does your group provide advice or expertise to the following European    
 institutions?  
Often=1      Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4  
om
c. Other institution:   
a. European C mission  
b. European Parliament  
   
 
11.  Here is a list of issues that may be affecting migrants/refugees throughout the European 
 the activities and political concerns of 
our group? 
ery    Not a  
       Important=2    Important=3 Priority=4  
   
   
  
   
 
   c.  Facilitating national citizenship  
 
 
   d.  Facilitating procedure  for   
   
 
   
   
 
   f.  Voting in local elections   
   
   
 
   pl
 
 
                 
 
  o.  Fighting discrimination                               
 
  p.  Improving migrants’ legal rights  
 
  q.  Providing education to migrants    
Union.  Could you indicate how important each issue is to
y
Highest V
    Priority=1    
a.  Learning national language  
   /customs 
b.  Improving asylum procedures      
          procedures     
s
   obtaining visas or work permits       
e.  Voting in national Presidential or 
          Parliamentary elections        
 
g.  Voting in European elections        
h.  Finding em oyment         
  i.  Psychological adjustment    
 
j.  Physical health / Health care        
 
 k.  Housing     
 
 l.  Improving society’s tolerance    
   
  m.  Access to European citizenship      
 
  n.  Facilitating free movement         
        within Europe for work    
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Section II.  Cooperation and Collaboration: 
2.  The next four questions list various ways that groups might work together to impact policy.  
 y c h vernmental 
y=3         Never=4 
ur group collaborated with non-governmental 
activities?     
Often=1  Sometimes=2   Rarely=3         Never=4 
nge advice/expertise     
c. To exchange personnel/resources     
d. To 
    
14.  In the past 2
and/or
 
a.  Business associations to exchange information     
.  Business associations to exchange advice/expertise    
.  Labor unions to exchange information    
f.   Labor unions
to exchange personnel/resources       
nothe ctivit s?     
Often=1     Sometimes=2  Rarely=3        Never=4 
.  Business associations to exchange information          
e advice/expertise     
.  Business associations to exchange personnel/resources   
nate ac ivities/ rojects  
.  Labor unions to exchange information     
f.   Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise         
g.  Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources        
h.  Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects          
 
1
In the past 2-3 ears, how often has your group ollaborated wit  non-go
organizations from your own country in the following activities?   
  
Often=1  Sometimes=2   Rarel
a. To exchange information  
b. To exchange advice/expertise      
c. To exchange personnel/resources 
d. To coordinate activities/projects 
    
13.  In the past 2-3 years, how often has yo
organizations from another country in the following 
 
a. To exchange information     
b. To excha
coordinate activities/projects 
-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with business associations 
 labor unions from your country in the following activities?      
 
Often=1  Sometimes=2   Rarely=3         Never=4
b
c.  Business associations to exchange personnel/resources  
d.  Business associations to coordinate activities/projects 
   
e
 to exchange advice/expertise        
g.  Labor unions 
h.  Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects        
    
15.  In the past 2-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with business associations 
and/or labor unions from a r country in the following a ie  
   
a
b.  Business associations to exchang
c
d.  Business associations to coordi t p    
 
e
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16.  Finally, in the p  at the European 
level, such as the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia or the Migration 
Pol
   
  Sometimes=2 Rarely=3        Never=4 
a. European groups to exchange information     
b. Euro
c. European groups to exchange personnel/resources 
d. E
 
Section
17. Now I’d like to ask about activities within your own country that groups might use to influence 
pol  uses 
the method?  
  
Often=1 Sometimes=2   Rarely=3       Never=4 
    a. Form h civil servants or ministers    
  b. Informal contacts with civil servants/ministers   
  c. C a
  d. Contacts with local government authorities      
  e. Demo
f. Legal recourse to courts/other judicial bodies        
g. C
h. Participation in government commissions and advisory committees     
i. Conta
 
 
18. Some groups work with international or European institutions to influence policy. For each of    
the o
    
  a. Contacts with officials of the European Commission    
  b. Cont
  c. Legal recourse to the European Court of Justice     
  d. Cont
  e. Demonstrations/protests that target the European Union  
  f. Conta
  g. Contacts with members of COREPER      
  h. Cont  European Council    
  i. Contacts with the United Nations      
 
ast 2-3 years, how often have you collaborated with groups
icy Group? 
Often=1 
pean groups to exchange advice/expertise    
uropean groups to coordinate activities/projects  
 III.  Activities: 
icy.  For each of the following activities would you indicate how frequently your organization
  
al meetings wit
ont cts with officials of political parties        
nstrations, protests, direct actions        
ontacts with people in the media      
cts with members of Parliament   
foll wing activities would you indicate how frequently your organization uses the method? 
Often=1 Sometimes=2  Rarely=3  Never=4 
acts with members of the European Parliament    
acts with officials of the Council of Ministers    
cts with the Economic and Social Committee    
acts with members of the
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19.  How often are your ulated by the 
following types of policy developments? 
  
Often=1 Sometimes=2   Rarely=3 Never=4 
    a.  Stim
  b.  Stimulated about equally by national and European Policy   
    c.  Stim  
 
Sec
20.  In general, how would you evaluate the effectiveness of your collaborations with groups from 
your ow ase evaluate the 
following activities: 
 
Very             Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
Effectiv
 
a. Exc
b. Exchanging advice/expertise 
c. Exc  
d. Coordinating activities/projects  
    
 
21. And
another country? Please evaluate the following activities:  
 
Very             Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
Eff v
 
a. Exc
b. Exchanging advice/expertise 
c. c
d. Coordinating activities/projects  
 
    
22.  No
unions from your own country in achieving your organization’s policy objectives. Please evaluate 
the following activities: 
                                
Ver  
Effective=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
     
a. Business associations to exchange information 
b. B n
c. Business associations to exchange personnel/resources  
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects 
                
e. L
f. Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise  
g. Labo
h. Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects    
 
contacts with groups from outside your nation stim
  
ulated mainly by national policy   
ulated mainly by European policy 
tion IV.  Effectiveness: 
n country in achieving your organization’s policy objectives? Ple
e=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
hanging information  
hanging personnel/resources
 how would you evaluate the effectiveness of your collaborations with groups from 
ecti e=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
hanging information  
 Ex hanging personnel/resources 
w I’d like to ask you to evaluate your collaborations with business associations and labor 
y            Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
                   
usi ess associations to exchange advice/expertise                
abor unions to exchange information  
r unions to exchange personnel/resources    
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23.    
country:  
 
Very             Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
Effe
 
a. Busin ange information    
b. Business associations to exchange advice/expertise 
c. B
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects 
 
e. Labor unions to exchange information  
f. Labor
g. Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources  
h. L
 
24.  When it comes to your collaborations with groups at the European level, how would you 
evaluate the following activities in achieving your policy objectives? 
Very             Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
Effe v
                
a. Europ
b. European groups to exchange advice/expertise     
c. European groups to exchange personnel/resources 
d. European 
 
 
25. 
achieving  objectives? 
 
Very            
Eff v
 
 a. Form
  b. Inform
  c. C a
  d. Contacts with local government authorities    
  e. Demo     
  f. Legal recourse to courts/other judicial bodies    
  g. Contacts with people in the media   
  h. Participation in government commissions and advisory committees   
   i. Contacts with members of Parliament   
       
 Please evaluate your collaborations with business associations and labor unions from another
ctive=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
ess associations to exch
usiness associations to exchange personnel/resources 
 unions to exchange advice/expertise  
abor unions to coordinate activities/projects   
    
cti e=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
ean groups to exchange information      
groups to coordinate activities/projects 
On average, how useful are the following activities you undertake within your country in 
your group’s policy
 Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t 
ecti e=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Know=9 
al meetings with civil servants or ministers 
al contacts with civil servants/ministers    
ont cts with officials of political parties    
nstrations, protests, direct actions
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26. And how would you eval pean activities in achieving 
your groups’ policy objectives?:  
 
V  
E w=9 
         
  a. Contacts with officials of the European Commissi
  b. Contacts with members  the European Parliamen
  c. Legal recourse to the European Court of Justice 
  d. Contacts with officials of the Council of Ministers
  e  hat target the European U  
  f mittee
  g. Contacts with members of COREPER   
  h uropean Council 
   i e United Nations  
 
2 l, would you please indicate which one e three st nts y d to agree    
w
 
              
uate the following international and Euro
ery             Somewhat       Not Very       Not At All     Don’t
ffective=1      Effective=2       Effective=3       Effective=4       Kno
on 
t of
 
. Demonstrations/protests t nion  
. Contacts with the Economic and Social Com   
. Contacts with members of the E  
. Contacts with th
7. In genera of thes ateme ou ten
ith most: 
a.  Groups working on migrants’ issues are more effective when they fo s their 
ts mainly within their own country. 
cu
effor
    b.  Groups working on migrants’ iss more ef e wh ey focus their 
ally within their own country and a ution/agen f the ean Union. 
ues are fectiv en th
efforts equ n instit cy o Europ
    c. Groups working on migrants’ issues are more effe e whe ocus their 
rts mainly within an institution/agency of the European Union. 
 
 
2 es that affect migra w would  descr
r an Union versus your nat overnmen
to the number of your response). 
  
ctiv n they f
effo
8. Overall, when it comes to issu nts, ho you ibe the 
eceptiveness of the Europe ional g t? (Please type an “X” next 
    1     2     3  
  
     In           In general, European        In general, European 
    e m re        institutions/agencies re as       institutions/agencies are less 
          receptive than the national 
    to  gover t to issues  
    that affect migrants            that affect migrants  that affect mi
 
 
Section V. Personal Information: 
 
2   
general, European 
institutions/agencies ar
    
o a
receptive than the nationa       receptive as the national 
government to issues         governments 
l  
issues nmen
    grants 
9. What is your job position?      
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Interview Questions for Migrant ion Organizations: Inclus  
ievi r policy goals, and  have you 
chosen these? 
s, and if so, what pro s you  so? 
esort to protest or other direct actions? If so, whom d u protest: the 
overnment, and why?  
ect your ac  or strate t the EU, versus your 
national government? Are there any factors in particular that push you towards action at 
e EU level? 
ce of f
 and discrimination or to work for issues that affect m s?   
6. To what extent do u collaborate or communicate with other organizations whose work 
igrants’ issues? For exam ith envir tal groups, ethnic 
io hy? 
ued that since the European Commis n’t  to face the 
on or electoral pressures, it has more freedom to propose 
 migrants’ rights or mi clusion i pe. To what extent 
does this influence your lobbying strategies? In o you feel your chances of 
achieving your policy goals are greater by lo  the Commission rather than your 
ke to see deeper EU integration in this po y area? In other words, 
u like to see a stronger role for the Commission, the EP, and the ECJ when it 
-disc ination? Why/why not?  
e efforts of the European Union and the national 
rove?
1. What are your preferred strategies in ach ng you why
2. Do you ever collaborate with other actor mpt  to do
3. Does your group r o yo
EU or the national g
4. Under what conditions do you dir tivities gies a
th
5. How would you describe the importan orming networks/alliances with other actors 
to combat racism igrant
yo
may not focus on m ple, w onmen
associations, business interests, or labor un ns? W
7. Some people have arg sion does  have
scrutiny of public opini
legislation that favors grant in n Euro
ther words, do 
bbyi gn
national government?   
8. Would your group li lic
would yo
comes to anti rim
9. In your opinion, what do you think of th
government in the area of anti-discrimination? How can they imp  
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Interview Questions for European Commission: 
vil society organizations important t e Commission? 
nsive is your interaction with civil  groups or ganizations that work for 
 do anti-discrimination NGOs interact with the Commission to 
as/achieve their policy goals
NGOs help to d the Com sion’s authority in this 
words, in pursuing poli ls at the , d help to 
expand the capacit of the Commission when it comes to the policy area of anti-
discrimination? If so, how? 
ssion facilita ourage or provide incentives for 
 togeth s-nationa r across different policy 
sectors? 
ons and/or employers involved anti-discrim ation  If 
so, how? Do they collaborate with NGOs? 
w do NGOs atte pt to form alliances with the Commission  Do the  lobby, etc? 
 alliances with pr ant/anti- grou k for 
 the areas of immigration and asylum? ermine 
fectiveness? 
 How would you describe the importance of form
on? 
ffectiveness of NGOs that work with the Commis
 
rivate, non-go ental experts to inform policy/to come 
eal with migr lusion, a sm,
1. Why are relations with ci o th
2. How exte society  or
migrant inclusion/anti-discrimination? 
3. In what ways
institutionalize their policy agend ? 
Do specific activities by these  expan mis
policy area? In other cy goa  EU level o NGOs 
y 
4. To what extent does the Commi te, enc
groups to either communicate or work er cros lly o
5. Are trade uni in the in policy sector?
6. Ho m ? y
7. Does the Commission form o-migr racist ps to wor
deeper integration in  If so, what factors det
ef
8. ing networks/alliances with other actors 
to combat racism and/or discriminati
9. How do you perceive the e sion in 
achieving their policy goals?
10. To what extent do you utilize p vernm
up with new policy ideas that d ant inc nti-raci  or anti-
discrimination? 
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11. Do you believe that there needs to be closer cooperation among the different DGs in the 
imination? 
ion ffectively ct its ion against 
? Why? 
hat is the European “value added” of your efforts at combating discrim
In your opinion, did the inclusion of Article 13 in the Amsterd  Treaty increase the 
l of activity by GOs in this policy area? 
d to complishe  the fu
 
Interview Questions for Members o  the European P en
area of anti-discr
12. In your opinion, where can the Commiss most e  dire act
discrimination
13. W ination? 
14. am
leve  N
15. What are the most pressing tasks that nee  be ac d in ture?  
f arliam t: 
1. In the context of your committee work, how would you describe your interactions with 
arly those that work on behalf of anti-racism, immigration, or asylum 
issues?  
In your opinion, are these NGOs a valid source of policy ideas? 
y that these NGOs have on policy
se NG o conside ir inp her words, 
find it important to form relationships with these groups? 
 you think that the EP is a good/effective avenue for influence for migrant inclusion 
NGOs, particul
2. 
3. How much of an im you sapact would -making, or on 
policy outcomes? 
4. What is it that makes you listen to the Os, or t r the ut? In ot
why do you 
5. Do
NGOs seeking to impact policy? 
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Appendix B to Chapter Four 
T
Sample of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Groups, by Country 
  Founded Membership of Euros) 
able A.4.1     
Group 
Year 
Approximate  
2004 Budget  
(in thousands  
     
Austria     
Interkulturelles Zentrum 1987 60 810 
Verein fur Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-
Arbeit 1999 70 400 
Caritas Refugee Service Vienna 2003 15 - 
Fair Play VIDC 7 200 
Bruno Kreisky Foundation for Human Rights 1976 0 17,500 
Auslander Integrationsbeirat 1996 12 - 
     
Le Monde des Possibles 2001 563 40 
Migration Policy Group 1995 0 1,000 
Anti-Poverty Network 1990 26 1,100 
Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen 
CRACPE 
1987 
1997 
15 
70 
19,000 
3 
Finland 
EU Mi
Refugee Advice Centre 
N=3     
France  
Femmes de la Terre 1992 0 - 
1973 45 200 
1997 
Megaphon 1995 120 200 
N=7     
Belgium     
Mentor Escale 1997 10 250 
L'Olivier  1996 30 48 
Universal Embassy 2001 30 0 
Jesuit Refugee Services 
Caritas 
Church’s Commission for Migrants in Europe 
1980 
1974 
1964 
80 
48 
21 
250 
1,000 
340 
N=11     
     
Denmark     
Akelin  1995 69 0 
Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights 1997 80 800 
N=2     
     
    
grant Artists' Network 1997 195 20 
1988 0 - 
Finnish League for Human Rights 1979 500 300 
     
   
-  1982 8 - 
Forum Refugies 1982 100 9,575.06 
Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les 
Migrations Internationales (CIEMI) 
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Reseau pour l'Autonomie Juridique des Femmes 1998 50 0 
Service National de la Pastorale des Migrants 1972 1,000 70 
     
Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland 1999 60 3.6 
Forum Menschenrechte 1994 45 56 
Immigrees (RAJFIR) 
N=6     
Germany     
ARIC Berlin 1993 20 90 
Aktion Courage 1992 200 - 
Inform
Anti-Fascist League 1946 150 5 
SOS Rassismus 1983 250 50 
     
Research and Support Center for Victims of 
Antigone Center  
N=3     
Ireland     
Anti-Poverty Network 1990 300 200 
 
1994 50 25 
ivili 1982 9 - 
Trama
N=5  
ationsverbund Asyl 1998 8 - 
Internationale Liga fur Menschenrechte 1997 400 - 
N=8     
Greece     
Maltreatment and Social Exclusion (CVME) 1994 22 60 
1995 8 80 
Neolaia Synaspismou 1994 2,000 200 
     
African Refugee Network 1997 263 63 
National Consultative Committee on Racism and 
Interculturalism (NCCRI) 1998 0 - 
Mercy Justice Office 2000 1,000 170 
Union of Students in Ireland 1959 250,000 400 
Refugee Information Service 1998 0 300 
Nasc: Irish Immigrant Support Centre 2000 200 50 
Irish Refugee Council 1992 200 500 
Vincentian Refugee Centre 1999 620 177.78 
N=9     
     
Italy     
- 1990 200 - 
I Nostri Diritti 1997 20 - 
European Coordination for Foreigners' Right to 
Family Life 
Comitato per I Diritti C
 di Terre 1997 150 130 
   
     
Luxembourg    
Service Refugie Caritas 1932 15 - 
Commission Luxembourgeoise Justice et Paix 1971 16 5 
Centre de Documentation sue les Migrations 
Humaines 1996 18 100 
N=3     
 128
     
Discriminatie Meldpunt Tumba 2000 0 0 
Stichting Train 1990 0 170 
Stichting Alleenstaande Minderjarige 1999 0 350 
RADAR Rotterdam 1983 0 300 
Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel 1996 0 162.5 
Landelijk Bureau ter Bestreiding van 
Rassendiscriminatie (LBR) 1985 28 1,300 
Dutch Refugee Foundation 1976 130,000 12,000 
1985 450 1,000 
Palet  1997 
Netherlands    
Steunpunt Minderheden Overijssel (SMO) 1995 26 1,700 
Bureau Discriminatiezaken Utrecht 1985 0 160 
Asielzoekers Humanitas (SAMAH) 
Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam 1996 0 280 
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Utrecht 1976 750 0 
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Midden Gelderland 
0 2,800 
N=13     
 
Portugal  
Liga de Amizade Internacional 1984 4,000 29.226 
N=3     
Spain     
Medicos del Mundo 1990 75,125 16,623.48 
  
     
Swe
Immigrantinstitutet 1973 5 1,653.49 
76 
Afrikagrupperna 1974 2,300 - 
Filmdays against 
e Service Limited 1989 45 2,836.17 
re of Immigrants 1967 1,000 1,205.37 
0 - 
28.362 
Asylum Aid 
    
   
Associacao dos Emigrantes de Tame 1999 340 13.88 
Intercooperacao e Desenvolvimento (INDE) 1988 29 - 
     
Caritas Diocesana 1985 5 135 
N=2   
den     
FARR  1988 750 33.2
Svenska Fredskommitten 1949 1,500 44.355 
Racism 
N=5  
1993 
 
80 
 
85.858 
 
     
UK     
North of England Refuge
Joint Council for the Welfa
-  1995 10
Minorities of Europe (MOE) 1995 200 
European Multicultural Foundation 1996 170 11.323 
Manchester Refugee Support Network 1996 13 194.278 
National Association of British Arabs 2001 120 0 
No One is Illegal 2003 10 0 
Student Action for Refugees (STAR) 1994 4,000 142.625 
1997 60 128.337 
Racial Equality Council 1994 80 87.523 
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Birmingham Race Action Partnership 1999 0 707.662 
The Runnymede Trust 1968 0 424.675 
Bar Human Rights Committee of England and 1991 80 - 
The Voice of Congo 2004 12 0 
Society 2003 800 1,017.24 
Scottish Human Rights Centre 1970 600 103.372 
 
N=19     
     
Hungary     
International Law Research and Human Rights 
Monitoring Centre 2003 16 61.619 
Utilapu Halozat 
Unity Movement Foundation 
1993 
1998 
80 
6 
32.863 
11.175 
N=4     
Czech Republic    
Ecumenical Network 
 
MKC 
Refugee Survival Trust 1996 25 101.709 
Positive Action in Housing (PAIH) 1997 250 4,370.31 
Wales 
COMPAS-ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and 
Roma Participation Program 1997 0 1028.594 
     
Dzeno Association 1994 125 0 
for Youth Action 
N=3 
1995 
 
1999 
4,000 
 
0 
300 
 
245.862 
  
Estonian Refugee Council  
 
   
Estonia     
Non-Estonians' Integration Foundation 1998 0 1,597.79 
People to People Estonia 1993 100 0.12782 
2000 12 38.347 
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights 
(LICHR) 1994 16 0.0975 
NGO Youth Union 
N=5  
2001 
 
431 
 
1.917 
 
     
Cyprus     
Apanemi Information and Support Centre 2004 150 80.413 
N=1     
     
Malta     
Euro-Mediterranean Youth Platform 2003 3,100 200 
Jesuit Refugee Service 1980 0 - 
N=2     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conventional and Challenging Political Activity at the National Level 
“We participate in regular formal and informal meetings with government ministers. We need to 
Service in Sweden. 
“Protest organizations have no influence with politicians,” Representative from Ligue des Droits 
 
 with 
 
 
 
 
al 
nt for 
engage dialogue with the government, not confrontation,” Representative from Caritas Refugee 
 
de l’Homme (Human Rights League) in Brussels. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Social movement organizations (SMOs) can choose from a wide variety of possible tactics in 
responding to or interacting with their government. For example, groups can mount a protest, 
stage a demonstration, meet with national ministers, contact parliament and political parties, 
participate in government commissions, use the media, take action in the courts, interact
local government authorities, and more. Their choice of tactics can be either confrontational in
nature (e.g., protests) or more conventional (e.g., lobbying). Among pro-migrant and refugee 
(PMR) organizations across Europe, how common is protest versus institutional lobbying? Are 
certain types of groups more prone to using challenging methods? What factors increase or 
decrease the use of specific tactics? Which factors prompt groups to choose more challenging 
methods over more conventional activities? This chapter addresses these questions and shows that
the nature of a group’s interconnections strongly shapes its domestic activity patterns. Moreover, 
the national POS, along with group identity and resources, also shapes political action.      
Over the last decade, PMR organizations have become increasingly conspicuous political
actors throughout the countries of the European Union (EU). Their actions focus government
and public attention on the existing and emerging problems of migrants, refugees, the relations 
between third country nationals and the host country, as well as the features of advanced 
industrial societies that generate such problems as intolerance. As part of a social moveme
migrant inclusion, the new issue demands and political values that these groups espouse 
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sometimes conflict with the dominant paradigms of advanced industrial societies. Conseque
they may end up challenging well-established social interests and governments that contest thei
policy objectives. In short, in attempting to exert political influence, PMR organizat
ntly, 
r 
ions find 
themsel nally 
 
 
 of the 
 
 
igrant 
n of 
ents endorse and 
administer policy, groups must use conventional lobbying activities to persuade elites to support 
ves faced with the predicament of other SMOs. They must decide to work conventio
within established political channels or rely on protest to influence political reform.  
Research on other new social movements, such as the peace movement and 
environmentalism, reflects this friction over participation in conventional versus unconventional
tactics (Rochon 1988; Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003), and highlights one of the ongoing debates
within the social movement literature over the choice of tactics among SMOs. One element
literature argues that because SMOs represent distinct political interests that challenge the 
political status quo, they are forced to rely predominantly on contentious and direct tactics, such
as demonstrations and protests, to confront political institutions (Piven and Cloward 1977; 
McAdam 1997). Highly visible and confrontational action focuses public attention on migrant 
and refugee issues that would otherwise not occur through conventional political processes. 
Furthermore, SMOs arguably espouse an image of political dissent that opposes close 
collaboration with the institutions and government officials they attempt to influence. SMOs are 
able to mobilize public support and thereby increase the resources at their disposal by challenging
and critiquing the political establishment (McAdam 1997). Thus, according to some scholars, 
direct and confrontational tactics (including visible and disruptive hunger strikes, sit-ins, and 
marches exemplified in Chapter 1) characterize the political style and key values of the m
inclusion movement. 
 Others argue that the most influential SMOs undertake the right type and combinatio
activities that will most effectively promote their objectives. This can occur either through 
conventional lobbying or protest, depending on the issue (Jenkins 1983; Zald and McCarthy 
1987; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Since governm
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 legislation, as the above quotes illustrate. There are many examples in SMO research of 
groups engaging in a range of lobbying activities, including meeting with members of parliament 
and participating in advisory committees (Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003). This perspective 
assumes that groups do not just confront established interests, but will also choose to work wit
them. This is an important assumption, as it leads researchers to expand their analytical lens 
beyond the protest activities for which SMOs are so well known to also include a focus on 
institutional lobbying and other less confrontational methods. Thus, research can begin to reali
a more complete and accurate picture of movement behavior. This naturally leads to the question:
Under what conditions will groups protest versus lobby?    
In sum, even if one assumes that migrant inclusion groups, like other SMOs, use a
range of tactics to exert political influence, the exact distribution of these tactics and the factors 
that increase or decrease participation in (and the efficacy of) different activity types remai
unknown. Moreover, it is also unknown which factors lead groups to choose to protest versus 
lobby. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify these issues. Understanding them will help build 
deeper and more robust understanding of social movement behavior.  
DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL ACTION REP
An integrative model of activity controls for several different explanatory facto
interconnectedness, the national POS, group identity, and organizational resources. Chapter 3 
elaborated on how each of these is expected to shape various facets of movement activity. The 
following sections summarize the theoretical propositions and put forth hypotheses in the context 
of national-level action.  
Interconnectedness and Challenging versus Conventional Activity 
Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 proposes a set of relationships about how groups’ connections shape their 
activity patterns. At the national level, the important links concern other SMOs based in the h
country, as well as national business associations and labor unions. The model first posits that 
more extensive connections with other domestic SMOs can be expected to produce more 
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contentious forms of activity within the nation-state, such as protests, demonstrations, and
action. As elaborated in Chapter 3, social movement organizations promote goals and uphold 
political values that pose a challenge to the establish
 court 
ed order of advanced democracies. By 
 
e 
logy 
 
 labor 
ns to 
acilitated access to members of the 
polity, PMR groups should be more rotest. Additionally, as SMOs 
definition, SMOs are part of a movement to challenge and change socio-political norms. For
example, women’s, environmental, peace, and migrant inclusion groups all seek to effect som
degree of social or political change. Previous research in the European context has found that 
contentious action is quite common among networks or coalitions of new social movement 
(NSM) actors (see Imig and Tarrow 2001). Thus, group ties based on a common NSM ideo
may underscore and strengthen a group’s sense of political alienation and perceived estrangement
from traditional political institutions and policy processes. In turn, the group may be more prone 
to confrontational political tactics that target the national government (Tilly 1978). Therefore, 
increasingly strong connections to other domestic SMOs are expected to increase the likelihood 
of employing contentious tactics.  
In contrast, the model also proposes that ties with national business associations and
unions likely produce a moderation of tactics. In corporatist systems such as those in Europe, 
business and labor occupy a privileged position in the policy process in which they are routinely 
and formally consulted by government for the purposes of policy input. Thus, they spend a good 
portion of time interacting in a lobbying capacity with government agents. In turn, PMR groups 
that maintain strong links with national business and labor may be able to use their connectio
increase ties to government agencies and policymakers. With f
 likely to lobby rather than p
interact more with business and labor, they may simply choose to adopt similar methods of 
influence. Thus, lobbying and other conventional activities should become more common. 
Previous work has suggested that business in particular should make a willing ally for PMR 
groups, as they tend to lobby for more open immigration policies to fill labor market demand 
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(Favell and Hansen 2002). Therefore, increasingly strong connections to national business and
labor are expected to increase the likelihood of institutional lobbying tactics.      
The National POS and Challenging versus Conventional Activity 
Many scholars have argued that a relatively open POS encourages conventional modes 
oriented toward the national government. This proposition should hold for both the broad and
issue-specific aspects of the POS. One aspect of the b
 
of action 
 
road POS is the relative openness of the 
ed 
courage more challenging tactics by cutting off these avenues for influence. In 
s 
 
oreover, federal versus centralized systems should encourage 
 
ort 
to contentious tactics. Since studies show that Left-leaning governments tend to be more 
receptive to social movement issues (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995), SMOs 
political system to the tactics and goals of a movement (Tarrow 1994). Studies have found that 
the degree of system openness relates to the tactics the SMO chooses (Eisenger 1973; Tarrow 
1989, 1994; Kitschelt 1986). Relatively open systems should promote conventional strategies 
because they provide groups more opportunities to act via institutional channels, whereas clos
systems tend to en
the context of an open political system, research has shown that groups tend to employ 
conventional tactics, such as lobbying and participating in formal and informal meetings with 
government officials, but in closed systems, when conventional channels of influence are les
available, disruptive tactics such as civil disobedience and protest are more likely (Kitschelt 1986; 
McAdam 1982; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Previous research suggests that when a country’s 
competitiveness of participation is more open, SMOs are more likely to use institutional methods
of influence (Dalton et al. 2003). M
conventional tactics since they afford SMOs more access point for influence (Dalton et al. 2003).   
 The presence or absence of elite political allies is also expected to shape political 
behavior (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). As discussed in Chapter 3, the presence of allies within the
political process indicates a relatively favorable POS, making groups more likely to employ 
conventional activities. In contrast, when connections to members of the polity are weak or non-
existent, avenues for influence become more constrained and groups are thus more likely to res
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should be more likely to lobby when the Left is in a position of power. Further, multiparty 
systems increase the odds that an SMO will find political allies in government (Lijphart 1999; 
 
olicies also measure the issue-specific POS. 
terests 
e 
 
lens through which it interprets the political world (Dalton 1994), it defines its key issues and 
priorities, and shapes the tactics it uses to address its policy concerns.  
Dalton et al. 2003), making groups more likely to lobby and less likely to protest.  
Beyond the broad POS, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) argue that it may even be more
important for research to examine the issue-specific POS. As Chapter 3 discusses, issue-specific 
opportunities represent those elements of the political-institutional environment most likely to 
affect the movement in question. Migrant inclusion research has found that certain elements of 
the issue-specific POS relate to political behavior (Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 
1999c, 2001, 2005). This and the following chapters examine the issue-specific POS most 
relevant to migrants and refugees with new data from the European Civic Citizenship and 
Inclusion Index. The Index operationalizes five policy areas at the national level: labor market 
inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. 
Where this “policy context” is relatively open to migrant inclusion interests, one would expect 
groups to use conventional participation strategies, such as formal meetings and lobbying. In 
addition, data from the survey that ask group representatives about their perceptions of national 
immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment p
Because an open environment affords groups the opportunities to express their political in
through traditional national channels, protest becomes unnecessary. Thus, a national POS (in 
both broad and specific forms) that is more open to SMO demands is expected to increase th
likelihood of using conventional tactics and decrease confrontational activities.  
Group Identity and Challenging versus Conventional Activity  
An organization’s political identity, or ideology, has been found to be a significant factor in 
explaining movement behavior (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). Because a group’s identity acts as a
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Based on a factor analysis, Chapter 4 provided evidence for three separate dimensions of 
PMR group identity: services/care, political/legal, and asylum. Each type of group is expected to 
ly on  groups 
 the 
their 
 
ey 
 may 
. 
ge 
 
 financed 
y the g
e 
ps’ 
overall levels of political activity and success across a range of activity types (Schlozman and 
re certain political methods based on its identity. First, the concerns of services/care
center on providing a needed social service to immigrant communities, rather than calling for 
changes in the existing system. Because their issue priorities tend not to pose a large threat to
established order, their values should be less challenging. In turn, their identity should shape 
political options. Thus, because they are more likely than more challenging groups to receive 
support and build alliances with members of the social and political establishment, services-care
groups are more likely to act conventionally and less likely to be contentious.   
 In contrast, the values of political/legal and asylum groups should reflect a more 
challenging identity because their issue priorities tend to pose a greater threat to existing social 
and political-legal relations. These groups generally reject the dominant order of relations 
between migrants and refugees on the one hand, and state and society on the other. In short, th
attempt to bring about social, political, and legal change. Therefore, because their identity
constrain their options for action, political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to resort to 
confrontational tactics and less likely to act conventionally. 
Organizational Resources and Challenging versus Conventional Activity 
As discussed in Chapter 3, resources can work in two different ways to shape national activity
First, organizations with higher levels of resources are better positioned to undertake a wide ran
of activity and are more likely to be effective in their tactics. This is because participation in both
conventional and challenging activities requires planned efforts that are organized and
b roup. For example, groups with more paid staff may be better able to engage in letter-
writing campaigns, organize meetings with government officials, and offer expertise. At the sam
time, these groups can also choose to focus their resources on organizing a demonstration or 
mounting a protest. Previous social movement research shows that resources influence grou
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Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et a
2003).Therefore, groups with more versus fewer overall resources are likely more politically 
l. 
f may 
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e has also been shown to shape its political activities. For example, 
Dalton (1994) demonstrated that older grou e conventional modes of action whereas 
are more likely to protest. As a group develops and gains experience over 
ates 
 
national ministers, informal contacts with civil servants/national ministers, contacts with 
political parties, contacts with parliament, and participation in government commissions/advisory 
active and effective, regardless of the activity type. 
 In contrast to the linear and straightforward relationship posited above, other social 
movement research has found that groups with specific types of resources tend to use certain 
methods of influence over others. In other words, resources could differentially affect the choice 
of activities. For example, groups with a higher annual budget and a large professional staf
choose to maintain relationships with other social groups, political elites, and other actors, 
thereby providing the group with long-term stability and effectiveness. These organizations m
thus opt for more conventional strategies, including lobbying and mobilizing the public 
(Oberschall 1993; Milofsky 1988). On the other hand, Piven and Cloward (1977) have show
SMOs with limited resources rely more heavily on their volunteer activists and are more prone
staging confrontational displays such as protest. Therefore, organizations with few financial 
resources, a small staff, and more volunteers are more likely to use challenging activities.  
 An organization’s ag
ps tend to us
younger organizations 
time, it increases its legitimacy among the public as well as members of the polity. It also cre
links to established social and political institutions. Thus, older groups are more likely than 
younger organizations to participate in conventional tactics.  
DATA AND METHODS 
The dependent variables in this chapter capture three broad forms of activity: conventional, 
challenging/mobilizing, and challenging versus conventional. The analyses of conventional 
activity examine six types: contacts with local government authorities, formal meetings with civil
servants/
 138
commit or 
 
indicate 
 
Os 
tries. 
est a 
 the 
n 
nd 
 measure 
m-
tees. Challenging/mobilizing activity is operationalized as: protests, demonstrations 
other direct actions; legal recourse to the courts or other judicial bodies; and contacts with the 
media. Finally, challenging versus conventional versus activity is captured by an additive index 
of all challenging versus conventional actions, where challenging acts are coded 1 and 
conventional acts are coded 0. All data for the dependent variables come from the Survey of 
European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations.  
 In addition, I operationalize a set of dependent variables that capture the effectiveness of
each activity in terms of meeting the group’s policy goals. Each measure of effectiveness comes 
from questions in the survey that ask groups to report how effective the given activity is (not at all 
effective, not very effective, somewhat effective, and very effective). Higher scores 
greater efficacy.  
 The independent variables that measure interconnectedness are constructed using data 
from the survey. Interconnectedness, or group ties, is operationalized using an additive index of
how frequently (never, rarely, sometimes, or often) the group interacts with the given actor: 
domestic NGOs, domestic business associations, domestic labor unions, EU organizations, NG
in other countries, business associations in other countries, and labor unions in other coun
More frequent interactions suggest a stronger relationship, and infrequent interactions sugg
weak or non-existent relationship.  
 Data for the broad aspects of the POS come from various sources. System openness to
tactics and goals of a movement is operationalized as a country’s competitiveness of participatio
(or the extent to which non-elites can access institutional channels of political expression), a
whether the country has a federal versus centralized system. Polity IV data is used to
competitiveness of participation, and Polity III data is used to obtain each country’s federalis
centralism score. I operationalize the presence of political allies as a Leftist chief executive or 
 139
government,21 and the number of political parties in the country. I obtained all data on political 
parties from the Database of Political Institutions and the CIA World Factbook.22  
 I use data from various sources to measure the issue-specific POS. First, the policy 
context specific to migrants and refugees is measured using data from the European Civic 
Citizenship and Inclusion Index. This data source compares a range of country level indicato
grouped into five primary policy areas that strongly affect migrants and refugees: labor market 
inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. 
Within each policy area, each country is rated on the following four criteria: eligibility/scope
policy, conditions/remedies, integration measures, and the
rs 
 of 
 extent to which the policy is rights-
lticollinearity 
s 
sus 
res 
reate an 
lunteers; 
associated. Higher scores reflect more favorable policies. Due to the presence of mu
between these policy areas, I develop an additive index comprising each of the five policy area
to measure the “policy context.” In addition, perceptions of the issue-specific policy environment 
are captured using data from the survey that ask groups to rate their country’s stringency ver
openness in terms of: immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment policies. Higher sco
indicate more open policy perceptions. Again, due to the presence of multicollinearity, I c
index that measures groups’ policy perceptions.      
 Finally, all data on group identity and resources come from the survey. I created 
measures of group identity based on the results of the factor analysis explained in Chapter 4. 
Services/care groups have goals that tend to be more moderate, whereas political/legal and 
asylum groups tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status quo. Organizational 
resources are measured by the group’s: age; number of full-time staff; part-time staff; vo
annual budget; an increasing annual budget; whether or not the group has received funding from 
the European Commission; and membership size. Higher scores indicate: older groups, more 
                                                 
21 The multivariate analyses use only the measure of a Leftist government (as opposed to the chief 
executive) due to the presence of multicollinearity between the variables. 
22 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mt.html#Govt, accessed 22 September 2005. 
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staff, more volunteers, a higher annual budget, an increasing budget over the past year, receipt of 
funds from the European Commission, and more members.           
 I estimate several models of activity and effectiveness. First, the purpose of the 
conventional activity models is to ascertain the factors that cause levels of participation in each
type of activity to increase or decrease (as well as effectiveness). Thus, I use binary logistic 
regression to compare acting frequently (often + sometimes) to acting infrequently (rarely + 
never), and general efficacy (very effective + somewhat effective) to general inefficacy (not 
effective + not at all effective). I use the same method in examining increases and decreases in 
challenging activity, as well as its effectiveness. Finally, I construct three relational models to 
ascertain the factors that prompt groups to use challenging versus conventional tactics. Rather 
than identifying the factors that increase or decrease levels of activity, the first relational model 
analyzes the factors that produce a shift in tactics from the more conventional toward the more
confrontational. Thus, it will provide information on the conditions under which contentious 
activity becomes more lik
 
very 
 
ely. I estimate this model using multinomial logistic regression 
s 
t, 
How 
techniques where no activity is coded 0, conventional acts are coded 1, a mixture of conventional 
and confrontational action is coded 2, and confrontational acts are coded 3. The analysis 
compares confrontational action to a base category of conventional tactics. The final two 
relational models compare the likelihood of using a mix of tactics (i.e., category 2 above) to 
reliance on a single baseline method (i.e., categories 1 or 3 above). I include a regional control 
variable in each model to account for any unobserved regional effects across Europe. This help
to guard against omitted variable bias and adds regional fixed effects to the models.  
 Overall, the methods used reflect the research questions being asked in this chapter. Firs
I ask several descriptive questions: how common is protest versus institutional lobbying? 
effective do groups perceive each activity type in achieving their policy goals? To address these 
questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the data to determine the breakdown of 
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participation in each mode of conventional and challenging activity, and to determine 
participation in each activity by type of group (i.e., services/care, political/legal, and asylum).  
 The second set of research questions is interested in the factors that cause changes i
activity patterns among groups: Are certain types of groups more prone to using challenging 
methods? What factors increase or decrease the use of specific tactics? Which factors prompt 
groups to choose more challenging methods over more conventional activities? To address t
questions, I first examined the bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent 
variables for each model. I then estimated a series of multivariate equations according to the 
models discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for participation in each type of 
activity and its efficacy, as well as a separate model for each qualitative assessment of activity 
choice. Although the multivariate tables present the results of the analyses by groupings of 
independent variables, in all cases where a regression was performed on the data all predictor
variables were included together in the full model (regardless of how the results are presented
other words, each regression controls for all predictor variables. The following se
n 
hese 
 
). In 
ctions discuss 
the resu
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 political 
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lts of the analyses.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Patterns 
Table 5.1 displays the percentages of groups that engage frequently in the various modes of 
institutional lobbying activities, as well as the more contentious and mobilizing forms of 
Contacts with the media are by far the most common activity, as 80% of PMR groups do so 
frequently. Moreover, 24% of all groups report that media contacts are very effective in enabling
them to achieve their policy goals. Consistent with other studies of social movements (Dalton 
1994; Dalton et. al. 2003), expressive tactics seem to constitute an essential part of the
re of PMR organizations; their work often includes attempts to educate and mobilize the 
public.  
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Aside from the media, conventional lobbying activities are far more common than 
challenging acts. In terms of frequent participation (i.e., often + sometimes), the most popular 
tactic is contacting local government authorities (72%), followed by formal meetings (67%) and 
informal meetings (66%) with civil servants or national ministers. A good proportion of gro
also engage in contacts with political parties (60%) and members of parliament (58%). Finally, 
many organizations choose to consult on government commissions or advisory committees 
(46%). Tellingly, although a majority of groups participate in most of these lobbying activities, 
very few consider any given activity very effective. Of all activities, informal contacts with civi
servants and national ministers is ranked the highest in terms of efficacy (24%), and participatin
on government commissions and advisory committees is ranked the lowest (11%).  
 In contrast, comparatively fewer organizations resort to outright challenging or 
confrontational acts against the government, yet these activities are not altogether uncom
example, 47% of groups frequently protest; this is comparable to the percentage that serves on 
government commissions and advisory committees. Yet, protest is viewed as far less effective 
(4% versus 11%). Moreover, 37% of organizations frequently bring about court cases. Of th
more contentious acts, this is regarded as the more effective (13%). Court action is even 
considered more or as
ups 
l 
g 
mon. For 
e 
 effective a strategy as most of the conventional lobbying activities.  
 Figures 5.1 – 5.4 show that some variation in activity and effectiveness exists by group 
identity. Overall, Figure 5.1 illustrates that services/care groups (which have less threatening 
goals) are slightly more likely to lobby the national government than political/legal and asylum 
groups (which champion more challenging ideals). Moreover, they tend to view a range of 
activities as effective means of policy influence, from the conventional to the more 
confrontational and mobilizing (Figures 5.2 and 5.4). In contrast, political/legal and asylum 
organizations are more likely to protest and use the courts, confirming that their activity choices 
are likely shaped in part by their political identity (Figure 5.3).    
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 Overall, the data confirm that most group activity is conventional in nature, adding to t
literature that finds that SMOs behave much like traditional interest groups (Dalton 1994; 
he 
ew social 
 
 
arties, and are over twice as likely (2.46, p<.01) to serve on 
ise, 
with 
Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003) and challenging the image of n
movements as predominantly reliant on unconventional political action. In general, the data 
reveal an understanding among PMR organizations that policy effectiveness requires active 
involvement in the policymaking process, yet groups also appear to display an awareness of the
potential problems of being perceived as allying too closely with government. Direct actions are 
unlikely to change policy alone; rather, groups’ repertoires reflect a combination of tactical 
lobbying interspersed with more confrontational actions.  
Main Findings: The Influence of Interconnectedness on Activity/Effectiveness 
Recall that the interconnectedness hypotheses predict that increasingly strong links with other 
domestic NGOs are expected to increase the odds of confrontational tactics, whereas increasingly
strong connections with national business and labor are expected to lead to a moderation of 
tactics whereby lobbying becomes more likely. Tables 5.6 – 5.11 display the results of how 
interconnectedness impacts activity and policy effectiveness. First, Table 5.6 shows that 
increasingly strong links with other domestic NGOs actually increase the odds of each mode of 
institutional lobbying. PMR groups with such relationships are 52% (p<.10) more likely to 
engage with the local government, 72% (p<.05) more likely to have informal contacts and over 
twice as likely (2.03, p<.05) to have formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, 
59% (p<.05) more likely to contact parliament, 47% (p<.10) more likely to engage in contacts 
with members of political p
government commissions and advisory committees than groups with weaker NGO ties. Likew
groups with stronger connections to national business and labor are over twice as likely (2.42, 
p<.01) to contact local government authorities, 49% (p<.10) more likely to have informal 
contacts with civil servants and national ministers, 57% (p<.10) more likely to have contacts 
political parties, and are over three times as likely (3.61, p<.01) to serve on government 
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commissions and advisory committees versus groups with weaker connections. Moreover, gr
ties with EU-level organizations also strongly increase many forms of domestic lobby
 In contrast, stronger group ties with actors from abroad – including NGOs, business and
labor – generally decrease the odds of domestic lobbying activity. For example, stronger link
with NGOs in other countries decrease the odds of local gover
oup 
ing.  
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in l contacts with civil servants and national ministers by 50% (p<.05), of formal meetings 
with these actors by 53% (p<.01), and of serving on government commissions and advisory 
committees by 66% (p<.01). Moreover, although stronger links with business and labor in oth
countries increases local government contacts, they decrease contacts with the parliament by 35% 
(p<.10) and of serving on government commissions and advisory committees by 56% (p<.01). 
Overall, the results in Table 5.6 suggest that simply being better connected with other domestic 
actors – whether NGOs or business and labor – increases the odds that a group will engage in 
many modes of institutional lobbying, while being better connected to actors in other countries 
decreases the odds.         
 Table 5.7, which illustrates how interconnectedness impacts levels of participation in 
challenging and mobilizing activities, points to similar findings. First, stronger group ties with 
other domestic NGOs do, as the hypothesis suggests, increase the odds of protesting the na
government by 53% (p<.05). Moreover, they increase the likelihood of media contacts by a factor
of 2.25 (p<.01). Yet, stronger connections with national business and labor also increase these
activities. Groups with such connections are 56% (p<.10) more likely to protest, 64% (p<.10) 
more likely to bring court action, and over twice as likely (2.30, p<.05) to mobilize supporte
the media versus groups with weaker ties to these actors. In contrast, stronger ties to NGOs and
business and labor in other countries decrease the odds of engaging in confrontational or 
mobilizing activities at home. Consistent with the previous results, strong domestic connections,
regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while non-domestic relationships depress i
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 When it comes to the effectiveness of conventional lobbying in achieving groups’ po
goals, Table 5.8 shows that virtually any type of network – domestic or non-domestic – increas
reported policy effectiveness. The one exception is stronger ties with NGOs abroad, which 
decreases the reported efficacy of local government contacts by 38% (p<.05). The connections 
that have the most consistently positive effect on lobbying efficacy are those with national actors
and particularly with national business and labor. For instance, stronger links with national 
business and labor increase the reported policy effectiveness of local government contacts b
54% (p<.10), formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers by 78% (p<.05), contac
with parliament by 46% (p<.10), and make groups over tw
licy 
es 
, 
y 
ts 
ice as likely to view party contacts 
.72, p
s that 
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 more prone to confrontation.    
oice 
x of both 
(2 <.01) and serving on government commissions and advisory committees (2.30, p<.01) as 
effective. In terms of the more confrontational and mobilizing tactics, Table 5.9 illustrate
stronger connections with domestic actors increase their reported policy effectiveness, as do 
connections with EU-level organizations. In contrast, groups with stronger ties to NGOs and 
business and labor from abroad are less likely to consider these tactics effective. 
Table 5.10 displays the effects of interconnectedness on the choice to engage in 
challenging versus conventional lobbying tactics. That is, rather than examining increases or 
decreases in specific activity modes, the table illustrates how connections shape groups’ choice o
one activity type over another. Interestingly, the results show that stronger domestic level ties 
decrease the odds of acting confrontationally versus more conventionally. For example, 
increasingly strong connections with other domestic NGOs decrease the odds of challenging 
versus lobbying activity by 98% (p<.01), and those with national business and labor decreas
by 96% (p<.10). Overall, these results suggest that more isolated PMR organizations (i.e., thos
with weaker connections to other domestic actors) are
Finally, Table 5.11 shows that interconnectedness has quite strong effects on the ch
to use a single type of strategy (i.e., lobby or act confrontationally) versus adopting a mi
conventional and more contentious strategies. Stronger links with national business and labor 
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have the strongest effect on promoting a mix of both types of tactics. For instance, it increases t
odds of employing a mix of tactics versus using only conventional lobbying by a factor of 8.56
(p<.01), and of a mix versus only confrontational action by a factor of 228.85 (p<.01). Sim
stronger group ties with other domestic NGOs increase the odds of using a combination of 
strategies versus only confrontational tactics by a factor of 41.99 (p<.01), suggesting that NG
networks actually produce a moderation of tactics. Interestingly, stronger links with EU-level 
organizations appear to encourage groups to use a mix of more confrontational tactics in additio
to lobbying (versus lobbying alone). This implies that groups with stronger connections to EU 
organizations are over three times as likely to act both confrontationally and conventionally as 
opposed to solely lobby. Finally, increasingly strong links with NGOs abroad decreases the odds 
that a group will adopt a mix of tactics. For instance, it decreases the odds of employing a mix of 
he 
 
ilarly, 
O 
n 
) by 82% (p<.01), and of 
 by 
 
ingle 
EU level 
 
add more confrontational methods, such as court action, to their repertoires. In general, PMR 
conventional and contentious tactics (versus conventional only
employing a mix of tactics versus only using confrontational methods by 90% (p<.01). Overall, 
these patterns suggest that connections with national business and labor increase all modes of 
action, connections with national NGOs mobilize groups to add lobbying methods to their 
repertoires, and ties to EU groups mobilize the addition of more confrontational methods to 
groups’ repertoires.  
In sum, the data on interconnectedness suggest a more complex picture than put forth
the hypotheses. Rather than producing different types of political action, stronger links with other
national actors generally increase all types of activities, from the more conventional to the more 
challenging. Stronger connections to all national actors also increase the odds of choosing to 
lobby versus act more confrontationally, and to adopt a mix of strategies versus rely on a s
type of tactic. Moreover, there is more to the picture than simply positing that connections that 
span beyond the country decrease the odds of national level action. Stronger links with 
organizations actually increase various forms of national lobbying, yet they also prompt groups to
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groups with strong connections to actors beyond the state are less likely to engage in national-
level activity of any type, and are less likely to use a broad mix of strategies at the national level.              
of 
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n contrast, 
where the Left is in power, groups are 64% less likely to mobilize potential supporters via the 
Other Findings: The Influence of the National POS on Activity/Effectiveness 
Tables 5.12 – 5.17 illustrate how the national POS shapes activity and effectiveness. In terms 
the broad aspects, Table 5.12 shows that an open national POS generally decreases the likeli
of institutional lobbying. For instance, groups based in a federal versus centralized system are 
37% (p<.10) less likely to hold formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, and are
55% (p<.01) less likely to sit on government commissions and advisory committees. Likewise, 
groups based in countries with a Left-leaning government are 41% (p<.10) less likely to engage 
in informal contacts and 47% (p<.05) less likely to hold formal meetings with civil servants an
national ministers, are 37% (p<.10) less likely to contact parliament, and are 75% (p<.01) less 
likely to participate in government commissions and advisory committees. Overall, a more ope
broad institutional environment makes groups less likely to lobby, perhaps because they believe 
their governments are already addressing their issue concerns. On the other hand, a more ope
issue-specific POS has the opposite effect. A more open national policy context specific to 
migrant and refugee issues increases the odds of interacting with the local government by a fact
of 5.11 (p<.10). Moreover, groups that perceive their specific national policy contexts to be m
open versus stringent are 86% (p<.01) more likely to engage in informal contacts with national 
civil servants and ministers, and are 59% (p<.05) more likely to contact parliament. Thus, it is n
enough to posit that an open national POS increases activity; rather it depends on which aspect
of the POS are examined.  
 Table 5.13 shows that most aspects of the broad POS similarly decrease the odds of 
challenging and mobilizing activity, except for competitiveness of participation. Groups based i
countries where competitiveness of participation is relatively more open are over twice as likely 
to protest (2.15, p<.05), and are 86% (p<.10) more likely to take judicial action. I
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media (p<.01), perhaps because there is less of a need to do so when allies are present in the 
elected government. In terms of the specific policy context, a more open institutional 
environment specific to migrants and refugees increases the odds of court action by a f
8.60 (p<.05). Because the national climate is already favorable to their goals, groups lik
believe they can achieve much by way of the national courts. 
 Tables 5.14 and 5.15 illustrate that the effects of the POS are more mixed when it comes 
to the effectiveness of the different activities. In terms of the broad POS, Table 5.14 shows tha
both a federal system (1.49, p<.10) and a Left-leaning government (1.66, p<.10) increase the 
reported efficacy of informal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, but greater 
competitiveness of participation counteracts these effects (.38, p<.05). Moreover, a federal 
actor of 
ely 
t 
system 
s increase the odds of reporting formal 
5) 
 
h 
. 
of an 
as 
e are more parties, protest has a greater chance of eliciting a reaction from 
governm
and more favorable migrant and refugee policy perception
meetings with civil servants and national ministers as effective by 51% (p<.10) and 81% (p<.0
respectively. However, at the same time that a federal system and a Leftist government increase
the odds of reporting informal contacts as effective, they have the opposite effect on contacts wit
political parties. Moreover, groups based in a country where the Left holds power are 31% less 
likely to report that serving on government commissions and advisory committees is effective
Overall, an open POS does not uniformly increase the efficacy of all lobbying activities.  
 In terms of challenging and mobilizing tactics, Table 5.15 illustrates that no aspect 
open POS increases the reported efficacy of protest per se, except for the number of political 
parties in a country. Groups based in countries with more versus fewer parties are over twice 
likely to view protest as an effective means of policy influence (2.45, p<.01). This is likely 
because where ther
ent and drawing attention to a particular issue. Yet at the same time, more versus fewer 
parties decreases the reported efficacy of judicial action by 50% (p<.01), and of media contacts 
by 56% (p<.05). With greater potential governmental allies, it is probably more effective to 
lobby. A Leftist government supports this contention. Groups based in countries with a Left-
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leaning government, a sign of political allies, are 58% (p<.05) less likely to consider protest 
effective, and 57% (p<.05) less likely to view media contacts as effective. On the other hand, 
greater competitiveness of participation – a sign of an open system – makes groups over tw
likely to report that judicial action (2.51, p<.05) and media contacts (2.06, p<.05) are effective. 
An open issue-specific POS tends to decrease the odds of finding protest effective (.02, p<.01
ice as 
), 
but incr 75, 
 It 
ics 
 federal system decreases these odds by 83% (p<.05), and more 
open m r, Table 
 
 
d 
% 
old 
institutionally when the national POS is relatively favorable. In contrast, an open issue-specific 
eases the odds that groups report judicial action (48.82, p<.01) and media contacts (1.
p<.05) effective. In sum, these results suggest that system openness increases the reported 
efficacy of these tactics, while the presence of elite allies decreases it. Moreover, the effects of 
the issue-specific POS depend on the activity examined.  
 Examining the qualitative choice of using more conventional versus more confrontational 
tactics may help shed light on whether an open POS broadly encourages lobbying while 
discouraging protest. To this end, Table 5.16 presents the effects of the POS on activity choice.
shows that both an open broad and specific POS decrease the odds of using challenging tact
versus lobbying. For instance, a
igrant and refugee policy perceptions decrease the odds by 99% (p<.01). Moreove
5.17 generally confirms this pattern. It shows that while political allies (in the form of a Leftist
government) mobilize a mix of both conventional and challenging tactics as opposed to a single
type of strategy, groups in a federal versus centralized system are 59% (p<.05) less likely to ad
challenging tactics to a repertoire based mainly on institutional lobbying. The same effect holds 
for groups with more open migrant and refugee policy perceptions, decreasing the odds by 63
(p<.01). Moreover, these groups are over one hundred times more likely to adopt lobbying 
strategies in addition to a predominantly contentious repertoire versus organizations that h
more stringent policy perceptions (127.14, p<.01).    
 In sum, the findings reveal that an open broad POS actually decreases the odds of 
participation in most forms of national lobbying, suggesting that groups are less active 
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POS mobilizes these activities, suggesting that when both aspects of the POS are con
relatively open issue-specific
trolled, a 
 policy environment encourages groups to interact with national 
policym
us more 
 
ific POS 
s.                  
anizations, which espouse goals that 
are less chall l methods 
 
o 
o. 
, 
sylum groups are consistently 
negative
akers. These interactions are most likely to occur both at the local level and at the 
national level through informal contacts and interactions with members of parliament. When it 
comes to challenging acts, both system openness and a more favorable issue-specific policy 
context increase their odds, but political allies decrease the need to turn to the media. Finally, 
both an open broad and issue-specific POS decrease the odds of choosing protest vers
conventional lobbying activities, lending the greatest support to the hypothesis. Also supporting 
the hypothesis is the fact that both aspects of the POS generally decrease the odds that groups will
add contentious tactics to a baseline of conventional repertoires, while an open issue-spec
increases the likelihood of adding lobbying tactics to a baseline of more confrontational method
The Influence of Group Identity on Activity/Effectiveness 
The group identity hypotheses predict that services/care org
enging to the political status quo, are more likely to engage in institutiona
of influence such as lobbying rather than act contentiously. In contrast, political/legal and asylum
groups, whose goals tend to pose a greater challenge to the established order, are more likely t
engage in confrontational or mobilizing activities. Tables 5.18 – 5.23 display the effects of 
organizational identity on activity and effectiveness. When it comes to lobbying the various 
national institutions, Table 5.18 shows that indeed services/care groups are more likely to do s
For instance, they are 60% (p<.05) more likely to interact with the local government. Moreover
even where the odds ratios do not reach levels of statistical significance, they are consistently 
positive. In contrast, the odds ratios for political/legal and a
, suggesting that these organizations are less likely to lobby. For instance, political/legal 
groups are 61% (p<.01) less likely to serve on government commissions and advisory 
committees, and asylum groups are 40% (p<.05) less likely to contact their local government. In 
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addition, Table 5.20 suggests that these groups are more likely to report that lobbying activities 
are an ineffective means of policy influence, where the opposite holds for services/care gr
 Similarly, Table 5.19 illustrates that services/care organizations are less likely to use 
confrontational methods. For example, they are 30% (p<.10) less likely to bring cases before 
national courts. However, they are over twice as likely to use the media (2.42, p<.01), even 
though they face greater opportunities for institutional methods of influence. In contrast, as
organizations are 68% (p<.01) less likely to do so, suggesting that mobilizing activitie
common among those groups with greater opportunities for influence. At the same time, Table 
5.21 shows that the slightly more challenging groups are more likely to report protest and co
action as effective means of achieving their policy goals. For instance, being a political/le
group increases the odds of considering protest an effective tactic by 98% (p<.05), and being an 
asylum organization increases the odds of viewing court action as effective by 66% (p<.05).   
 Although organizational identity does not appear to shape groups’ choice to use 
challenging versus more conventional tactics (Table 5.22), Table 5.23 illustrates that it does 
impact the odds of using a mix of tactics versus a single mode of influence. The result
oups. 
ylum 
s are more 
urt 
gal 
s show that 
services
ss 
/care groups are most likely to use a wide array of tactics, both conventional and more 
challenging. For instance, being a services/care group increases the odds of employing both 
conventional and more confrontational means of influence versus conventional means alone by a 
factor of 3.79 (p<.01), and of using both types of methods versus only challenging tactics by a 
factor of 6.53 (p<.01). Simply because their goals pose less of a challenge does not mean that 
services/care groups only use conventional tactics. Rather, they use the broadest range of 
activities. In contrast, asylum groups are less likely to rely solely on conventional methods. When 
conventional tactics are the base category, being an asylum group increases the odds of adding 
contentious activities to the mix by a factor of 1.00 (p<.05). Moreover, they are 90% (p<.05) le
likely to add conventional acts to a baseline strategy of challenging tactics.         
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 In sum, the results support the contention that organizational identity influences how 
groups choose to act. As the hypotheses predict, services/care groups are more likely to use 
conventional tactics, whereas political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to act 
confrontationally. That is not to say, however, that services/care groups never resort to 
challenging methods. On the contrary, Table 5.23 shows that they are the most likely to uti
range of tactics. Moreover, they are more likely than the others to use the media. These finding
are illustrative of the fact that all of these groups comprise a larger social movement to bring 
about change, barring none from the use of more challenging or mobilizing tactics. In gener
lize a 
s 
al, 
howeve
more 
n 
 
ing and mobilizing activities. 
These g
ected 
at 
r, the patterns show that the less challenging groups are more prone to conventional 
action, whereas the slightly more radical organizations are more prone to confrontation.     
The Influence of Resources on Activity/Effectiveness  
Resources were hypothesized to affect activity in two alternate ways. First, groups with 
resources were expected to participate at higher levels in all types of activity. This expectatio
tends to hold mainly for groups with larger annual budgets. For example, Table 5.24 shows that 
such groups are 60% (p<.10) more likely to hold formal meetings, and are over twice as likely 
(2.09, p<.01) to have contacts with political parties as organizations with smaller budgets. In 
addition, organizations with more staff members are significantly more likely to hold formal and
informal meetings with civil servants and national ministers. At the same time, Table 5.25 
illustrates that a larger budget also increases the odds of challeng
roups are 61% (p<.05) more likely to protest and 54% (p<.10) more likely to use the 
media than groups with smaller budgets. In general, larger annual budgets facilitate all types of 
political activity.  
In addition to the above hypothesis, smaller, less professionalized groups were exp
to be more likely to use challenging versus conventional tactics. Indeed, Table 5.25 shows th
organizations with more full-time employees are 52% (p<.01) less likely to protest, and are 38% 
(p<.05) less likely to use the national courts than groups with fewer staff members. Media usage, 
 153
however, appears to be driven by more financial resources. For example, organizations with a 
larger annual budget are 54% (p<.10) more likely to use the media, and groups whose budgets 
have increased over the past year are 65% (p<.05) more likely to do so. In addition, more 
volunteers actually decreases the odds of using the media by 48% (p<.05), suggesting th
protest, mobilizing activity is structured in favor of more professionalized organizations.      
When it comes to policy effectiveness, Table 5.26 illustrates that groups with larger 
annual budgets are far more likely to find most of the conventional lobbying activities an 
effective means of influence versus organizations with smaller budgets. For example, having a 
larger annual budget increases the odds of reporting informal meetings effective by a factor of 
1.76 (p<.05), formal meetings by a
at, unlike 
 factor of 2.04 (p<.05), contacts with parliament by a factor of 
1.52 (p<  
allenging versus 
lobbying tactics (3.14, p<.10). Moreover, an interesting finding is that organizations that have 
received funding from the European Commission are over 11 times as likely as those that have 
not to use challenging versus conventional tactics at the national level (11.87, p<.10). This 
suggests that, given a choice of activities, age and EU funding promote more confrontational 
tactics such as judicial action. Finally, Table 5.29 suggests that an increasing budget also 
promotes more challenging tactics. Organizations whose budgets have increased versus decreased 
over the past year are over seven and a half times more likely (7.55, p<.05) to use a mix of 
challenging and conventional tactics rather than rely solely on conventional activities. Moreover, 
.05), and contacts with political parties by a factor of 1.72 (p<.10). Moreover, older
versus younger groups are 46% (p<.10) more likely to view party contacts as effective. At the 
same time, Table 5.27 shows that these groups are also more likely to find challenging and 
mobilizing activities effective. 
The final resource hypothesis posited that older groups should be more prone to 
conventional lobbying. Table 5.28 illustrates that this is not at all the case. In fact, older PMR 
groups are over three times as likely as younger organizations to engage in ch
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they are 86% (p<.05) less likely to adopt a mix of both tactics versus rely solely on 
confrontational methods. 
In sum, PMR organizations with large annual budgets are better positioned to engage in a 
variety of activity modes, from the more conventional to the more challenging. These groups also 
tend to report that a wide range of activities are effective in achieving their policy goals. At the 
same time, however, more professionalized groups with higher levels of full-time employees are 
less likely to act confrontationally. When given the choice of how to act, older PMR 
organizations and those with an EU grant are more likely to choose confrontational over lobbying 
methods of influence. In terms of group age, this may highlight the presence of path-dependency 
when it comes to groups’ political strategies. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
conclusion. In addition, those groups whose budgets have increased over the past year are only 
more likely to adopt a mix of strategies when they include contentious activity. Otherwise, they 
re more prone to relying solely on challenging methods.  
CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate how an organization’s interconnectedness shapes 
its national-level political behavior and effectiveness while controlling for competing effects 
including the national POS, identity and resources. On a broad level, I expected changes in group 
ties (and other factors) to produce changes in groups’ political activities, and the effectiveness of 
those activities in achieving policy goals. I expected these changes to be reflected in both the 
types of activities undertaken (i.e., qualitative changes), and the levels of participation in these 
activities (quantitative changes). Overall, the data supported most of the hypotheses put forth at 
the beginning of this chapter, with several qualifications.  
In comparing the performance of the interconnectedness variables to the other predictors, 
e results of this chapter show that group ties are the strongest and most consistent predictors of 
lobbying, are among the strongest predictors of challenging and mobilizing activity, and have the 
strongest effects on the moderation of groups’ political tactics. In examining these ties, the data 
    
a
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suggest that simply being better connected with other domestic actors increases the odds that a 
group will be politically active, regardless of the type of activity. This relationship holds 
regardless of the type of network being examined (e.g., NGO, business and labor).  In contrast, 
being better connected to actors beyond the state decreases the odds of national-level activity. In 
general, then, strong domestic ties, regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while non-
domestic ties depress it. Moreover, interconnectedness in general tends to increase policy 
effectiveness. In terms of activity choice, the results suggest that more isolated PMR 
organizations (i.e., those with weaker connections to other domestic actors) are more prone to 
onfrontation. In addition, being better connected via national business and labor networks 
ncourages groups to adopt a mix of tactics versus rely on a single method of influence. 
Similarly, being better connected to national NGOs mobilizes groups to adopt a mix of strategies 
versus acting confrontationally. In contrast, stronger ties with EU groups mobilize the addition of 
more confrontational methods to groups’ repertoires. Overall, the data illustrate two general 
patterns: being better connected to any type of actor at the domestic level increases political 
activity of all kinds, and it also has a moderating effect on groups’ choice of tactics.  
This chapter also controlled for other explanations of political behavior. First, it found 
that an open broad POS generally decreases the likelihood of institutional lobbying, whereas a 
more open issue-specific POS has the opposite effect. This suggests that groups are less active 
institutionally when the broad POS is relatively favorable, but when both aspects of the POS are 
controlled, an open issue-specific policy environment mobilizes groups to interact with national 
policymakers. Similarly, an open broad POS also decreases the odds of undertaking challenging 
and mobilizing activity. These results point to a pattern whereby having certain broad institutional 
configurations in place at the national level decreases groups’ overall levels of political activity. 
The implication is that there is less of a need to mobilize when allies are present in the elected 
government. Even when these broad institutional configurations are in place, however, groups 
will still mobilize if the specific institutional environment in terms of migrant and refugee 
c
e
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policies is favorable. This suggests that when the national climate is already favorable to their 
g rms of policy influence and are thus more 
active in lobbying policymakers. Given the choice to protest or lobby, bo n open broad and 
specific POS decrease the odds of ging tactics while increasing the likelihood of 
l nt. In sum, the results suggest several patterns: groups are 
g e wh  those broad cts of th S are relati  open; yet, 
groups are more likely to be active when the issue-specific environment is open; and an open 
b oderate groups  m izing lobby ctivity. 
ight w esp  support for the group identity hypotheses. 
As predicted, the more oderate groups (se e) are mo
t ps (political/legal and asylum) tend to act 
confrontation heir government. However, this pattern does not sug t that 
services/care groups never resort to challenging me ods. Rathe they are the m st likely to 
u nal. Overall, 
t  confrontational, 
l belong to a larger social movement to bring about change, barring none from the use of more 
challenging or mobilizing tactics. However, the general pattern reveals that the less challenging 
groups are more prone to undertaking conventional action and a mix of strategies, whereas the 
slightly more radical groups are more prone to confrontation.    
Finally, this chapter found both expected and unexpected results in terms of how group 
resources impact activity. As expected, groups with larger annual budgets undertake a variety of 
activities, from the more conventional to the more challenging. These groups also tend to report 
that a wide range of activities are effective in achieving their policy goals, suggesting that 
finances facilitate the ability to act and the scope of action. In addition, an expected finding 
highlights that more professionalized groups with more full-time employees are less likely to act 
confrontationally. An unexpected finding, however, is that older organizations are more likely to 
oals, groups likely believe they can achieve much in te
th a
using challen
obbying the national governme
enerally less politically activ en aspe e PO vely
road and specific POS ends to m t ’ tactics by obil ing a
In addition, the findings highl id read
m rvices/car re likely to use conventional 
actics, whereas the more challenging grou
ally against t g se
th r, o
ndertake a wide range of activities, from the more conventional to the confrontatio
he findings underscore the fact that although certain group types are more or less
al
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undertake challenging versus lobbying activities. This runs counter to theoretical arguments in the 
s ent literature at over me, the increasing legitimacy of social ovement groups 
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participation. In the migr clusion move  be that older groups th
e  be re the 19 m t   place 
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 Chapter Five: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 5.1
Conve ional Lobbying Activity by G oup Type
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Figure 5.2
Effectiveness of National Conv al Activi y Group Type
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Figure 5.
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Table 5.1       
nal an  Challenging/ obilizing Political 
    
%  
o
%  
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%  
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Activities: National Level     
Activity   ften etimes very ective 
       
Conventional      
ith civil    
ers 24
l government 18
 civil servants or    
12
 13
  12
s  11
   
    
 13
tional government 4 
  
 
 24
 
      
roups that reported frequently ("often" or 
activity to address their prim ues of conce
, and that reported the given activity to be "very 
  Informal contacts w
  servants/minist 34 32  
  Contact loca  31 41  
  Formal meetings with
  ministers 
 
31 36  
  Contact parliament 
ts 
27 
23 
31  
  Party contac 37  
  Participate in government  
  commissions/advisory committee 19 27  
    
 Challenging 
  Judicial action 18 19  
  Protests aimed at na
  
15 32 
  
 
 
 Mobilizing   
  Media contacts  45 35  
    
  
  
N=114     
Note: Figures are percentages of g
"sometimes") utilizing the given ary iss rn 
over the past two to three years
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Informal  
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servants/ 
ministers 
Local 
gov't 
Formal  
meetings: 
civil  
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/  
advisory  
committees 
 Table 5.2 
Bivariate Associations: Independent Variables and Conventional Lobbying Activit
Variable  
Interconnectedness       
  national NGOs .26** .28** .28** .34** .34** .38** 
  national business .23** .32** .26** .09 .20** .35** 
  national labor .21** .24** .14 .21** .32** .35** 
  EU groups .31** .02 .31** .27** .21** .30** 
  non-national NGOs .11 -.11 .08 .21** .12 .07 
  non-national bus. .12 .12 .11 .04 .10 .16* 
  non-national labor .18* .10 .16* .09 .25** .11 
Broad POS       
  competitiveness of   
  participation -.03 .04 -.16* -.06 .16* -.11 
  federal system -.01 -.12 -.12 -.13 -.05 -.16* 
  Left chief executive -.05 .15 -.06 -.05 .12 -.14 
  Left government -.11 .04 -.14 -.10 .03 -.24** 
  number of parties .03 .07 -.01 .07 -.05 .14 
Issue-Specific POS       
  labor market policy .06 .16* -.03 .03 .19** .03 
  long-term residence  .05 .13 -.05 -.00 .18* -.00 
  family reunification  .07 .13 -.03 .05 .22** .03 
  naturalization  .11 .20** -.01 .06 .24** .07 
  anti-discrimination  .08 .18** -.01 .05 .23** .04 
  immigration policy   
  perception .10 .02 .05 .16* .02 -.01 
  citizenship policy  
  perception .17* -.05 .16* .24** .07 .01 
  asylum policy  
  perception .17* -.01 .11 .10 -.06 -.03 
  employment policy  
  perception .04 .02 .08 .04 -.02 .11 
Identity        
  services/care .08 .29** .06 .12 .20** .16* 
  political/legal .03 .04 -.04 .04 .03 -.03 
  asylum  -.01 -.09 -.05 -.04 .05 .02 
Resources       
  EU grant  .14 .12 .15 -.00 .09 .19** 
  group age -.03 .11 .11 .10 .09 .07 
  full-time staff .14 .04 .25** .09 .13 .13 
  Volunteers -.01 .19** .09 .11 -.05 .10 
  budget  .06 .09 .14 -.00 .17* .10 
  income trend -.05 -.19** .00 .05 .03 .08 
  Members -.04 -.04 .03 .04 .05 .10 
Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05. 
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 Table 5.3      
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Challenging/Mobilizing 
Activity 
Variable     Protests Judicial action Media 
Interconnectedness     
  national NGOs  .22** .15 .37** 
  national business  .15 .19** .16* 
  national labor  .18* .06 .20** 
  EU groups  .00 .10 .03 
  non-national NGOs  -.03 -.08 .06 
  non-national business -.04 .03 -.02 
  non-national labor  .09 -.12 -.11 
Broad POS     
  competitiveness of participation .17* -.01 -.11 
  federal system  -.05 -.01 -.05 
  Left chief executive  .05 -.10 -.08 
  Left government  .08 -.05 -.11 
  number of parties  .02 .05 -.03 
Issue-Specific POS     
  labor market policy  .10 -.03 .01 
  long-term residence policy .10 -.05 -.02 
  family reunification policy .12 -.06 .00 
  naturalization policy  .13 -.06 -.01 
  anti-discrimination policy .11 -.01 .06 
  immigration policy perception .01 -.00 -.03 
  citizenship policy perception -.06 -.12 .04 
  asylum policy perception -.04 -.10 -.10 
  employment policy perception .02 .04 -.03 
Identity      
  services/care  .21** .14 .13 
  political/legal  .23** .10 -.00 
  asylum   .05 .19** -.11 
Resources     
  EU grant   -.10 .09 .07 
  group age  .15 .04 .13 
  full-time staff  -.16* -.12 .17* 
  part-time staff  .13 .04 .09 
  volunteers  .12 .14 .09 
  budget   -.04 .04 .13 
  income trend  -.09 -.04 .12 
  members   .16* -.02 .15 
Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05. 
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Table 5.4        
Bivariate Associations: Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying 
Activity 
Variable   
Informal  
contacts with 
civil servants/ 
ministers 
Local 
gov't 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory  
committees 
Interconnectedness       
  national NGOs .24** .04 .15 .17* .22** .21** 
  national business .26** .27** .30** .20** .28** .41** 
  national labor .12 .08 .08 .21** .29** .22** 
  EU groups .24** .05 .20** .19** .11 .18* 
  non-national NGOs .14 -.06 .07 .18* .13 .15 
  non-national bus. .22** .13 .19** .12 .10 .28** 
  non-national labor .12 -.06 .14 .03 .11 .11 
Broad POS       
  competitiveness of  
  participation .02 .04 -.03 .12 .16* .05 
  federal system .10 -.01 .10 .01 -.21** -.01 
  Left chief executive .02 .06 -.00 .13 .14 -.02 
  Left government -.02 .04 -.05 .11 .12 -.05 
  number of parties .07 .05 .06 .09 .04 .17* 
Issue-Specific POS       
  labor market policy .07 .09 .04 .13 .18* .10 
  long-term residence  .05 .09 .01 .11 .16* .08 
  family reunification  .05 .06 .00 .11 .18* .07 
  Naturalization .09 .07 .04 .11 .19** .05 
  anti-discrimination  .09 .10 .06 .13 .19** .09 
  immigration policy  
  perception .01 .05 .08 -.08 .00 -.12 
  citizenship policy  
  perception .12 .03 .15 .01 .05 .06 
  asylum policy  
  perception .00 .02 .10 -.18* -.02 -.02 
  employment policy  
  perception -.06 .07 -.02 .03 .06 -.08 
Identity        
  services/care .09 .16* .02 -.04 .12 .08 
  political/legal -.04 -.03 -.11 .04 .02 .04 
  asylum  -.09 -.06 -.10 .02 .02 -.04 
Resources       
  EU grant  .11 .17* .17* -.02 .07 .16* 
  group age .07 .14 .04 .15 .20** -.01 
  full-time staff .18* .11 .13 -.05 -.06 .05 
  part-time staff .15 .11 .15 -.01 .05 .14 
  Volunteers -.05 .03 -.12 .03 .04 .02 
  budget  .15 .11 .17* .11 .05 .09 
  income trend .00 -.11 -.01 .04 -.21** .07 
  Members .10 .03 .08 .06 .11 -.04 
Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05. 
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 Table 5.5      
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of 
Challenging/Mobilizing Activity 
Variable     Protests Judicial action Media 
Interconnectedness     
  national NGOs  .09 .01 .18* 
  national business  .15 .19** .21** 
  national labor  .10 .04 .14 
  EU groups  .17* .13 .04 
  non-national NGOs  .02 -.06 .11 
  non-national business .07 .00 .05 
  non-national labor  -.01 -.08 -.07 
Broad POS     
  competitiveness of participation .11 -.01 -.05 
  federal system  .02 .10 .02 
  Left chief executive  -.17* -.08 -.11 
  Left government  -.15 -.05 -.06 
  number of parties  -.19** .04 -.02 
Issue-Specific POS     
  labor market policy  -.03 -.01 -.11 
  long-term residence policy -.05 -.05 -.13 
  family reunification policy -.01 -.08 -.12 
  naturalization policy  .03 -.09 -.12 
  anti-discrimination policy -.01 .00 -.10 
  immigration policy perception .03 -.07 .02 
  citizenship policy perception .01 -.05 .07 
  asylum policy perception .06 -.04 .01 
  employment policy perception .01 -.16* .01 
Identity      
  services/care  .20** .21** .16* 
  political/legal  .31** -.00 .17* 
  asylum   .20** .16* .08 
Resources     
  EU grant   -.05 .02 -.09 
  group age  .03 -.01 .01 
  full-time staff  -.15 -.03 -.07 
  part-time staff  .01 -.01 .03 
  volunteers  -.03 .00 -.00 
  budget   -.11 .05 -.01 
  income trend  .03 .00 .09 
  members   .06 .01 .04 
Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05. 
 
 165
 Table 5.6        
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Conventional Lobbying Activity  
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts with  
civil servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Interconnectedness      
  national  
  NGOs 
 
1.52* 
(.42) 
1.72** 
(.54) 
2.03** 
(.69) 
1.59** 
(.42) 
1.47* 
(.38) 
2.46*** 
(.90) 
        
  national  
  social  
  partners 
2.42*** 
(.88) 
1.49* 
(.42) 
1.28 
(.38) 
1.23 
(.39) 
1.57* 
(.44) 
3.61*** 
(1.37) 
        
  EU groups 1.01 2.01*** 2.10*** 1.69** 1.24 3.21*** 
  (.30) (.53) (.58) (.42) (.39) (1.15) 
  non-national  
  NGOs 
.65* 
(.21) 
.50** 
(.16) 
.47*** 
(.14) 
1.06 
(.30) 
.88 
(.26) 
.34*** 
(.14) 
        
  non-national  
  social   
  partners 
1.67** 
(.47) 
.95 
(.24) 
1.61 
(.74) 
.65* 
(.18) 
.95 
(.27) 
.44*** 
(.15) 
        
N=   107 110 109 110 110 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-
frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.7      
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity  
Predictor     Protest Judicial Media 
Interconnectedness     
  national NGOs  1.53** 1.13 2.25*** 
   (.35) (.28) (.83) 
  national social partners 1.56* 1.64* 2.30** 
   (.45) (.55) (1.14) 
  EU groups  1.02 1.33 .75 
   (.28) (.39) (.25) 
  non-national NGOs  .80 .50** .48** 
   (.22) (.16) (.20) 
  non-national social partners 1.18 .79 .40** 
   (.28) (.21) (.17) 
N=     106 109 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation 
(sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.8        
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Effectiveness of Conventional 
Lobbying Activity  
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts 
with  
civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings  
with  
civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory  
committees 
Interconnectedness       
  national  
  NGOs 
1.17 
(.29) 
2.11*** 
(.65) 
1.78** 
(.56) 
1.40 
(.41) 
1.75** 
(.59) 
1.34 
(.35) 
        
  national  
  social partners 
1.54* 
(.42) 
1.12 
(.41) 
1.78** 
(.61) 
1.46* 
(.37) 
2.72*** 
(.97) 
2.30*** 
(.55) 
        
  EU groups 1.19 1.50* 1.31 1.71** 1.14 1.14 
  (.31) (.46) (.36) (.47) (.42) (.29) 
  non-national  
  NGOs 
.62** 
(.17) 
.95 
(.30) 
.71 
(.22) 
.90 
(.27) 
1.16 
(.40) 
.78 
(.24) 
        
  non-national  
  social partners 
.99 
(.33) 
2.05* 
(.98) 
2.01* 
(1.02) 
.88 
(.21) 
1.17 
(.40) 
1.22 
(.29) 
        
N=   110 107 109 110 107 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are  
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective).  
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective"  
versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios  
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are  
reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.9      
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing 
Activity  
Predictor     Protest Judicial Media 
Interconnectedness     
  national NGOs  1.51* 1.09 1.65* 
   (.39) (.31) (.52) 
  national social partners 1.59* 2.02*** 2.44*** 
   (.53) (.64) (.91) 
  EU groups  1.60* 1.35 .76 
   (.55) (.41) (.28) 
  non-national NGOs  .60* .39*** .98 
   (.23) (.14) (.34) 
  non-national social partners 1.07 1.08 .73* 
   (.35) (.36) (.17) 
N=     109 106 106 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective 
(not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus 
"ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.10   
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Challenging versus Conventional 
Activity  
Predictor    Odds 
Interconnectedness   
  national NGOs  .02*** 
   (.02) 
  national social partners .04* 
   (.09) 
  EU groups  2.63 
   (2.71) 
  non-national NGOs  1.76 
   (1.40) 
  non-national social partners .36 
   (.34) 
N=    110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity. 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus conventionally 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.11    
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics  
Predictor     
Mix of Conventional and 
Challenging | Conventional 
Only  
Mix of Conventional and 
Challenging | Challenging  
Only 
Interconnectedness    
  national NGOs  .78 41.99*** 
   (.29) (10.82) 
  national social partners 8.56*** 228.85*** 
   (7.06) (11.37) 
  EU groups  3.39* 1.29 
   (2.81) (.96) 
  non-national NGOs  .18*** .10*** 
   (.11) (.08) 
  non-national social 
  partners 
.16 
(.31) 
.46 
(.65) 
     
N=     110 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational 
activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a 
mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.12       
Multivariate Results for POS and Conventional Lobbying Activity  
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with  
civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Broad POS       
  compet. of  
  participation 
.63 
(.32) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
        
  federal  
  system 
1.14 
(.32) 
.81 
(.23) 
.63* 
(.19) 
.70 
(.21) 
.83 
(.23) 
.45*** 
(.14) 
        
  Left  
  government 
1.46 
(.57) 
.59* 
(.21) 
.53** 
(.16) 
.67* 
(.20) 
.71 
(.23) 
.25*** 
(.12) 
        
Issue-Specific POS      
  policy context  
  index 
5.11* 
(5.36) 
.28 
(.31) 
.44 
(.45) 
.47 
(.49) 
.66 
(.54) 
.22 
(.26) 
        
  policy  
  perceptions  
  index 
.98 
(.24) 
1.86*** 
(.53) 
1.43 
(.49) 
1.59** 
(.43) 
1.04 
(.26) 
.98 
(.28) 
        
N=   107 110 109 110 110 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-
frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + 
often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus 
"infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be 
calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.13     
Multivariate Results for POS and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity  
Predictor    Protest Judicial Media 
Broad POS     
  competitiveness of participation 2.15** 1.86* --- 
   (1.02) (.89)  
  federal system  1.06 .73 .91 
   .32 (.26) (.34) 
  Left government  .67 .66 .36*** 
   (.23) (.26) (.14) 
Issue-Specific POS     
  policy context index 1.13 8.60** 3.49 
   (1.22) (9.50) (4.77) 
  policy perceptions index 1.08 1.18 .92 
   (.24) (.27) (.25) 
N=    106 109 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation 
(sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.14       
Multivariate Results for POS and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity  
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with  
civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Broad POS       
    
  competit. of    
  participation 
--- 
 
.38** 
(.23) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
1.86 
(1.18) 
--- 
 
        
  federal  
  system 
.93 
(.21) 
1.49* 
(.41) 
1.51* 
(.44) 
.90 
(.23) 
.44*** 
(.15) 
.98 
(.29) 
        
  Left  
  government 
1.01 
(.29) 
1.66* 
(.61) 
.77 
(.25) 
1.00 
(.32) 
.57* 
(.24) 
.69* 
(.19) 
        
  number of  
  parties 
--- 
 
1.36 
(.45) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
1.32 
(.37) 
        
Issue-Specific 
POS       
  policy context  
  index 
.84 
(.78) 
2.65 
(2.92) 
.43 
(.50) 
1.51 
(1.48) 
3.61 
(4.46) 
.77 
(.97) 
        
  policy  
  perceptions  
  index 
1.05 
(.22) 
1.23 
(.36) 
1.81** 
(.58) 
.99 
(.23) 
.94 
(.27) 
1.19 
(.29) 
        
N=   110 107 109 110 107 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.15     
Multivariate Results for POS and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity  
Predictor    Protest Judicial Media 
Broad POS     
  competitiveness of participation --- 2.51** 2.06** 
    (1.33) (.91) 
  federal system  .78 1.28 1.25 
   (.28) (.35) (.50) 
  Left government  .42** .82 .43** 
   (.17) (.34) (.18) 
  number of parties  2.45*** .50*** .44** 
   (.77) (.14) (.18) 
Issue-Specific POS     
  policy context index .02*** 48.82*** 2.37 
   (.02) (6.44) (3.22) 
  policy perceptions index 1.24 1.00 1.75** 
   (.30) (.26) (.54) 
N=    109 106 106 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.16   
Multivariate Results for POS and Challenging versus Conventional Activity  
Predictor     Odds 
Broad POS   
  competitiveness of participation --- 
    
  federal system  .17** 
   (.18) 
  Left government  6.30 
   (9.06) 
  number of parties  4.34 
   (6.37) 
Issue-Specific POS   
  policy context index --- 
    
  policy perceptions index .01*** 
   (.01) 
N=     110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories 
are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 
3=confrontational activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting 
confrontationally versus conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 
represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, 
*p<.10. 
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Table 5.17    
Multivariate Results for POS and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics   
Predictor     
Mix of Conventional and 
Challenging | Conventional Only  
Mix of Conventional 
and Challenging | 
Challenging Only 
Broad POS    
  competitiveness of  
  participation 
--- 
 
--- 
 
     
  federal  
  system  
.41** 
(.20) 
2.48 
(2.63) 
     
  Left  
  government  
.33* 
(.28) 
.05** 
(.08) 
     
  number of  
  parties  
.92 
(1.06) 
.21 
(.25) 
     
Issue-
Specific POS    
  policy context index .17 .01 
   (.83) (.01) 
  policy perceptions  
  index 
.37*** 
(.14) 
127.14*** 
(14.68) 
     
N=     110 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories 
are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 
3=confrontational activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a 
single type of tactic versus a mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 
represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.18       
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Conventional Lobbying Activity 
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Identity        
 
services/care 1.60** 1.11 1.04 1.17 1.12 1.41 
  (.45) (.34) (.28) (.31) (.30) (.48) 
  
political/legal --- --- .95 --- --- .39*** 
    (.27)   (.12) 
asylum  .60** .96 --- .83 .95 --- 
  (.18) (.30)  (.21) (.25)  
N=   107 110 109 110 110 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation 
(sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.19    
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity 
Predictor  Protest Judicial Media 
Identity     
  services/care .82 .70* 2.42*** 
  (.21) (.18) (.74) 
  political/legal 1.25 --- --- 
  (.32)   
  Asylum  --- 1.38 .32*** 
   (.38) (.13) 
N=  106 109 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation 
(sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.20       
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Effectiveness of Conventional 
Lobbying Activity 
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Identity        
  
services/care 1.41* 1.35 .91 .73 1.19 .89 
  (.36) (.39) (.25) (.20) (.36) (.24) 
  
political/legal --- --- .55*** --- --- .86 
    (.14)   (.22) 
asylum  .68* .56** --- 1.13 .76 --- 
  (.17) (.18)  (.29) (.22)  
N=   110 107 109 110 107 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.21    
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing 
Activity 
Predictor  Protest Judicial Media 
Identity     
  services/care 1.11 1.18 1.42 
  (.30) (.28) (.42) 
  political/legal 1.98** --- 1.06 
  (.71)  (.33) 
  Asylum  --- 1.66** --- 
   (.47)  
N=  109 106 106 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. 
Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = 
unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.22  
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Challenging versus Conventional Activity 
Predictor  Odds 
Identity   
  services/care .58 
  (.43) 
  political/legal --- 
   
  asylum  .94 
  (1.51) 
N=  110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational 
activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus 
conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.23   
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics 
Predictor   
Mix of Conventional and Challenging | 
Conventional Only  
Mix of Conventional and 
Challenging | Challenging Only 
Identity    
  services/care 3.79*** 6.53*** 
  (1.47) (4.88) 
  political/legal --- --- 
    
  asylum  1.00** .10** 
  (.13) (.13) 
N=   110 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational 
activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a 
mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.24       
Multivariate Results for Resources and Conventional Lobbying Activity 
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings 
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties 
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Resources       
  EU  
  grant  
1.07 
(.37) 
.77 
(.21) 
.76 
(.20) 
.69* 
(.19) 
.91 
(.27) 
.98 
(.35) 
        
  full-time  
  staff 
.94 
(.26) 
1.64* 
(.52) 
2.18** 
(.93) 
1.24 
(.29) 
.84 
(.22) 
1.36 
(.40) 
        
  volunteers .90 .73* 1.06 1.04 .75 .87 
  (.22) (.16) (.26) (.24) (.17) (.25) 
  budget  1.44 .88 1.60* 1.34 2.09*** 1.49 
  (.41) (.26) (.56) (.32) (.62) (.50) 
  budget  
  increasing 
.51** 
(.16) 
.85 
(.25) 
1.20 
(.36) 
.95 
(.22) 
.90 
(.22) 
1.21 
(.36) 
        
N=   107 110 109 110 110 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-
frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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 Table 5.25    
Multivariate Results for Resources and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity 
Predictor  Protest Judicial Media 
Resources    
  EU grant  1.09 1.20 .61 
  (.30) (.35) (.26) 
  full-time staff .48*** .62** 1.78 
  (.13) (.17) (.87) 
  Volunteers 1.18 1.23 .52** 
  (.25) (.27) (.17) 
  Budget  1.61** 1.32 1.54* 
  (.46) (.33) (.51) 
  budget increasing .89 --- 1.65** 
  (.21)  (.49) 
  Members --- .97 --- 
   (.19)  
N=  106 109 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-
frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 5.26       
Multivariate Results for Resources and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying 
Activity 
Predictor   
Local 
gov't 
Informal  
contacts  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers 
Formal  
meetings  
with civil 
servants/ 
ministers Parliament Parties
Commissions/ 
advisory 
committees 
Resources       
  EU  
  grant  
1.19 
(.31) 
.68* 
(.20) 
.80 
(.25) 
.74 
(.21) 
.75 
(.20) 
.76 
(.21) 
        
  group age 1.21 .74 .96 1.24 1.46* .92 
  (.29) (.21) (.26) (.29) (.42) (.24) 
  full-time  
  staff 
1.09 
(.27) 
1.47 
(.50) 
1.37 
(.42) 
.73 
(.19) 
.78 
(.17) 
1.11 
(.29) 
        
  budget  .94 1.76** 2.04** 1.52** 1.72* 1.16 
  (.24) (.57) (.80) (.37) (.61) (.32) 
  budget  
  increasing 
.87 
(.20) 
.76 
(.23) 
.62* 
(.19) 
.87 
(.21) 
.54** 
(.15) 
1.24 
(.33) 
        
N=   110 107 109 110 107 109 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.27    
Multivariate Results Resources and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity 
Predictor  Protest Judicial Media 
Resources    
  EU grant  .49** .99 .48** 
  (.20) (.32) (.17) 
  group age 1.97** 1.06 .94 
  (.63) (.31) (.26) 
  full-time staff .54** .70 1.03 
  (.17) (.23) (.33) 
  Budget  .90 1.88** 2.03*** 
  (.28) (.54) (.64) 
  budget increasing 1.15 .91 1.09 
  (.30) (.25) (.30) 
N=  109 106 106 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as 
"effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 5.28  
Multivariate Results for Resources and Challenging versus Conventional Activity 
Predictor   Odds 
Resources  
  EU grant  11.87* 
  (2.19) 
  group age 3.14* 
  (2.69) 
  full-time staff .32 
  (.75) 
  budget  --- 
   
  budget increasing --- 
   
N=   110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational 
activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus 
conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 5.29   
Multivariate Results for Resources and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics 
Predictor   
Mix of Conventional and Challenging | 
Conventional Only  
Mix of Conventional and Challenging 
| Challenging Only 
Resources   
  EU grant  2.60 .22 
  (3.70) (.28) 
  group age 1.39 .44 
  (.66) (.34) 
  full-time staff .12 .37 
  (.24) (.39) 
  budget  --- --- 
    
  budget  
  increasing 
7.55** 
(8.85) 
.14** 
(.13) 
    
N=   110 110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational 
activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a mix 
of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
From the National to the Supranational: Institutional Lobbying and 
Challenging Activity at the EU Level  
 
“Policy on migration is becoming more and more European; we are moving toward a complete 
withdrawal of it from the realm of the Member State governments within the next 15 to 20 years,” 
Representative from the King Baudouin Foundation in Brussels. 
 
“We are seeing a new EU dimension in the area of [migrant] integration. It’s not very defined 
yet, but it’s moving along,” Representative from the European Policy Center in Brussels.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the political behavior of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) organizations 
at the supranational level, and is interested in why and how groups use the EU to achieve their 
policy goals. Whereas the previous chapter showed that groups undertake a variety of political 
initiatives in their own nation-states directed at their governments, this chapter is interested in the 
factors that produce activity directed at the EU. It asks: What proportion of groups aim their 
tactics at the EU? Are certain types of PMR groups more likely to lobby EU institutions versus 
challenge them? What factors influence the likelihood of lobbying the European Commission, 
European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, and Coreper? What 
factors lead groups to challenge the EU via the European Court of Justice or by direct action? 
What conditions produce a qualitative shift in the arena of activity from the national to the EU 
level? In addressing these research questions, this chapter is predominantly interested in how 
interconnectedness impacts activity. At the same time, like the others, it integrates and builds on 
aspects of various theoretical approaches to studying social movement organizations (SMOs). It 
aims to address these questions surrounding supranational activity by examining the variables 
discussed in the previous chapter (interconnectedness, the national POS, group identity and 
resources), and relating changes in these variables to changes in EU-level activity patterns.    
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 Previous research has shown that organizations act in both national and supranational 
settings, and that groups’ activity patterns tend to differ at the level of the EU versus the nation-
state (Imig and Tarrow 2001). For example, contentious activity is found to be much more 
common at the national level, as the political-institutional environment of the EU policy process 
is such that it creates incentives for lobbying, holding meetings, etc. (Marks and McAdam 1999; 
Imig and Tarrow 2001). Although we know that the nature of activity differs across levels of 
governance, we do not know whether an organization’s connections, along with other factors, 
influence the level or choice of EU activity. Do groups with strong connections to EU 
organizations and other actors beyond their country have a greater likelihood of acting at the EU 
versus the national level? Will groups turn to the EU when the national institutional environment 
is relatively closed? Are political/legal and asylum groups shut out of EU political processes due 
to the nature of their identity? Are groups with a grant from the Commission more likely to lobby 
it or other EU institutions? This chapter seeks to fill a theoretical gap by going beyond 
documenting differences in national versus EU activity and assessing the factors that produce 
quantitative changes in the odds of specific EU activities as well as qualitative changes in the 
choice to act at the national versus the supranational level.  
 There are two alternative perspectives in assessing the relationship between sub-national 
actors and the EU, and the ways in which the nation-state influences that interaction. First, the 
liberal intergovernmental approach to EU integration views the nation-state as the most important 
actor in international or supranational politics (Moravcsik 1994, 1999). Thus, it sees the 
mobilization of sub-national actors as a process dominated primarily by states acting as the sole 
intermediary with the EU (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001). In this perspective, groups are likely to 
affect EU political processes only when their objectives overlap with those of the state; thus, they 
function as extensions of their national governments.  
 In contrast, proponents of the multi-level governance approach to EU integration view 
the process of mobilization by sub-national groups as independent from the nation-state. Thus, it 
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becomes possible for groups to use the EU as an alternative arena for influencing politics (Marks 
1992, 1993, 1996). This view holds that groups can influence politics not simply by acting as 
extensions of the state, but rather by acting independently of it.  
 It is likely that both intergovernmental and multi-level governance processes influence 
the interactions between PMR groups and supranational political processes. PMR actors have 
been shown to mobilize independently of their governments at the level of the EU, as the multi-
level governance approach would suggest (Geddes 1995, 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2003). At the 
same time, however, the national institutional environment of states undoubtedly influences 
group activities, including the likelihood of turning to the EU. Moreover, interconnectedness may 
facilitate mobilization independently of the state. The previous chapter illustrated that each of 
these factors in some way influences the propensity to mobilize, suggesting that even if 
organizations do mobilize independently of their governments, national and group level factors 
likely shape their activity in some way. This leads to the question: under what conditions will 
groups act at the EU level, and what factors prompt them to turn away from the state and choose 
EU versus national political activity?     
BACKGROUND: THE CONTEXT OF MIGRANT AND REFUGEE POLITICS IN THE 
EU  
The European Union23 embodies the notion of supranational governance, that is, governance 
beyond the nation-state. As a unique supranational actor, scholars have argued that its governance 
processes with respect to immigration and refugee policymaking afford certain avenues of 
influence for PMR organizations (Geddes 1998, 2000b). The idea of free movement within a 
single market underlies the foundations of immigration and asylum policymaking at the EU level. 
In general, the quest toward free movement has highlighted issues of migration and has brought 
them to the forefront of debates concerning European integration (Butt Philip 1994; Ireland 1991; 
                                                 
23 The term European Union refers to the current structure of the European Union as well as past 
embodiments including the European Community, EC, and EEC.  
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Koslowski 1994, 1998). The following sections provide an overview of migration-related issues 
in the context of the EU while highlighting the interplay of intergovernmental and multi-level 
governance forces. 
Immigration Control, Security Frames, and the Third Pillar 
Since the early 1980s, police and other law and order officials have become increasingly involved 
with migration management at the EU level. Migration control experts have regularly participated 
in intergovernmental working groups on security-related issues, such as the 1970s Trevi group 
(Guiraudon 2003). These working groups tend to adopt an informal and secretive nature, allowing 
migration control officials to set the agenda of intergovernmental cooperation by emphasizing the 
sorts of technical solutions to the migration “problem” that required their expertise (Guiraudon 
2003). During the Schengen Implementation Agreement (SIA), these officials were very much 
involved in negotiating on behalf of migration control and in framing immigration as a security 
issue. Interior and Justice personnel dominated these negotiations, resulting in the security-
oriented content of the SIA and subsequent negotiated agreements.  
 The character of intergovernmental cooperation at this time, which involved non-binding 
decisions rather than integration as such, resulted in part from national-level constraints on 
migration control that occurred in the early 1980s (Guiraudon 2000a). In many instances, for 
example, court decisions prevented individual governments from blocking family reunification. 
The 1980s also witnessed the first clashes between immigrant integration agencies and those that 
dealt with migration control. These developments provided incentives for migration control 
forces to seek a new policy environment free from national legal constraints and conflicting 
policy goals (Guiraudon 2003). Thus, instead of opting for a “regime” at the EU level to 
institutionalize policy, national officials chose to negotiate and cooperate in an intergovernmental 
forum to promote migration control outside of domestic constraints.   
 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty formalized the existing network of intergovernmental 
cooperation among national ministries of justice and the interior (and related national ministries) 
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into the Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Title VI of the Treaty of the European 
Union, consisting of articles K.1 to K.9, covers “cooperation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs…for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free 
movement of persons,” (Wallace and Wallace 2000). Its subject matter, as defined in K.1, 
includes the development of a common asylum policy, rules on external border controls, 
immigration policy, and rules for third country nationals (among other issues pertaining to civil 
and criminal matters and police cooperation). The scale of activity within the Third Pillar 
increased during the first half of the 1990s, and became the largest single field for which the 
Council Secretariat serviced meetings. In 1997, for example, this amounted to a third of the 
meetings convened and over 40% of the papers circulated (Wallace and Wallace 2000).   
 Throughout much of the 1990s, migration continued to be framed as a security rather 
than a social inclusion or labor market issue. The Third Pillar on JHA had become the 
predominant institutional framework for handling migration concerns at the EU level. This 
framework required unanimous decisions on migration-related issues by the Council of Ministers, 
and thus remained outside the Community legal order. Moreover, the Commission lacked the 
right of initiative that it enjoyed in other policy areas, and as a consequence could not adopt an 
entrepreneurial, agenda-setting role in the immigration policy domain (Wallace and Wallace 
2000).   
 From the Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam Treaty, the JHA Council found little to 
agree on. The crowning achievement was an agreement on a single joint position pertaining to a 
common definition of a refugee, and on five related legally binding joint actions (Wallace and 
Wallace 2000). The complicated decision-making structure of the Third Pillar has been faulted 
for the lack of formal agreements during this time (Guiraudon 2003). However, the Third Pillar 
was only one of several policy venues dealing with migration issues. Forums on migration and 
asylum, such as the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration 
Policies, were also taking place at this time. This resulted in an expanding arena in which to 
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debate and propose measures regarding common immigration and asylum policies that went 
beyond the domain of the Council of Ministers (Guiraudon 2003).    
 The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in May of 1999, shifted the entire 
immigration policy sector from the Third Pillar of JHA to the First Pillar of supranational 
decision making, facilitating cooperation in this area (Wallace and Wallace 2000). This shift 
effectively separated the issue of immigration from other sensitive issues dealing with national 
security, such as cross-border crime and drugs. This was a significant development, as decisions 
on migration now fell into the Community framework, which gave the European Commission a 
stronger voice and paved the way for deeper integration in this policy area, albeit with certain 
limitations on the role of EU institutions. Since that time, the logic of the immigration and asylum 
policy process has been slow to change. For a period of five years after the treaty, the 
Commission faced competition from member states that had a right of co-initiative in 
policymaking. At the same time, law enforcement measures tend to meet more success than 
efforts emphasizing migrants’ rights (Guiraudon 2003), illustrating that this policy sector has 
proceeded largely according to the intergovernmental model.      
 These developments confirm the importance of the migration issue within the EU.  
Although law and order officials remain key players, since the Amsterdam Treaty they have 
become increasingly constrained and forced to cooperate with EU institutions. Although they 
moved beyond national-level constraints to successfully define the EU migration policy frame in 
terms of security and favored intergovernmental policy forums, this may be slowly changing. 
PMR groups have been able to mobilize independently of their governments and develop a 
competing agenda in favor of migrant inclusion, particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty. The 
following section addresses these efforts. 
Pro-Migrant Actors and Migrant Inclusion 
At the time when the first Schengen agreement was signed in 1985, the Commission issued new 
guidelines on migration and adopted the stance that European integration could provide foreign 
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residents with better access to rights (CEC 1985). Despite setbacks from contesting member 
states, the Commission, along with pro-migrant transnational organizations, continued efforts to 
carve out a policy space for migrants’ rights and migrant inclusion within Europe.   
        The unit (D.4) within the Commission Directorate for Employment and Social Affairs, 
subsequently called “Free Movement of Workers, Migrant Integration, and Anti-Racism,” was 
created in 1958 to address issues related to the free movement of labor, among other issues 
(Guiraudon 2003). Individuals within this unit have an incentive to adopt the larger migrant 
inclusion policy agenda to increase the Commission’s own scope for action (Geddes 2000a). This 
logic of “purposeful opportunism” (Cram 1997) also applies to other EU institutions seeking to 
expand their competencies, such as the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).  Because much of their activities take place away from the public’s eye, these 
institutions may be used to achieve successful initiatives in the area of migrant inclusion.   
 As one scholar writes, “To help mobilization on this agenda, the Commission sought to 
increase its legitimacy as a spokesperson for ‘civil society’ by engineering an official channel of 
interest representation,” (Guiraudon 2003: 273). Thus, in 1991, the Commission founded the EU 
Migrants’ Forum, which was an umbrella lobby organization comprising 130 individual migrant 
associations (Geddes 1998). Although ethnic differences produced internal divisions and thus 
inefficacy, it was followed by other lobbies organized at the EU level (Geddes 1998). 
 On a side note, an important function of the European Commission has been to provide 
funding to numerous migrant associations and their initiatives (CEC 1995a). Because Directorate 
General V (Employment, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs)24 finances projects against 
racism and xenophobia, actions in favor of migrant workers and their free movement, and 
initiatives favoring the integration of refugees, it has been the primary source of funding for 
                                                 
24 Since the fall of 1999, the numbers of the directorate generals are no longer operative.  Additionally, 
their names and attributions have changed somewhat, due to the implementation of a new treaty, an internal 
reform of the Commission, and the nomination of a new college of Commissioners headed by Romano 
Prodi.  Because this discussion involves the time period up to these changes, I employ the names and 
numbers of the Delors and Santer commissions. 
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migrant NGOs (CEC 1995b). After 1995, the Commission developed a clear set of criteria for 
support. Part of this stemmed from the Delors commission’s expansionist attitude and the 
skepticism it caused among the member states (Guiraudon 2001). Member states began to 
increasingly invoke the subsidiarity principle (i.e., what can best be solved locally or nationally 
should be dealt with at that level). This meant that all Commission units managing projects 
increasingly had to explain why they – rather than the national governments or institutions – 
should intervene. A second part of this change stemmed from discussions of the opaqueness of 
the Commission’s funding procedures (Guiraudon 2001). The DG-V responded by establishing 
clearer funding requirements that also demonstrated the added value of EU funding. From this 
point on, the unit decided to include “transnationality” (i.e., projects involving the cooperation of 
multinational teams) as a criterion for receiving Commission funds. This came about due to the 
legal constraints facing the Commission – without an underlying “European” justification, 
member states could attempt to terminate programs due to non-respect of the subsidiarity 
principle before the European Court of Justice. In general, securing these funds would seem to be 
an incentive for migrant NGOs to inscribe their action in a “European” context.   
 By 1992 it was evident that what had been the predominant strategy of linking migrants’ 
rights to the concept of European citizenship was ineffective. Instead, the Commission and the 
Brussels-based NGO Migration Policy Group (MPG) shifted their agenda to the EU war on 
“social exclusion” (Article 137 of the Treaty of Amsterdam) (Guiraudon 2003). Because social 
exclusion encompasses a range of programs, the MPG linked migrant integration to this agenda in 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. This frame proved beneficial to established transnational 
networks that could rely on their expertise in the area of anti-discrimination (Geddes 2000b). In 
1992, for example, the Starting Line Group was founded and supported by the MPG. Its 
organizational structure and expertise has enabled the organization to successfully lobby in favor 
of anti-discrimination policies (Geddes 1998). Linking migrant inclusion to an anti-discrimination 
policy frame proved quite successful and resulted in the adoption of the “race directive” in June 
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of 2000 (Guiraudon 2003). The mere seven months it took was “a record for the adoption of a 
piece of Community law requiring substantive legislative changes at national level,” (Tyson 
2001: 112). At present, PMR groups continue to link migrant inclusion to anti-discrimination. 
 In sum, pro-migrant NGOs have been able to expand the EU’s sphere of influence to 
include immigrant-related issues, as have their migration control counterparts. The migrant 
inclusion agenda may be more likely to succeed through lobbying EU institutions (a process that 
occurs away from public scrutiny) rather than via actions at the national level (where opposing 
public opinion and anti-immigrant mobilization may constrain the migrant inclusion agenda), 
particularly now that asylum policy decisions are taken on the basis of qualified majority voting 
rather than unanimity. This argument suggests that groups may turn to the EU when their national 
environments are unfavorable to their policy goals. Particularly since the shift from the Third 
Pillar (JHA) to the First, the migrant inclusion agenda has met increasing opportunities to involve 
not only the Commission, but also the EP and ECJ (under certain circumstances), in counter-
balancing the Council’s intergovernmental nature. At the same time, however, migration policies 
at the EU level present problems for the aims of the single market and the integration of different 
national-level practices. As a result, migration-related policy developments at the EU level reflect 
certain conflicts. First, there are tensions between competing agendas – those that advocate for 
migration control versus migrant inclusion. Second, tensions exist between the creation of 
common policies that deal with migration and the preservation of member states’ national 
policies. These tensions underlie the majority of PMR group activity at the EU level. 
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING FUNCTIONS 
The Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations allows a more nuanced 
investigation into supranational conventional activity than previous studies have been able to 
accomplish. For example, the data permit a breakdown of activity by EU institution. This is 
useful in that although previous research has documented the predominant use of lobbying 
activity at the EU level, it has not been refined enough to analyze the factors that prompt groups 
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to target specific policymaking bodies. There are several institutions involved in formulating, 
adopting, and implementing EU policies in the area of immigration and asylum. Among the most 
significant are the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament 
(EP), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A brief overview of each institution is provided 
below.  
 The Council of Ministers is composed of representatives of member state governments, 
and represents the most important legislative body in the EU (Marks and McAdam 1999). 
Migrant and refugee issues represent a component of the Council’s agenda. This is due, in part, to 
the growing national concern over migration as a security issue since 9/11. The nature of its 
composition suggests that groups likely apply pressure at the national level to influence the 
Council. PMR groups can hold meetings with national officials to attempt to exert influence 
before Council negotiations. However, given that groups can choose to lobby other EU 
institutions, such as the Commission, it is possible that PMR organizations will shift their focus 
from the Council to other institutions when opportunities become constrained. In other words, 
groups may increase their EU-level activity when they lack influence at home.   
 The European Commission is one institution to which PMR groups may turn when the 
national context is unfavorable. The role of the Commission includes proposing and drafting 
legislation that is then debated within the European Parliament and Council of Ministers. Within 
the Commission, the Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs, Unit D/3 Anti-
Discrimination and Civil Society, is responsible for migrant inclusion affairs. Because the 
Commission also researches the feasibility of new migrant inclusion policies, it serves as an 
access point for PMR groups. However, the openness of the Commission to civil society input is 
counterbalanced by its heavy workload. In many cases, group interviews confirmed that the most 
successful PMR groups are those that have the technical knowledge and resources to draft 
legislation proposals and present them to the Commission; in other words, groups must be willing 
and able to do the Commission’s work. Moreover, the Commission is biased toward groups with 
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more moderate goals, since its proposed legislation must pass Council and EP debate. This 
suggests that EU-level activity may be just as likely to be driven by the resources and identity of 
an organization as by the national context.     
 The European Parliament is the sole decision-making institution in the EU that is directly 
elected by the public. In most policy areas, the EP has the power of co-decision with the Council 
to decide legislation. As individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can champion 
various causes, PMR groups also have an incentive to lobby the EP. This may be the most viable 
strategy for PMR groups seeking to influence EU policy, since the EP is often a willing ally that 
consistently calls for Europeanized immigration and asylum policies and for legislative action 
against racist and xenophobic discrimination (European Parliament 1998). MEPs can influence 
the Commission in back-and-forth negotiations over drafts of proposed legislation, can work with 
the Council to approve legislation, and can garner support within the EP for various initiatives. 
 In addition to the major policymaking institutions above, groups may attempt to wield 
influence via other EU bodies. For example, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the Economic 
and Social Committee as a consultative body to unite representatives of business, employers, and 
trade unions and to allow their positions to be heard by the Commission, EP, and Council 
(Wallace and Wallace 2000). Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee’s domain was 
expanded to include issues of social policy, social and economic cohesion, environment, 
education, and more. Thus, it is a target of activity for many different interest groups. In addition, 
Coreper is an EU body directly affiliated with the Council of Ministers. It comprises the 
permanent representatives of each EU government in Brussels, and deals with preparing all items 
to appear on the agenda of meetings of the Council of Ministers. As such, groups may choose to 
target Coreper in attempting to indirectly influence the agenda or policy decisions of the Council.  
 Although the structure of EU policymaking favors conventional activity, research has 
shown that challenging tactics via the European Court of Justice have at times been effective 
(Guiraudon 1998, 2003). Although the role of the ECJ is limited in the area of migrant inclusion, 
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it nonetheless can offer activists a potential avenue of influence. The ECJ can be particularly 
effective in the case of agreements between the EU and third countries. Agreements with Turkey, 
Morocco, and Algeria, for instance, contain provisions for labor market rights for third country 
nationals, and have been used as the basis for proposing expansion of the rights of all third 
country nationals (Starting Line Group 1998). Moreover, the ECJ has been an important actor in 
the development of an intra-EU migration regime based on the supranationalization of policy 
areas such as free movement and anti-discrimination (Geddes 1998). For instance, in 1990 it ruled 
that a company could move its location to another member state and retain its own staff, even if 
some of the employees are third country nationals (Guiraudon 1998). Further, some ECJ 
decisions have been outright opposed to the intentions of member states (despite efforts by states 
to limit the role of the ECJ in immigration matters). For example, it has ruled that nationals of 
states with which the EU holds contracts have directly enforceable rights in a way that makes 
them part of the acquis communautaire, and these rights must be upheld by national courts 
(Guiraudon 1998).  
HYPOTHESES 
Interconnectedness and Supranational Activity 
Recall that Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 outlines a set of relationships about how interconnectedness, 
or group ties, shapes activity. The previous chapter tested the first two sets of relationships 
concerning how groups’ national-level connections shape their domestic political tactics. The 
analyses found that more extensive national-level ties of any kind increase the odds of activity, 
suggesting that domestic connections mobilize domestic activity. Moreover, the chapter found 
that less connected, more isolated PMR groups are more prone to acting confrontationally against 
their governments. Although this might suggest that those more isolated groups are also more 
likely to act confrontationally against the EU, I argue that this is probably not the case. Since any 
type of EU-directed activity requires more in terms of mobilization and is more costly in terms of 
time and finances than acting at the national level, the types of groups that target the EU are 
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likely to be fairly well-connected regardless of the mode of activity they choose to employ. Thus, 
a plausible hypothesis is that stronger connections to national NGOs increase the odds of EU-
targeted protest. Taking these findings into consideration, we would broadly expect that when 
groups have increasingly strong connections with domestic actors, the likelihood of acting 
conventionally beyond the nation-state at the level of the EU decreases. In addition, we would 
expect that when groups have stronger connections with national NGOs, the likelihood of 
confrontational activity at the EU level increases.  
Conversely, the last set of relationships in Figure 3.1 postulates that a stronger connection 
with any type of non-national actor increases the odds that the group will act at the EU level. As 
interconnectedness develops beyond the nation-state, groups are more likely to shift the target of 
their activities beyond the national arena. For example, connections with an EU organization, 
such as the Migration Policy Group, may mobilize groups to lobby the EP or contact the 
Commission in addition to, or instead of, targeting the national government. Moreover, business 
and labor are routinely and formally consulted in matters of EU policymaking. Relationships with 
business and labor interests across many countries may thus make groups more likely to 
capitalize off of their influence and target the EU. Therefore, a plausible expectation is that 
increasingly strong connections with EU groups or actors beyond the nation-state will increase 
the odds of EU directed activity. Moreover, they should also make groups more likely to act at the 
EU versus the national level.       
The National POS and Supranational Activity 
The results of the previous chapter found differences in how the broad and issue-specific aspects 
of the POS mobilize political activity. First, an open broad POS tended to decrease the odds of 
domestic activity. One might expect this to carry over to the EU context as well. For example, 
where the national political system is relatively open to the tactics and goals of a movement 
(Tarrow 1994), one would expect less EU-directed activity. In providing groups more 
opportunities to influence political processes via national institutional channels, relatively open 
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systems should promote activities in the domestic arena. The same expectation holds when 
political allies are present in the national government, as this presumably decreases the need to 
turn to other arenas. In contrast, relatively closed systems or a lack of political allies may increase 
the odds of EU activity since groups lack access to institutional avenues of influence to some 
degree. Previous research has shown that groups tend to target the EU when national 
opportunities are relatively closed (Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001). Therefore, a relatively 
open broad national POS is expected to decrease EU activity, and is expected to decrease the 
odds of EU versus national activity.  
  In contrast, the previous chapter illustrated that the issue-specific POS most relevant to 
the migrant inclusion movement mobilizes domestic activity. When the issue-specific POS is 
relatively open, groups are more active politically. This suggests that organizations take 
advantage of a favorable political climate surrounding their policy issues of concern. Some have 
argued that this open political climate also exists at the level of the EU. The EU’s democratic 
deficit, in shielding policymakers from the scrutiny of public opinion, has the potential to produce 
an environment favorable to the goals of the movement. Thus, an open issue-specific POS at the 
national level may also mobilize EU-directed activity. Therefore, a more open issue-specific 
policy context is expected to increase the odds of EU activity, and to increase the likelihood of 
EU versus national activity.    
Group Identity and Supranational Activity 
The previous chapter found that an organization’s political identity, or ideology, is a significant 
factor in explaining its political behavior in the national context. The less challenging 
organizations were more prone to lobbying, whereas the slightly more radical groups tended to 
use protest and other challenging methods. Because the political-institutional environment of the 
EU is such that it encourages conventional over spectacular tactics, I expect identity to work 
differently in shaping EU as opposed to national action. Scholars have found that the democratic 
deficit of the EU makes it much less receptive to protest (Imig and Tarrow 2001). The low 
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democratic accountability of most supranational institutions insulates them from protest (Eisinger 
1973). Rather, Marks and McAdam (1999) have argued that the institutional structure of the EU 
makes it more likely that groups will undertake conventional activities, as these tactics are better 
suited to influence the EU policy process (Tarrow 1995; Rucht 1990).  
Recall that three dimensions of PMR organizational identity exist: services/care, 
political/legal, and asylum. The goals of services/care groups tend to be less challenging, whereas 
those of political/legal and asylum groups tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status 
quo. At the EU level, I expect that instead of trying to coordinate protest-based tactics, the more 
challenging groups may simply be excluded from EU political processes. Thus, services/care 
groups are the most likely to engage in a variety of tactics at the EU level. Moreover, these 
groups should be more likely to act at the EU versus the national level. In contrast, political/legal 
and asylum groups are likely to be insignificant actors in the EU policy process. Thus, 
political/legal and asylum groups are less likely to act at the EU versus the national level.   
Resources and Supranational Activity 
Organizational resources are also important to account for, as previous research and the prior 
chapter has found them to mobilize many forms of political action (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider 
and Dalton 2002). Groups with more financial resources in particular were more likely to 
undertake a variety of activities at the national level. Presumably, higher levels of resources 
should produce the same effect at the supranational level, as these groups possess the means to be 
politically active across different levels. For example, they can serve on government commissions 
and advisory commissions as well as lobby the European Parliament and attempt to influence the 
Council of Ministers. In contrast, organizations with fewer resources are more limited in the 
activities they can undertake. Presumably, this limitation also affects their ability to act beyond 
the state setting. Therefore, groups with more resources are more likely to undertake a variety of 
EU-level activities, and are more likely to act at the EU level.  
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In addition to resource levels, resource mobilization theory also emphasizes the source of 
group resources. The source of an organization’s resources is important to consider, as it likely 
influences the type of activity the group selects. For instance, groups that rely mainly on 
individual donations may be more apt to stage a demonstration against the government versus 
those that depend on a government grant. This chapter will examine the effect of EU funding on 
groups’ propensities to act at the EU level. The previous chapter found that a grant from the EU 
actually encourages confrontational methods of influence, such as court action, in the national 
context. In the context of the EU, a plausible expectation is that EU funding increases the 
likelihood that groups will lobby the EU. As discussed in prior sections, groups that receive such 
funds must have a transnational dimension to their proposed activity (CEC 1995b). To the extent 
that this encourages interactions at the supranational level, EU funding can be expected to 
increase the odds of supranational versus national activity.     
DATA AND METHODS 
The dependent variables to be analyzed in this chapter reflect both quantitative measures of levels 
of activities as well as qualitative measures of activity choice. They measure: level of 
participation in a series of conventional lobbying activities by EU institution (the European 
Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, and 
Coreper); level of participation in bringing court cases before the ECJ and protest against the EU; 
participation in EU versus national lobbying activity; and EU versus national court action and 
protest. All data for the dependent variables come from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and 
Refugee Organizations.  
The dependent variables above are all coded dichotomously. Those that measure activity 
levels are coded so that 1=participation in the given activity, 0=non participation. Those that 
measure activity choice are coded so that 1=EU activity, 0=national activity. Given the binary 
nature of the dependent variables, logistic regression for survey data is the appropriate technique. 
The latter type of dependent variables are particularly useful in that they allow an assessment of 
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the factors that cause groups to shift their arena of action and move beyond the national level. 
Although prior research has shown that EU activities tend to be more conventional in nature 
(Marks and McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001), it has not yet shown which factors cause 
groups to shift their focus from the national to the supranational setting. The ensuing analyses 
will be positioned to answer this question.  
In addition to the activity measures, a set of dependent variables measures the 
effectiveness of EU action in achieving the organization’s policy goals. The effectiveness 
measures are also coded dichotomously so that 1=generally effective (somewhat effective + very 
effective), 0=generally ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective). Due to their binary 
nature, these variables also require estimation using binary logistic regression techniques for 
survey data.  
The data for most of the independent variables come from the Survey of European Pro-
Migrant and Refugee Organizations. The POS data come from a variety of sources. The 
construction and data source of each independent variable was discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. As before, the models also include a regional control variable to account for any 
unobserved regional effects across Europe in order to guard against omitted variable bias and add 
regional fixed effects to the models.  
As in each empirical chapter, the methods used reflect the research questions being 
asked. I begin by asking a series of descriptive questions: What proportion of groups engage in 
tactics directed at the EU? Are certain types of PMR groups more likely to lobby EU institutions 
versus challenge them? To address these questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the 
data to determine the distribution of participation in each mode of EU activity, and to determine 
participation in each EU activity by type of group (i.e., services/care, political/legal, and asylum).  
The second set of research questions inquires about the factors that produce changes in 
activity patterns among groups: What factors increase or decrease the likelihood of lobbying the 
European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social 
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Committee, and Coreper? What factors affect the odds of challenging the EU via the European 
Court of Justice or by direct action? What conditions produce a qualitative shift in the arena of 
activity from the national to the EU level? In order to answer these questions, I first examined the 
bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent variables for each model (which are 
presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3). I then estimated a series of multivariate equations according to 
the models discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for participation in each type of 
EU activity, as well as a separate model for each EU versus national level activity choice.  
The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in tables by groupings of 
independent variables. Thus, there is a separate table for the effects of interconnectedness, the 
POS, identity, and resources on EU activity. In all cases where a regression was performed on the 
data, all predictor variables were included together in the full model (regardless of how the results 
are presented). In other words, each regression controls for all predictor variables even though 
they are presented separately. The subsequent sections discuss the results of the analyses. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Patterns 
Table 6.1 illustrates the percentage breakdown of participation in both conventional and 
challenging political activities at the EU level. The two most common activities are interacting 
with the European Commission and lobbying the European Parliament. When it comes to 
frequent participation in these activities (often + sometimes), 40% of all groups engage in the 
former and 43% in the latter. Moreover, a comparable proportion of groups view each activity as 
a very effective method of policy influence (10% and 9%, respectively). When it comes to 
lobbying the other EU institutions, however, the numbers drop off dramatically. For example, 
only 13% of all PMR organizations frequently attempt to influence the Council of Ministers, only 
13% frequently interact with the Economic and Social Committee, and only 5% have frequent 
contacts with Coreper. In addition, very few groups consider these activities highly effective 
ways to influence policy. Only 5% consider contacts with the Council very effective, only 1% 
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report the same about interactions with the Economic and Social Committee, and no groups 
believe that interacting with Coreper is a very effective method. These numbers illustrate which 
institutions open potential opportunities for groups to access and influence the EU policy process, 
and where they may look for political allies.  
 When it comes to protests directed at the EU, research has shown that they are indeed a 
rare event (Imig and Tarrow 2001). Nonetheless, 15% of PMR groups frequently engage in 
protests against the EU. Because the questionnaire simply asked groups to describe how often 
they engage in “protests or demonstrations that target the EU,” groups have the option to define 
protest in different ways. In fact, one European Commission official who interacts with migrant 
inclusion groups on a regular basis described their “protests” as mainly taking the form of 
petitions or letter-writing campaigns, while emphasizing that these were rare events. Thus, this 
figure is likely not driven by demonstrations or other acts in which groups take to the streets, but 
rather more mild forms of protest that may not be as visible. In any case, protest is not considered 
a very effective method of policy influence (2%). Similarly, only 4% of all groups frequently 
bring court cases before the ECJ, and only 3% believe this method to be very effective. 
 Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that some variation in these activities is driven by group 
identity. By and large, services/care groups tend to participate slightly more than the others in all 
types of conventional lobbying (Figure 6.1). This is expected given that they are the least 
challenging of the three group types. The interesting exception is targeting the Council of 
Ministers, which asylum groups seem to do more frequently that the others. Figure 6.2 shows that 
asylum organizations are also more likely to protest against the EU. When it comes to bringing 
court cases before the ECJ, however, each group is about equally likely to do so.          
 Overall, the descriptive data confirm that, like the national level, the majority of EU-
directed activities are conventional in nature. This largely affirms the literature that finds the EU 
policy process more receptive to institutional lobbying activities than protest (Marks and 
McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001). However, it would be misleading to say that PMR 
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groups never protest the EU. In fact, they may do so more than one would expect. At the same 
time, however, protest can be defined in many different ways, including less visible or public 
displays. Because it is costly in terms of time, money, and mobilization effort to mount a 
demonstration in Brussels, when groups protest the EU it is likely via letter-writing campaigns or 
similar methods. Finally, using the ECJ is the least popular EU activity of all, confirming that it is 
costly to bring challenges out of the national arena and into the sphere of EU politics.  
Main Findings: Interconnectedness and EU Directed Activity 
Tables 6.4 – 6.8 display the effects of group ties on the likelihood of activity aimed at the EU. In 
disaggregating lobbying activity by EU institution, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that stronger ties with 
actors outside of the group’s nation-state increase both the odds of activity and the odds of 
reporting EU lobbying as a very effective method of influence. For example, while strong ties 
with national actors decrease the odds, groups with stronger connections to organizations at the 
EU level (such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles) have more than five times the 
odds of targeting the Commission (5.69, p<.01). Similarly, maintaining a strong relationship with 
NGOs abroad increases the likelihood of Commission-directed activity by a factor of 1.88 
(p<.05). Finally, more regular interactions with business associations and labor unions from 
beyond the group’s home country increase the odds of targeting the Commission by a factor of 
1.82 (p<.10). Overall, interconnectedness has a powerful effect on the likelihood that a PMR 
group will interact with the Commission and lend support to the theoretical model put forth in 
Chapter 3.  
In addition, Table 6.4 illustrates that connections with non-national actors significantly 
impact activity directed at the European Parliament. Links with EU organizations and NGOs 
abroad, for example, render groups over twice as likely to lobby the EP (2.90, p<.01 and 2.07, 
p<.05, respectively). Moreover, those with the social partners in other countries increase the odds 
by a factor of 3.05 (p<.01). In addition, the fact that stronger national-level connections decrease 
the odds of this activity lends further support to the model of interconnectedness.  
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Group ties also powerfully shape Council-directed activity. Consistent with the 
theoretical model, national ties decrease the odds of activity whereas those beyond the country 
increase them. For example, groups with stronger links to EU organizations are over six times as 
likely to try to influence the Council (6.61, p<.01). Likewise, those with strong relationships with 
the social partners that span beyond the country level are over three times as likely to do so (3.14, 
p<.05). Conversely, connections with the national social partners decrease the odds by 48% 
(p<.05). Overall, the results thus far suggest that group ties that extend beyond the national level 
tend to facilitate access to EU institutions.  
In terms of the less conspicuous institutions, the pattern is largely the same when it comes 
to interacting with the Economic and Social Committee. When it comes to lobbying Coreper, 
which is linked to the Council of Ministers, Table 6.4 illustrates that the pattern changes slightly. 
Whereas increasingly regular networking with EU organizations and NGOs abroad strongly 
increases the likelihood of targeting Coreper, so do links with national business and labor. 
Groups with such connections are over eight times as likely to lobby Coreper as organizations 
with weak or non-existent ties to the national social partners (8.40, p<.01). Although this finding 
contradicts the interconnectedness hypothesis, it is not without explanation. Because its members 
comprise the permanent representatives of each EU government, groups are dealing mainly with 
national political actors in their interactions with Coreper. Moreover, because the social partners 
are formally consulted in matters of national policy, it makes sense that migrant inclusion groups 
with stronger links to them would attempt to influence policy via Coreper. In general, however, 
the results presented in Table 6.4 support the hypothesis that increasingly strong ties to actors 
outside of the state mobilize EU lobbying activity, whereas ties with national-level actors 
generally decrease this likelihood.  
Table 6.6 presents the effects of interconnectedness on the odds of acting 
confrontationally against the EU. Consistent with the hypothesis, stronger links with national 
NGOs increase the odds of protesting the EU by a factor of 3.07 (p<.01). However, there is more 
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to the picture. The findings indicate that increasingly strong ties to the social partners in other 
countries also increase this likelihood by a factor of 2.56 (p<.01). Moreover, strong ties to EU 
groups increase the odds of bringing court cases before the ECJ by 68% (p<.05). Thus, although 
connections with domestic NGOs increase the likelihood of EU protest, so do those that exist 
beyond the state level.      
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the likelihood of including the EU as a target of action versus 
acting strictly at the national level. Confirming the hypothesis, the results presented in Table 6.7 
show that group ties that extend beyond the country increase the odds of acting at the EU level. 
For example, increasingly strong ties to EU groups (3.24, p<.01) and the social partners (3.31, 
p<.05) abroad make groups over three times as likely to extend the scope of their action beyond 
the national-level. Likewise, links with NGOs in other countries increase the odds by 82% 
(p<.10). In terms of protest, Table 6.8 shows that increasingly strong links with national NGOs 
make groups over twice as likely (2.91, p<.05) to include the EU in their protest campaigns 
versus confining their protest to the national arena. Moreover, networking with the social partners 
abroad increases the odds that groups will include the EU as a target of protest by a factor of 3.61 
(p<.01). When it comes to judicial action, stronger relationahips with NGOs and the social 
partners in other countries increase the odds of including the ECJ in groups’ litigation strategies 
by 75% (p<.05) and 59% (p<.10) respectively versus only using the national courts. Overall, 
interconnectedness strongly increases the odds of each type of lobbying activity in ways that 
generally support this chapter’s hypotheses.   
Other Findings: The National POS and EU Directed Activity 
Tables 6.9 – 6.13 display the effects of the national POS, in both broad and issue-specific 
forms, on EU activity. Overall, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that an open national 
POS in its broad form decreases the need to turn to the EU. In examining lobbying by EU 
institution, Table 6.9 shows that in all cases not involving the Council or its related body Coreper, 
an open broad POS actually increases the odds of lobbying the EU, and Table 6.10 shows that it 
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increases the likelihood that groups will find these activities effective. For example, the presence 
of national political allies in the form of a Left leaning government and more political parties 
increases the odds of contacting the Commission by a factor of 2.22 (p<.10), and 2.17 (p<.10), 
respectively. Similarly, groups based in countries that have a greater number of political parties 
are 99% (p<.05) more likely to lobby the EP and are over twice as likely (2.62, p<.01) to target 
the Economic and Social Committee. In contrast, a Leftist government makes groups less likely 
to try to influence the Council, and combined with a federal system makes groups less likely to 
target Coreper. Overall, an open institutional environment at home prompts, and does not 
discourage, lobbying at the EU level except for the national representatives of the Council and 
Coreper. Although this does not support the hypothesis, a plausible explanation is that such 
groups have less of a need to take action via domestic actors if they believe their national 
environments are already receptive to migrant and refugee issues. In such cases, groups may turn 
to the other EU institutions in an attempt to transmit their national standards to EU policy.  
The effects of the issue-specific POS are quite mixed, neither confirming nor refuting the 
hypothesis that its open form mobilizes EU activity. On the one hand, Table 6.9 shows that the 
perception of an open national policy context specific to migrants and refugees clearly increases 
the odds of Commission contacts by 83% (p<.10), and of targeting the Council by 87% (p<.01). 
Yet at the same time, it has mixed effects on prompting groups to interact with the Economic and 
Social Committee and Coreper. Moreover, it tends to decrease the reported effectiveness of many 
of the lobbying activities. 
An open national POS in its broad form also influences groups to use the ECJ, as 
illustrated in Table 6.11. PMR organizations based in a federal versus centralized system are 55% 
more likely to use the ECJ, and those based in countries with Left leaning versus Right leaning 
governments are over twice as likely to do so (2.40, p<.05). In general, an open broad national 
POS mobilizes activity of all types directed at the EU. Tables 6.12 and 6.13 lend further support 
to this conclusion. Groups based in countries with more versus fewer political parties are over 
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twice as likely (2.34, p<.05) to include the EU institutions as targets of group lobbying, versus 
lobbying strictly national institutions (Table 6.12). Moreover, organizations in countries with a 
Leftist government are 93% (p<.10) more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies 
versus bringing cases before strictly national courts (Table 6.13).       
Group Identity and EU Directed Activity 
Tables 6.14 – 6.18 illustrate that there is a rather clear breakdown of EU directed activity by 
group identity. First, in examining Table 6.14 it becomes apparent that the slightly more 
challenging groups are less likely to target the Council and are more prone to interacting with the 
more minor institutional players. For example, political/legal groups, whose goals tend to pose a 
greater challenge to the political status quo, are 46% (p<.10) less likely to lobby the Council. Yet 
they are more likely to target the Committee by 80% (p<.10), whereas the less challenging 
services/care groups are 43% (p<.10) less likely to do so. Moreover, asylum organizations are 
over nineteen times as likely to target Coreper (19.59, p<.05). This suggests that groups with a 
more challenging identity are not necessarily excluded from the EU policy process, as the 
hypothesis suggests, but may try to exert influence through “back door” strategies that involve 
targeting the relatively less conspicuous players and avoiding contact with the major 
policymaking institutions. In terms of effectiveness, Table 6.15 shows that there is no clear 
pattern in terms of how group identity structures the reported efficacy of EU lobbying activities. 
 Table 6.16 displays the results of how identity affects the odds of challenging the EU. 
Similar to the national-level findings of the previous chapter, it shows that the slightly more 
challenging groups tend to mount challenges against the EU. Specifically, political/legal 
organizations are 60% (p<.05) more likely to protest the EU and asylum groups are over twice as 
likely to use the ECJ (2.37, p<.01). Although Table 6.17 illustrates that identity does not 
significantly shape the odds of lobbying the EU versus the national government, Table 6.18 
shows that it does have an effect on EU versus national challenging activity. Asylum groups are 
more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies versus strictly rely on the national 
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courts (2.83, p<.01). Overall, the results do not support the identity hypotheses. Services/care 
groups do not appear to use a wide range of tactics at the EU level (as they do in the national 
arena), and they are not more likely than the others to act at the EU level in the first place. 
Moreover, the slightly more radical groups are not less likely to target the EU versus the national 
government, suggesting that they are not necessarily shut out from supranational political 
processes.    
Resources and EU Directed Activity 
The effects of group resources on EU directed activity are displayed in Tables 6.19 – 6.23. Table 
6.19 shows that group age has a rather consistent effect on EU lobbying. For example, older 
organizations are over two times more likely (2.11, p<.10) to target the Council of Ministers and 
are over nine times more likely (9.60, p<.05) to interact with Coreper versus younger groups. At 
the same time, they are 46% (p<.05) less likely to have contacts with the Economic and Social 
Committee, but those groups with more full time staff are 61% (p<.10) more likely to do so. In 
addition, more employees also increases the odds of targeting Coreper (3.37, p<.10). Table 6.20 
illustrates that the effect of resources on effectiveness is very mixed. Those groups that have 
received a Commission grant are more likely to report contacts with the Economic and Social 
Committee and Coreper as very effective (1.99, p<.10 and 2.71, p<.05 respectively). In addition, 
having a larger annual budget increases the odds of reporting contacts with the Council as very 
effective (2.25, p<.05), and a larger paid staff increases the reported efficacy of interacting with 
the Commission (1.44, p<.10).  
 Table 6.21 shows that resources do not shape challenging actions taken against the EU, 
and Table 6.22 illustrates that they do not significantly affect the odds of lobbying the EU versus 
national government when other factors are controlled. However, they do weakly shape the odds 
of EU versus national challenging tactics, as illustrated in Table 6.23. Resources have 
inconsistent effects on protest, as groups with more versus fewer full time staff are 35% (p<.10) 
less likely to include the EU as a target of protest, but organizations with a larger annual budget 
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are 53% (p<.10) more likely to do so. Finally, older groups are more likely to limit their court 
action to the national level, as they are 39% (p<.10) less likely than younger groups to include the 
ECJ in their litigation strategies.      
CONCLUSIONS: SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
The goal of this chapter was to investigate how an organization’s level of interconnectedness 
impacts its EU directed activity independently of other relevant factors, such as the national POS, 
group identity and resources. Yet this chapter was also interested in how these other factors shape 
groups’ supranational political behavior in and of themselves. Overall, the data lend support to 
the interconnectedness hypotheses advanced in this chapter. However, the findings lend mixed or 
no support to many of the other hypotheses. These are discussed below.  
 Chapter 3 put forth a theoretical model of political action, and part of that model was 
tested in this chapter. In short, I first hypothesized that stronger connections with domestic actors 
would decrease the odds of lobbying beyond the nation-state at the level of the EU, while those 
with EU groups or actors beyond the nation-state would increase the odds of EU activity. The 
data broadly support these propositions. Links with national NGOs do, in fact, significantly 
decrease the odds of targeting the Commission and Coreper. Similarly, connections with the 
national social partners decrease the odds of most lobbying activities as well. On the other hand, 
EU lobbying is mobilized by networks that reach beyond the state and include EU organizations, 
NGOs in other countries, and business and labor in other countries. Moreover, these types of 
relationships make groups more likely to include the EU in their lobbying activities versus 
focusing strictly on national institutions.   
In addition, I expected stronger ties with national NGOs to increase the likelihood of 
confrontational activity at the EU level. The data also support this contention. I found that strong 
links to national NGOs increase the odds of EU directed protest, and increase the odds that 
groups will target their protest against the EU versus only the national government. However, this 
is not the end of the story as the hypothesis would suggest. Links to actors beyond the state 
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significantly increase confrontational activity as well, suggesting that the more “connected” 
groups endure the added costs of mounting challenges against the EU. Overall, connections 
beyond the state were found to mobilize all types of EU political activity – from the conventional 
to the more challenging. However, ties with national NGO only served to mobilize more 
confrontational tactics.    
  Although I am most interested in the performance of the interconnectedness predictors, 
an integrative model of activity controls for other explanatory factors as well. Among these is the 
national POS. I hypothesized that a relatively open broad national POS would decrease EU 
activity, and would decrease the odds of EU versus national activity. In fact, the results suggest 
that the effect is exactly the opposite. Aside from activity directed at the Council and Coreper 
(which are comprised of national-level actors), an open broad POS increases the odds of each 
type of EU lobbying activity. Moreover, it increases the likelihood of using the ECJ, suggesting 
that when the national broad POS is open, groups are mobilized across a spectrum of EU activity. 
These conditions also increase the odds that a group will include the EU in its lobbying tactics 
versus lobbying exclusively national institutions, and increase the likelihood of expanding 
litigation strategies beyond the national sphere to include the ECJ. 
 Unlike at the national level where they increase the odds of activity, the issue-specific 
POS has mixed effects on EU activity. I hypothesized that a more open issue-specific policy 
context would increase the odds of EU activity, and would increase the likelihood of EU versus 
national activity. In general, the national policy context specific to migrant and refugees has no 
significant effect on challenging the EU, or on the odds of EU versus national activity. Where its 
effects are clear, an open policy context only increases the likelihood of lobbying the 
Commission and Council. Interestingly, although an open policy context mobilized national 
activity, it does not have a consistent effect on EU action, suggesting that the effects of the issue-
specific POS on groups’ political repertoires are most pronounced in the national arena.  
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  Based on the findings from the previous chapter, the identity hypotheses predicted that 
services/care groups would be the most likely to engage in a variety of tactics at the EU level, and 
would be most likely to act at the EU versus the national level. In contrast, I expected 
political/legal and asylum groups to be less likely to act at the EU versus the national level. The 
data reveal that this is not at all the case. Just as at the national level, there is a rather clear 
distribution of activity by identity at the level of the EU. In general, the more challenging groups 
tend to channel their lobbying activity through the less conspicuous EU institutions, suggesting a 
“back door” strategy to policy influence. While these groups, due to their political values and the 
issues they espouse, may be relatively excluded from the more common practices of lobbying the 
major EU policymaking institutions, they nonetheless participate in the supranational political 
process by attempting to express their views through the institution that serves as a link between 
civil society organizations and the EU institutions (i.e., the Committee) and through the 
permanent representatives of Coreper, which interacts with the Council of Ministers. This 
highlights a clever means of attempting to influence policy via the less prominent EU bodies that, 
in turn, interact and have influence with the major policymaking institutions. In addition, the 
more challenging groups are more likely to protest the EU and make use of the ECJ. Asylum 
groups are also more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies versus strictly bring 
cases before the national courts. Thus, although it is structured in favor of conventional strategies, 
the more challenging groups nonetheless devise means of challenging the EU.   
 Finally, I expected that groups with EU funding would be more likely to lobby the EU. 
Surprisingly, this is not supported by the data, as EU funding is insignificant in each model. 
Moreover, I hypothesized that groups with more resources would be more likely to undertake a 
variety of EU-level activities, and would be more likely to act at the EU versus national level. 
Because of their inconsistent effects, there is mixed support for the former hypothesis depending 
on which resources one examines. Older groups and those with more employees are more likely 
to lobby at least two of the five EU institutions examined. In addition, organizations with higher 
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annual budgets are more likely to include the EU as a target of protest in addition to the national 
government, since this is a costly activity. Considering all resources together, they do mobilize a 
broad spectrum of EU activities. However, no single resource has a consistent effect on activity.  
 In sum, the magnitude of the odds ratios, together with the significance levels and 
consistency of effects, suggests that group ties are the strongest set of predictors when it comes to 
lobbying the EU, and when it comes to EU versus national lobbying and protest. Moreover, they 
are among the most powerful predictors of EU challenging activity, and of EU versus national 
court action. Overall, groups’ choice of activity depends to a large extent on who they know and 
how well they know them. Interconnectedness thus works in conjunction with other factors to 
mobilize groups to move their struggles beyond the nation-state and into the realm of EU politics. 
Thus, at both the EU and national levels, connections help to mobilize activity. The following 
chapter will test the effects of interconnectedness (while controlling for other factors) on 
collaborative activity among actors across levels of governance.   
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Chapter Six: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 6.1
EU Lobbying Activity by Group Identity
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Figure 6.2
EU Challenging Activity by Group Identity
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Table 6.1       
Conventional and Challenging Political Activities: EU 
Level     
Activity       
%  
often 
% 
sometimes 
%  
very effective 
Conventional      
Contact European Commission  15 25 10 
Contact Member(s) of European Parliament 10 33 9 
Contact Council of Ministers  2 11 5 
Contact Economic and Social Committee 2 11 1 
Contact COREPER   1 4 0 
       
Challenging       
Protests aimed at EU  4 11 2 
Judicial action in ECJ  1 3 3 
       
       
N=114             
Note: Figures are percentages of groups that reported frequently utilizing the given activity to 
address their primary issues of concern over the past two to three years ("often" or 
"sometimes"), and that reported the given activity to be "very effective." 
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Table 6.2          
Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables, EU Conventional Activity, and 
Effectiveness 
 Commission Parliament Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Predictor A E A E A E A E A E 
Network Structures        
  national NGOs .02 
 
-.08 .02 
 
-.02 .06 -.03 -.10 -.19** .01 -.12 
  national business .24** .20** .15 .15 .25** .04 .14 .10 .32** .11 
  national labor .07 .09 .15 .07 .24** .09 .18** .09 .32** .02 
  EU groups .53** .20** .51** .24** .55** .19** .42** .12 .48** -.02 
  non-national NGOs .35** .22** .25** .10 .40** .02 .37** -.04 .32** -.15 
  non-national bus. .31** .23** .29** .17* .40** .11 .38** .13 .38** .03 
  non-national labor .28** .21** .36** .19** .44** .14 .39** .05 .37** -.06 
Broad POS         
  competitiveness of 
participation -.02 .05 .09 .02 .04 .04 -.06 -.04 .13 -.05 
  federal system .12 .23** .06 .07 .21** .12 .06 .07 .14 -.03 
  Left chief executive -.11 -.00 -.10 -.05 -.20** .00 -.16* -.09 -.18* -.04 
  Left govt -.14 .01 -.13 -.01 -.26** -.00 
-
.20** -.09 
-
.21** -.03 
  no. of parties  .15 -.04 .17* .09 .18* -.06 .24** .02 .17* -.03 
Issue-Specific POS        
  labor market .01 .02 .09 -.01 .15 .03 -.03 .00 .14 -.02 
  family reunification -.00 -.01 .11 -.02 .13 .03 -.02 -.02 .16* -.03 
  long-term residence -.01 .01 .07 -.02 .10 .04 -.06 -.01 .11 -.02 
  naturalization .02 .00 .13 -.04 .15 .02 .00 -.03 .20** -.05 
  anti-discrimination -.00 .03 .08 -.04 .19** .02 -.00 .01 .19** -.01 
  immigration policy 
perception .18* -.03 .18* .00 .11 
-
.19** .03 -.15 -.04 -.04 
  Citizenship policy 
perception .18* .03 .17* .01 .12 -.06 .07 -.04 .08 .02 
  asylum policy 
perception .19** .05 .14* -.00 .16 -.14 .14 -.17* -.07 -.05 
  employment policy 
perception .11 .06 .07 .14 .13 -.08 .02 -.02 -.03 .08 
Identity          
  services/care-giving .03 -.05 -.03 .03 .11 .02 .02 .02 .16* .10 
  political/legal .09 -.02 .07 .09 .03 -.09 .23** -.05 .13 -.06 
  asylum -.02 -.16* -.02 .05 .07 -.04 .01 .07 .19** -.01 
Resources          
  EU grant  .20** .17* .08 .18* .34** .23** .32** .20** .30** .18*
  age of group .07 .02 .05 -.04 .21** .04 -.12 .04 .12 .05 
  full-time staff .18** .09 .07 .05 .14 .07 .06 .11 .14 .07 
  part-time staff -.02 .04 -.12 .06 -.12 .04 .02 -.11 -.13 .04 
  Volunteers -.08 -.06 -.14 -.05 .06 -.10 .01 -.05 .01 .05 
  Budget .07 .06 -.02 .06 .14 .16* -.06 .10 .06 .18*
  income trend .16* -.05 .06 -.08 .03 -.00 -.03 .02 .13 -.06 
  Members -.09 .04 .00 .03 -.10 .08 -.10 .04 -.07 .05 
Note: Table entries are Pearson product moment correlations (r). A=Activity, E=Efficacy. **p<.05, 
*p<.10. 
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Table 6.3     
Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables, EU Confrontational Activity, and 
Effectiveness 
  Protest ECJ 
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy 
Network Structures   
  national NGOs .27** -.15 -.07 -.04 
  national business .24** -.00 .23** .16* 
  national labor .23** -.13 .09 -.03 
  EU groups .07 -.00 .23** .06 
  non-national NGOs .01 -.06 .00 -.00 
  non-national bus. .17* -.05 .14 -.01 
  non-national labor .21** -.21** .11 -.15 
Broad POS    
  competitiveness of 
participation .21** .13 .11 -.07 
  federal system -.10 .01 .20 .20 
  Left chief executive .02 .06 -.01 -.02 
  Left govt .00 .07 .00 .01 
  no. of parties  .31 .18 .04 .22 
Issue-Specific POS   
  labor market .18* .00 .06 -.05 
  family reunification .18** -.02 .04 -.07 
  long-term residence .17* -.01 .05 -.06 
  naturalization .19** -.02 .05 -.10 
  anti-discrimination .16* .01 .04 -.07 
  immigration policy 
perception -.03 -.13 -.01 .07 
  citizenship policy 
perception -.00 .00 -.10 .16* 
  asylum policy perception -.08 -.19** -.04 -.03 
  employment policy 
perception .02 -.09 .03 .15 
Identity     
  services/care-giving .25** .08 .20** .01 
  political/legal .20** .11 .23** -.01 
  asylum .15 -.05 .27** -.09 
Resources     
  EU grant  .01 -.03 .18* .15 
  age of group .05 .01 .05 .16* 
  full-time staff -.09 -.06 -.12 .07 
  part-time staff .11 .09 .04 .07 
  volunteers .03 -.03 .08 -.08 
  budget -.05 -.00 .10 .11 
  income trend .02 -.00 -.07 .06 
  members .05 .07 -.03 .04 
Note: Table entries are Pearson product moment correlations (r). **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 216
 
Table 6.4       
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by 
Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs 
 
.45**  
(.21) 
.89  
(.41) 
.72  
(.53) 
.68  
(.34) 
.02***  
(.03) 
  national social partners 
 
1.08  
(.34) 
.58**  
(.16) 
.52**  
(.18) 
.40***  
(.15) 
8.40*** 
(5.80) 
  EU groups 
 
5.69*** 
(2.35) 
2.90*** 
(.86) 
6.61*** 
(3.30) 
2.84*** 
(.96) 
55.69*** 
(6.85) 
  non-national NGOs 
 
1.88**  
(.71) 
2.07** 
(.92) 
2.39  
(1.81) 
3.45*** 
(1.82) 
24.56*** 
(3.97) 
  non-national social  
  partners 
1.82*  
(.75) 
3.05*** 
(1.53) 
3.14*** 
(1.45) 
2.19** 
(.77) 
1.34  
(.73) 
N=   110 112 111 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along 
with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 
1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
 
Table 6.5       
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying 
Activity by Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs 
 
.36**  
(.18) 
1.17  
(.34) 
.89  
(.31) 
.89  
(.35) 
.61  
(.26) 
  national soc. partners 
 
1.48  
(.54) 
.85  
(.21) 
1.43  
(.49) 
1.49  
(.47) 
2.32 
(1.75) 
  EU groups 
 
2.47***  
(.86) 
2.59***  
(.83) 
1.82**  
(.63) 
1.23  
(.41) 
1.68*  
(.68) 
  non-national NGOs 
 
2.65**  
(1.28) 
1.10  
(.40) 
1.64**  
(.49) 
1.76 
(1.50) 
1.15  
(.86) 
  non-national social  
  partners 
1.26  
(.45) 
1.11  
(.35) 
.95  
(.29) 
1.19  
(.35) 
.89  
(.31) 
N=   110 112 96 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not 
effective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These 
are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not 
effective increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 
1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.6     
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of EU Challenging Activity  
   Protest ECJ 
Predictor     Activity Activity 
Network Structures    
  national NGOs 
  
3.07***  
(1.18) 
1.15  
(.55) 
     
  national social partners 
 
1.11  
(.28) 
1.20  
(.30) 
     
  EU groups 
  
1.05  
(.32) 
1.68**  
(.51) 
     
  non-national NGOs 
  
.80  
(.27) 
1.22  
(.40) 
     
  non-national social partners 
 
2.56***  
(.84) 
1.37  
(.46) 
N=     111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of 
participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds 
ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.7    
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and EU versus National Conventional 
Activity  
    
Predictor     Lobby EU and Nat’l | Lobby Nat’l 
Network Structures   
  national NGOs  1.44  
   (.55) 
  national social partners .67 
   (.21) 
  EU groups  3.24*** 
   (1.34) 
  non-national NGOs  1.82* 
   (.73) 
  non-national social partners 3.31** 
   (1.98) 
N=     110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and 
national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 6.8     
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and EU versus National Challenging Activity  
     
Predictor     
Protest EU and Nat’l |  
Protest Nat’l 
ECJ and Nat’l courts |  
Nat’l courts 
Network 
Structures    
  national NGOs 
  
2.91**  
(1.55) 
.70 
(.29) 
     
  national social partners 
 
1.28  
(.38) 
1.19 
(.39) 
     
  EU groups 
  
1.10  
(.39) 
1.47 
(.52) 
     
  non-national  
  NGOs  
.93  
(.35) 
1.75** 
(.61) 
     
  non-national social partners 
 
3.61***  
(1.75) 
1.59* 
(.49) 
     
N=     111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and 
national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 6.9        
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper   
Broad POS       
  competitiveness of  
  participation 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
  
  federal system 
 
1.57  
(.86) 
.89  
(.27) 
.83  
(.33) 
.76  
(.21) 
.08**  
(.09) 
  Left government 
 
2.22*  
(1.23) 
.86  
(.34) 
.39** 
(.22) 
.77  
(.26) 
.11**  
(.14) 
  number of parties 
 
2.17*  
(1.12) 
1.99** 
(.63) 
1.80  
(.86) 
2.62*** 
(.93) 
.73  
(.45) 
Issue-Specific POS       
  policy context index 
 
.22  
(.44) 
.26  
(.43) 
1.10 
(1.99) 
.05** 
(.07) 
105.47***  
(7.19) 
  policy perceptions index 
 
1.83*  
(.69) 
1.18 
(.32) 
1.87*** 
(.49) 
1.82** 
(.60) 
.05***  
(.06) 
N=   110 112 111 111 112   
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation 
in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree 
to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
 
Table 6.10      
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by 
Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of  
  participation 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
  federal system 
 
3.12***  
(1.48) 
1.47  
(.45) 
1.51 
(.50) 
2.04*  
(.97) 
1.54  
(.92) 
  Left government 
 
1.25  
(.55) 
.98  
(.37) 
.82  
(.41) 
.44  
(.29) 
.61  
(.46) 
  number of parties 
 
1.33  
(.36) 
1.88* 
(.78) 
1.52 
(.61) 
2.21** 
(.90) 
.59  
(.33) 
Issue-Specific POS      
  policy context index 
 
.10**  
(.11) 
.10** 
(.13) 
.06** 
(.08) 
.07  
(.16) 
2.18 
(2.45) 
  policy perceptions index 
 
1.36  
(.35) 
1.37* 
(.33) 
.61  
(.32) 
.49**  
(.18) 
.11*  
(.15) 
N=   110 112 96 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective 
(not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.11    
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of EU Challenging Activity  
   Protest ECJ 
Predictor    Activity Activity 
Broad POS    
  competitiveness of participation --- --- 
     
  federal system 
  
.77  
(.25) 
1.55*  
(.46) 
     
  Left government 
  
.88  
(.43) 
2.40**  
(1.09) 
     
  number of parties 
  
1.02  
(.24) 
1.46  
(.51) 
Issue-Specific POS    
  policy context index 
 
1.54  
(2.12) 
1.04  
(1.58) 
     
  policy perceptions index 
 
.95  
(.24) 
1.19  
(.40) 
N=    111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of 
participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds 
ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be 
calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.12   
Multivariate Results for POS and EU versus National Conventional Activity  
    
Predictor    Lobby EU and Nat’l | Lobby Nat’l 
Broad POS   
  competitiveness of participation --- 
    
  federal system  1.03 
   (.40) 
  Left government  .67 
   (.29) 
  number of parties  2.34** 
   (.91) 
Issue-Specific POS   
  policy context index .19 
   (.33) 
  policy perceptions index 1.22 
   (.48) 
N=    110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and 
national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 6.13    
Multivariate Results for POS and EU versus National 
Challenging Activity   
Predictor     
Protest EU and Nat’l |  
Protest Nat’l 
ECJ and Nat’l courts |  
Nat’l courts 
Broad POS    
  competitiveness of participation --- --- 
     
  federal system 
  
.81  
(.29) 
1.26 
(.42) 
     
  Left government 
  
.78  
(.39) 
1.93* 
(.98) 
     
  number of parties 
  
.95  
(.27) 
1.09 
(.43) 
     
Issue-Specific POS    
  policy context index 
 
2.90  
(4.25) 
4.67 
(7.21) 
     
  policy perceptions index 
 
1.06  
(.30) 
1.41  
(.48) 
     
N=     111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national 
levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ 
= unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 6.14       
Multivariate Results for Identity and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper   
Identity        
  services/care 
 
.96  
(.38) 
1.15 
(.37) 
1.51 
(.82) 
.57*  
(.20) 
1.57  
(1.06) 
  political/legal 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
.54*  
(.21) 
1.80* 
(.70) 
--- 
  
  asylum 
  
.70  
(.22) 
1.21 
(.37) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
19.59**  
(2.61) 
N=   110 112 111 111 112   
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted 
as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with 
changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 
represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
 
 
Table 6.15      
Multivariate Results for Identity and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by 
Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Identity       
  services/care 
 
.64  
(.22) 
.63*  
(.19) 
.75  
(.28) 
.83  
(.42) 
2.16  
(1.53) 
  political/legal 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
1.65**  
(.44) 
1.15  
(.42) 
--- 
 
  asylum 
  
.92  
(.30) 
1.32  
(.36) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
1.48  
(.90) 
N=   110 112 96 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective 
(not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.16    
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Odds of EU Challenging Activity  
   Protest ECJ 
Predictor    Activity Activity 
Identity     
  services/care 
  
1.14  
(.37) 
1.23  
(.39) 
     
  political/legal 
  
1.60**  
(.46) 
--- 
 
     
  asylum 
   
--- 
 
2.37***  
(.88) 
N=    111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of 
participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds 
ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be 
calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.17   
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and EU versus National Conventional Activity 
    
Predictor    Lobby EU and Nat’l | Lobby Nat’l 
Identity    
  services/care  1.12 
   (.31) 
  political/legal  --- 
    
  asylum   .64 
   (.24) 
N=    110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and 
national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
Table 6.18    
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and EU versus National 
Challenging Activity  
     
Predictor     
Protest EU and Nat’l |  
Protest Nat’l 
ECJ and Nat’l courts | 
Nat’l courts 
Identity     
  services/care 
  
.88  
(.29) 
1.07 
(.40) 
     
  political/legal 
  
1.24  
(.41) 
--- 
 
     
  asylum 
   
--- 
 
2.83*** 
(1.14) 
     
N=     111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national 
levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ 
= unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 6.19      
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Resources      
  EU grant 
  
.95  
(.43) 
.81  
(.25) 
1.53  
(.56) 
1.14  
(.38) 
--- 
 
  full-time staff 
 
1.52  
(.69) 
.97  
(.30) 
1.36  
(.67) 
1.61* 
(.51) 
3.37*  
(2.76) 
  age 
  
.71  
(.35) 
1.09 
(.42) 
2.11*  
(1.03) 
.54**  
(.16) 
9.60**  
(11.23) 
  budget 
  
.87  
(.52) 
1.05 
(.38) 
.84  
(.32) 
--- 
 
.15***  
(.08) 
  budget increasing 
 
.68  
(.23) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N=   110 112 111 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along 
with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 
1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
 
Table 6.20      
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by 
Institution 
Predictor   Commission EP Council Econ/Soc Coreper 
Resources      
  EU grant 
  
1.17  
(.33) 
1.00 
(.26) 
1.16  
(.44) 
1.99*  
(.92) 
2.71**  
(1.51) 
  full-time staff 
 
1.44*  
(.36) 
1.12 
(.29) 
--- 
 
1.30  
(.63) 
1.84  
(1.17) 
  age 
  
.74  
(.24) 
.93  
(.31) 
.95  
(.28) 
.64  
(.38) 
.79  
(.27) 
  budget 
  
1.24  
(.39) 
1.03 
(.26) 
2.25**  
(.86) 
--- 
 
1.60  
(.97) 
  budget increasing 
 
.58*  
(.22) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N=   110 112 96 111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective 
(not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.21    
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of EU Challenging Activity  
   Protest ECJ 
Predictor    Activity Activity 
Resources    
  EU grant 
   
.85  
(.26) 
.97  
(.29) 
     
  full-time staff 
  
--- 
 
--- 
 
     
  volunteers 
  
.86  
(.19) 
1.31  
(.35) 
     
  age 
   
.93  
(.27) 
.84  
(.26) 
     
  budget 
    
--- 
 
--- 
 
N=    111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of 
participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds 
ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ = unable to be 
calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
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Table 6.22   
Multivariate Results for Resources and EU versus National Conventional Activity 
    
Predictor    Lobby EU and Nat’l | Lobby Nat’l 
Resources   
  EU grant   .75 
   (.32) 
  full-time staff  1.78 
   (.80) 
  age   1.18 
   (.39) 
  budget   .69 
   (.27) 
  budget increasing  1.38 
   (.35) 
N=    110 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and 
national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 6.23    
Multivariate Results for Resources and EU versus National Challenging Activity 
     
Predictor     
Protest EU and Nat’l |  
Protest Nat’l 
ECJ and Nat’l courts |  
Nat’l courts 
Resources    
  EU grant 
   
.88  
(.30) 
.79 
(.28) 
     
  full-time staff 
  
.65*  
(.18) 
.77 
(.31) 
     
  volunteers 
  
--- 
 
1.21 
(.33) 
     
  age 
   
.68  
(.22) 
.61* 
(.19) 
     
  budget 
    
1.53*  
(.45) 
1.49 
(.62) 
     
N=     111 112 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no 
participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level 
participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national 
levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. “---“ 
= unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
From the Visible to the “Behind the Scenes:” Collaborative Activity at 
the National, Transnational and Supranational Levels 
“We form alliances with the biggest number possible of other organizations. If we don’t make 
alliances, we are not strong enough to put pressure on politics,” Representative from the Flemish 
Refugee Council in Brussels. 
 
“[Collaborating is] pretty important; it carries weight for different organizations and for 
different constituencies to speak with the same voice,” Representative from the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles in Brussels.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Whereas the previous chapters examined a range of politically visible lobbying and contentious 
activities, this chapter moves out of the realm of visible politics and examines the “behind the 
scenes” activities that occur among groups. Its overarching purpose is to investigate several 
research questions regarding collaborative activity among migrant inclusion actors. First, what 
proportion of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) groups engages in collaborations with other actors? 
At which levels of governance do collaborative activities take place and how common is it across 
levels? Are certain groups more prone to acting in concert with others? Under what conditions 
will groups act in collaborative arrangements? Do interconnections with specific actors increase 
or decrease active PMR group collaboration? Which other factors, if any, also play a role? In 
addressing these questions, this chapter pursues two goals. First, it seeks to better understand the 
scope and nature of collaborative actions as well as the conditions under which groups will 
undertake such activities. The equally significant second goal is to examine both domestic 
collaboration and that which transcends the nation-state. Although recent years have witnessed a 
proliferation of scholarship on transnational activity among groups, very little research exists on 
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domestic collaboration. This chapter will illustrate that both types occur among PMR groups and 
are influenced in part by their group ties.     
 The status of PMR groups as political challengers and part of a social movement to effect 
political change suggests that the implementation of policy reforms cannot be accomplished 
alone. On the contrary, contemporary politics in advanced democracies involves alliance 
formation, coalition building, and cooperation in order to secure allies and counterbalance 
opponents (Dalton 1994). Collaboration within the migrant inclusion movement potentially 
occurs at numerous levels of governance, including the national and supranational levels. 
Collaboration can also occur at the transnational level, between actors based in different 
countries. In general, collaborative efforts with a broad range of supporters are a key step in 
preparing effective political strategies and building political coalitions. 
 Long before the twentieth century, the rise of the modern nation-state created a national 
setting and focus for social movement action (Tilly 1984). Similarly, the postwar period has 
witnessed the proliferation of international institutions and a set of supranational institutions 
which provide a focus for transnational action among social movement organizations (SMOs) 
(della Porta et al. 1999). Thus, it is possible for groups to act across levels of governance. 
Moreover, from the 1960s onward the political landscape in most advanced democracies 
witnessed a proliferation of SMOs, including many types of migrant inclusion organizations (see 
Chapters 2 and 4). While these groups are quite active in the domestic arena, some scholars have 
argued that SMOs, migrant inclusion groups included, increasingly collaborate in transnational 
arrangements (Beja Horta 2002; Danese 1998; Geddes 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; Kastoryano 
1998). This phenomenon has produced claims by some scholars that a global civil society is 
emerging comprised of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999; Risse-
Kappen 1995; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Overall, research has shown that groups act in concert 
with other actors and target multiple levels.  
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 The social movement literature has documented many types of transnational collaborative 
activity. For example, many studies examine the emergence of transnational networks of actors 
and their influence on policies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Danese 1998). The 
more quantitative research has shown that well over two-thirds of European SMOs surveyed have 
met with groups from other countries to exchange information and coordinate common activities 
(Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Moreover, a survey of global SMOs found that well over half 
met with other groups to collaborate in some way (Dalton et al. 2003). Thus, prior research 
suggests that we can expect groups to spend a good portion of their time and efforts acting in 
concert with others.        
 This body of research raises the questions: What factors prompt groups to engage in this 
type of activity and how common is it across levels? In addition to the literature on 
transnationalism, groups based in the same country can also be expected to collaborate, since it is 
comparatively less costly to do so. Although this remains an under-researched area, social 
movement theory provides much guidance on the factors that plausibly shape different types of 
collaborative activity. Moreover, although groups may incur costs in coordinating collaborative 
actions, there are many reasons why we would expect SMOs to bear these costs to more 
effectively bring about political change; indeed, the above body of research suggests that they 
quite often do. In this chapter, I broadly hypothesize that group ties, or the extent of groups’ 
connections with specific types of actors, can be expected to work in conjunction with other 
factors to shape both domestic collaborative activity and that which transcends the state. The 
following sections will discuss these issues in greater detail.  
COLLABORATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Perhaps the best argument in favor of collaborative activity is that it allows groups to band 
together in order to wield greater influence. In other words, SMOs can achieve greater political 
leverage when they cooperate. Although groups do compete with one another, it is possible for 
their common interests to override this tendency and stimulate cooperation. Some elements of 
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resource mobilization (RM) theory, for example, emphasize the social movement group as an 
organization that focuses on the process of coalition-building to achieve its goals (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Klandermans 1988). RM theory contends that an organization’s behavior 
is shaped by strategic calculations of how to achieve its resource needs (Dalton 1994), suggesting 
that groups consciously select activities that will best meet and advance group goals. Thus, we 
can surmise that organizations strategically choose to emphasize common interests and act 
together as a means of advancing their interests.  
The logical foundation of collaboration is that all SMOs seek some type of socio-political 
change that requires altering the status quo. Presumably, altering the status quo becomes more 
likely when groups work in concert rather than in isolation or against one another. Hence, Charles 
Tilly (1978) posits that it is not uncommon for groups to act in concert in pursuit of a common 
goal, even if they share no more in common than an opposition to the political status quo. 
Empirical research indicates the increasing potential for cooperation among SMOs based on 
common interests (Rochon 1988; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Thus, there is an incentive for social 
groups to cooperate to challenge the political establishment and advance their interests. Under 
certain circumstances, groups can be expected to harness their common interests as a basis for 
collaborative activity. One purpose of this chapter is to determine the circumstances under which 
this occurs.     
Arguments against Collaboration 
Political economy arguments suggest that SMOs are unlikely to collaborate with one another 
because it is a difficult activity to achieve. According to this perspective, movement 
entrepreneurs are self-interested and prioritize the existence and expansion of the SMO above 
political reform. Organizations compete for scarce resources, members, and political influence 
(Zald and McCarthy 1987), which can inhibit cooperation. For example, a study of human rights 
movements found some level of competition over members among transnational groups (Smith et 
al. 1997), and other research has identified similar competition among groups in specific 
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countries (Maney 2000). Moreover, research on pro-migrant groups found that competition 
hampered group efforts and ultimately led to the demise of a well-known transnational 
organization (Guiraudon 2001). Thus, although groups may share common interests, competition 
may preclude collaborative activities.  
 In addition to resources as obstacles to collaboration, groups may also face ideological 
impediments. For example, the question of how to frame an issue can constitute a major source of 
disagreement among organizations (Meyer and Kleidman 1991). Since a common collective 
action frame must underlie common action (Gerhards and Rucht 1992), ideological disagreements 
can hamper collaboration. At the heart of such disagreements lie fundamental group differences 
about the issue at stake and how to best address it. Within the migrant inclusion movement, for 
example, there is often fierce ideological competition among ethnic-specific organizations 
(Guiraudon 2001) that each seeks to draw attention to problems of a particular ethnic group. 
Moreover, political rivalries and other intergroup differences have been the basis for many 
coordination problems within the French migrant inclusion movement. This dissertation has 
shown evidence for three distinct ideological dimensions of PMR groups: services/care, 
political/legal, and asylum. Under what circumstances, if any, will these groups engage in 
collaborative activity? Do their patterns of collaboration differ?    
 Given these obstacles, it is remarkable that so many PMR organizations so frequently 
engage in collaborative activity. A glance at Table 7.1 shows that most PMR groups collaborate 
frequently across levels (Table 7.1 will be discussed in detail in later sections). What factors best 
account for this pattern? I have argued throughout this dissertation that group ties are often 
ignored but important factors that likely play a strong role in shaping PMR group political 
behavior. Thus, I expect group ties, or interconnectedness, to prompt common action among 
PMR groups by facilitating their connections with other actors in the movement, thereby making 
collaborations more likely.  
What We Know about Collaboration 
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Since the mid-1990s, there has been a proliferation of research examining transnational 
dimensions of social movements. Many of these studies focus not on the conditions that prompt 
collaborative action, but rather on the development of international norms and the role of non-
state actors (such as SMOs) in international policymaking (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 1999). At the heart of this body of work are questions regarding traditional realist 
approaches that underscore the utmost importance of states in international politics (Tarrow 
2001). The implication of this research is that the role of non-state actors in international politics 
is growing, and thus so is cooperation among groups seeking to impact change. What these 
studies leave unanswered for the most part is what factors cause groups to engage in collaborative 
activities. Although some research suggests that opportunities at the international or supranational 
levels promote activities in concert with others (Geddes 2000b, Guiraudon 2001), very little work 
has examined a variety of factors, including those within the domestic environment, in prompting 
groups to collaborate with others both within and beyond their national borders.   
 Transnational movement research tends to view global forces as having had a profound 
effect on social movements (e.g., Guidry et al. 2001). For example, international and 
supranational institutions like the European Union (EU) shed a new perspective on how social 
movements interact with their governments and what may prompt those actions. Moreover, most 
scholars agree that since 1945 cooperation among social movement organizations has become 
more common. In addition, the number of SMOs (domestic, international, and transnational) has 
greatly increased. 
 The likelihood that globalization, to some extent, impacts transnational and collaborative 
activity among SMOs renders conceptions of social movements as a purely national phenomenon, 
or as movements and groups that act in isolation, increasingly inappropriate. Although migrant 
inclusion policy issues may fall mostly within the domain of the state, they do not fall entirely 
within its domain. Thus, SMOs are becoming increasingly important actors that are able to 
confront migrant- and refugee-related problems with expertise. Because of their specialized 
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knowledge and expertise, they are fulfilling certain functions once dominated by the state. Often, 
these activities have a transnational dimension which leads to the phenomenon of transnational 
collaboration among SMOs across state boundaries. The EU provides a telling example as the 
European Commission actively seeks input from civil society groups (Marks and McAdam 1999). 
In contrast, these types of activities were less likely to take place when the state held a monopoly 
on migration-related issues.   
 Globalization and its attendant changes, then, facilitate communication among groups in 
different countries (Tarrow 1998b). This, in turn, makes it possible for PMR groups in different 
states to coordinate activity and work toward similar movement goals. In addition, the growth of 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations encourages groups to act 
transnationally; these IGOs are often targets of group activity. Thus, IGOs often provide a focus 
for group action (Tarrow 1998b).  
 These arguments about the impact of globalization on social movements provide the 
impetus for scholars to shift from examining national factors to those transnational and 
supranational factors that likely shape movement behavior. Indeed, the expansion of opportunities 
beyond the nation-state is one reason for the phenomenon of transnational collective action 
(Tarrow 1998b). Moreover, SMOs themselves recruit both local and non-local supporters via the 
Internet to mount transnational collaborative action (Imig and Tarrow 2001). The implication of 
such arguments is that the nation-state is losing its ability to structure social movement activity as 
groups gain access to new allies and resources to organize collective action (Rosenau 1990).     
Despite these developments, realist international relations theory serves as a reminder 
that the state continues to be a powerful and significant force in shaping policy as well as 
opportunities for SMO activity, even though the activities of non-state actors may be increasing. 
States remain the dominant agents in most areas of policy. This is particularly true when it comes 
to immigration and asylum issues, as they embody important notions of border control and state 
sovereignty that are increasingly associated with national security. While much migrant inclusion 
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research has focused on the role of transnational actors in shaping policy (Beja Horta 2002; 
Danese 1998; Geddes 200b; Guiraudon 2001; Kastoryano 1998), in this chapter I investigate what 
causes groups to collaborate in the first place. As part of an integrative model I argue that in 
addition to interconnectedness, the national political-institutional environment and group 
characteristics likely play a role in shaping collaborative activity both within and beyond the 
state.        
Just as it is important for social movement researchers to focus broadly on both 
conventional and contentious activity, it is equally important to analyze both domestic and non-
domestic forms of collaboration in order to arrive at accurate and reliable causal inferences about 
political behavior. The literature that focuses solely on transnational or supranational action 
excludes the wealth of collaborative activity that takes place within the state. In confronting an 
issue, groups may be just as likely to collaborate with domestic actors as those in other countries. 
In fact, they may be more likely to collaborate domestically since it is less costly to do so. In sum, 
although activity in the transnational arena may be increasing, the national setting continues to be 
an important locale for group activities. Whereas the literature has thoroughly documented the 
nature of collaboration among SMOs, less is known about the factors that prompt organizations to 
engage in collaborative activities. The following sections will discuss this issue in more detail.      
DETERMINANTS OF COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITY 
In constructing an integrative model of activity, I incorporate the variables used in previous 
chapters: interconnectedness, the domestic POS, and group characteristics. The hypothesized 
effects of each set of predictors are discussed in turn.   
Interconnectedness 
Recall that Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 outlines a relationship between interconnectedness and group 
activity. First, it posits that group ties with other domestic social movement actors can be 
expected to produce activity that targets the national government. The same holds for ties with 
national business associations and labor unions. As groups forge connections with these actors, 
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they strengthen their alliance network and thereby create a platform for common action (Dalton 
1994). In other words, interconnectedness, by its nature, encourages cooperation among groups. 
Ties to national actors may affect the nature of that cooperation by encouraging a domestic 
orientation to group action. Thus, in the context of this chapter, the model predicts that the 
stronger a group’s links are to domestic actors of all kinds, the more likely the group is to engage 
in collaborative activity within the nation-state. In other words, collaborative activity in the 
national arena should be more likely to occur when groups have increasingly strong connections 
with other domestic actors.        
 In contrast, stronger connections with groups in other countries, business and labor in 
other countries, and EU-level groups can be expected to produce activity beyond the national 
arena. The previous chapter showed that these types of relationships strongly and significantly 
shape EU-directed activity. The more frequent groups’ interactions are with actors in other 
countries, the more perspectives they receive on a given issue, and the more opportunities they 
have to harness their ties to organize common action. As with domestic connections, transnational 
and supranational ties create a platform for common action and a venue for collaborative 
mobilization. Thus, increasingly strong connections with actors from beyond the national level 
should mobilize transnational and supranational collaborative activity.    
The National POS 
This chapter allows for the possibility that groups collaborate not only transnationally and 
supranationally, but domestically as well. Thus, as in the previous chapters, it adopts a focus on 
the national POS. I assume that changes in the national POS, both broad and issue-specific 
aspects, can be expected to produce changes in patterns of collaborative activity. The previous 
chapter found that the presence of political allies at home (in the form of a Leftist government) 
decreased groups’ propensities to act beyond the nation-state. Similarly, when elites are more 
open to PMR group demands, groups likely experience less of a need to act in concert with others 
at any level as their concerns are being met by government.  
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 In addition, some have argued that relatively open rather than closed national systems can 
be expected to produce transnational activity (Risse-Kappen 1995). Others have found empirical 
evidence to support this (Westby 2002). In contrast, others have argued that transnational 
movements are more likely to mobilize in response to issues for which the domestic POS is 
relatively closed (Smith et al. 1997). In this study, a relatively open system not only reflects the 
presence of elite allies in power, but also greater competitiveness of participation. Moreover, as 
argued in previous chapters, federal systems can be thought of as being more open to movement 
demands versus centralized systems, since they allow groups multiple access points for influence. 
Thus, groups’ demands have a greater chance of being institutionally channeled in a federal 
system. Moreover, issue-specific opportunities related to the migrant and refugee policy context 
also need to be considered. The issue-specific POS is considered more open when the national 
migrant and refugee policy context is less stringent.      
 In general, then, when the national POS (in both broad and issue-specific forms) is more 
open to SMO demands, groups become less likely to engage in collaborative activity. This is due 
to the fact that when groups’ demands are met institutionally, they incur less of a need to band 
together for common action. Thus, groups are more likely to act in concert with like-minded 
allies when their issue concerns are not being addressed by their governments.  
Group Identity 
In addition to the above factors, Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002) have shown that group 
characteristics impact transnational collaboration among groups. One group characteristic is that 
of identity. This study has found evidence for three distinct types of PMR group identity: 
services/care, political/legal, and asylum. It was shown in the previous chapter that all three types 
act beyond the national level, although the nature of that action differs. I have also argued in 
previous chapters that political/legal and asylum groups espouse goals which tend to pose a 
greater challenge to the political status quo.  
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 Because of their more challenging identity, asylum groups are less likely to undertake 
conventional activities aimed at the national government, and political/legal groups are more 
prone to using challenging tactics (see Chapter 5). This suggests that their political identity acts as 
a constraint when it comes to opportunities for influence. Because of this, these groups are less 
likely to have their demands met by their government compared to services/care organizations. In 
turn, political/legal and asylum groups may be more likely to band together with other like-
minded groups to act in concert, as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by 
government.  
Resources 
Organizational resources also need to be considered, if only as controls, as previous research has 
found them to facilitate political activity of all types (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 
2002). Groups with more resources possess the means to organize different types of action in 
different venues. For example, they can share information with groups in the home country as 
well as engage in common projects with groups based in other countries. In contrast, 
organizations with fewer resources are more limited in the activities they can undertake. 
Presumably, this limitation also applies to collaborative activity. Thus, groups with more 
resources are expected to engage in higher levels of collaborative activity across levels. 
 I have argued in previous chapters that the resource source is also important in that it can 
be expected to affect the nature of the group’s activity. For example, groups that receive 
government or private grants are probably less likely to use protest as such methods do not 
conform to the norms, values, and expectations of the funding source. Because the survey asks 
groups whether or not they have received a grant from the European Commission, the impact of 
EU funding on activity can be ascertained. Interestingly, Chapter 6 found that financing from the 
EU actually mobilizes more confrontational methods of action directed against the EU. In this 
chapter, we might expect that EU funding increases the likelihood of transnational or 
supranational collaboration. One criterion for receiving such funds is that groups have a 
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transnational dimension to their proposed activities (CEC 1995b). Thus, EU funding is almost 
certain to have a positive effect on transnational collaboration.    
DATA AND METHODS 
All data for the dependent variables are from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee 
Organizations. The data for resources, identity, and perceptions of the migrant and refugee policy 
context also come from the survey. Data for the broad and specific aspects of the POS25 come 
from other sources and have all been discussed in earlier chapters.  
I test several models of collaborative activity and its efficacy at the national level, the 
transnational level and the supranational level. In addition, I test two relational models examining 
the choice of transnational versus national collaborative activity, and supranational versus 
national collaborative activity. At the national level, the dependent variables measure 
collaborative activity by the extent to which groups engage in sharing information, sharing 
advice/expertise, sharing personnel or other resources, and collaborating on common projects 
with other social movement organizations based in their country. At the transnational level, the 
dependent variables measure the same activities but with other social movement organizations 
based in another country. Similarly, at the EU level, the dependent variables measure the same 
activities but with EU-level groups.26 The extent to which groups engage in these activities is 
gauged from “never” to “often.” Moreover, effectiveness of these activities is measured from “not 
at all effective” to “very effective.” Finally, the dependent variable for the relational model of 
transnational versus national collaboration uses an additive measure of all collaborative 
                                                 
25 The variables that measure the broad POS include: competitiveness of participation, federal versus 
centralized system, Leftist government, and number of political parties. Those that measure the issue-
specific POS include: each country’s stringency measure on five policy dimensions that comprise a “policy 
context” index, and groups’ perceptions of national immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment 
policies.  
26 Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with national NGOs are 
not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those NGOs. Similarly, networks with 
NGOs in other countries are omitted from analyses of transnational activity, and networks with EU groups 
are omitted from analyses of supranational activity. However, these networks are able to be included in 
analyses of the effectiveness of collaborative activity, as similar problems do not arise. 
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activities.27 In terms of the national versus supranational relational model, the dependent variable 
measures the extent to which groups engage in sharing information, sharing advice/expertise, 
sharing personnel or other resources, and collaborating on common projects with national versus 
EU organizations. The relational models add much to the picture by allowing an analysis of the 
factors that cause groups to move beyond domestic to transnational/supranational collaboration.   
 The methods conform to the research questions being asked in this chapter. First, this 
chapter asks a series of descriptive questions: What proportion of PMR groups engages in 
collaborative activity? At which level does this type of activity occur and how common is it at 
each level? Are certain types of groups more prone to collaboration than others? To address these 
questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the data to determine the breakdown of 
participation in collaborative activity at the national versus transnational and supranational levels, 
and to determine the influence of group identity in shaping these activity patterns.  
 The second set of research questions asks about the factors that cause changes in 
collaborative activity patterns among groups. To address these questions, I first examined the 
bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent variables for each model. Following 
this, I estimated a series of logistic and multinomial logistic equations according to the models 
discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for each type of collaborative activity and its 
efficacy at each level, as well as a separate model for transnational and supranational versus 
national collaborative activity. As in previous chapters, a regional control variable is included to 
guard against omitted variable bias and add regional fixed effects to the models.  
The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in tables by groupings of 
independent variables. Thus, there is a separate table for the effects of interconnectedness, the 
POS, identity, and resources on collaborative activity. In all cases where a regression was 
performed on the data, all predictor variables were included together in the full model (regardless 
of how the results are presented). In other words, each regression controls for all predictor 
                                                 
27 The dependent variable is constructed in this manner due to low responses in some of the categories. 
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variables even though they are presented separately. The subsequent sections discuss the results 
of the analyses. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Patterns 
Table 7.1 indicates that the vast majority of groups engage in some type of collaborative activity. 
At the national level, an overwhelming 98% of all PMR organizations frequently (often + 
sometimes) share information with other SMOs. Moreover, 93% frequently share advice or 
expertise, 47% share personnel and other resources, and 91% coordinate common projects or 
other activities. In terms of collaboration at the transnational level, a full 80% share information 
with groups based in another country, while 70% exchange advice/expertise. Further, 30% share 
resources or personnel, and 60% coordinate common activities/projects. Finally, 63% of groups 
exchange information with groups at the EU level, 45% share advice/expertise, 20% share 
resources or personnel, and 39% undertake common projects or activities. Overall, collaborative 
activity is very common among PMR organizations, as the overwhelming majority engages in 
various modes. Moreover, it is quite common across all levels of governance.      
Interestingly, although most groups act in concert with others, the majority do not view 
most of these activities as very effective. Although over half (52%) report that sharing 
information with other SMOs at the national level is very effective, only 33% report this to be the 
case when it comes to exchanging advice/expertise, only 7% view sharing resources and 
personnel as very effective, and 36% find this to be true for coordinating common activities and 
projects. Moreover, the reported effectiveness of these activities tends to decrease as groups 
collaborate at increasingly higher levels. Overall, this pattern suggests that groups prefer to act 
together with other SMOs in their own country, calling into question the claim that a global civil 
society comprised of transnational advocacy coalitions is on the rise (Lipschutz 1996; Risse-
Kappen 1995; Rosenau 1998).  
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The data show that there are slight variations in activity by group identity. For example, 
Figure 7.1 illustrates that in the domestic arena services/care groups, which espouse the least 
challenging ideology, participate more in information sharing and common projects with others 
compared to political/legal or asylum groups. They are also the most likely to report that sharing 
information as well as advice and expertise are very effective strategies. In contrast, asylum 
organizations are slightly more prone to sharing advice and expertise, and together with 
political/legal groups they are most likely to share resources.  
At the transnational level, Figure 7.2 shows that services/care organizations are the most 
likely to act across each activity type, with the exception of resource-sharing, which is dominated 
slightly by political/legal groups. Overall, asylum groups participate the least in activities at this 
level. Although each group type is about equally likely to view coordinated activities at this level 
as very effective (only 17% across group types), about the same proportion of services/care and 
political/legal groups view the sharing of information as well as advice and expertise as very 
effective. Finally, of the three, asylum organizations tend to report the highest efficacy when it 
comes to sharing resources and personnel with groups based in another country. 
 At the EU level, Figure 7.3 confirms that asylum groups participate at higher levels in 
two of the four collaborative activity types: sharing information, and sharing resources. 
Moreover, they are about as likely as services/care organizations to share advice or expertise with 
EU-level groups. In contrast, both services/care and political/legal groups are about equally likely 
to coordinate activities or projects with EU groups. In terms of efficacy, generally services/care, 
or services/care together with political/legal, groups are the most likely to report collaborative 
activities at the EU level as very effective. The one exception is sharing resources, which asylum 
organizations are about twice as likely to view as very effective.    
I have argued that differences in the frequency of participation in collaborative activities 
across levels, and the effectiveness of those activities, is likely strongly related to groups’ 
interconnectedness. In addition, I have suggested that other factors, including the broad and issue-
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specific POS, group identity, and resources also likely play a role. In order to assess the impact of 
these factors on collaborative activity, I proceeded in two steps. First, I examined bivariate 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables. These are presented Tables 7.2 – 
7.7.28 Following this, I estimated a series of multivariate equations in order to arrive at 
explanatory models.  
The following sections expound on the latter processes of testing the hypotheses and the 
results of the analyses. Although each set of predictors were included together in the multivariate 
equations, for organizational purposes the following sections separately treat each set of factors’ 
effects on activity and effectiveness. For each set of predictors below, I first discuss the results of 
the models that estimate collaboration in the domestic, transnational, and supranational arenas. 
Secondly, I add a relational component to the discussion by illustrating how each set of factors 
influences transnational versus domestic collaboration, and supranational versus domestic 
collaboration. The analyses lend support to the claim that interconnectedness is indeed among the 
most important determinants that shape the likelihood of both domestic and non-domestic 
collaboration by PMR groups.  
Main Findings: Interconnectedness and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness 
Tables 7.8 – 7.12 illustrate how interconnectedness impacts collaboration at various levels. Recall 
that domestic ties are expected to increase national activity, whereas non-domestic ties should 
increase activity beyond the state. Table 7.8 shows that the relationship is actually more complex. 
Whereas the prediction holds across most of the activities, a caveat must be added. As expected, 
stronger connections with national business and labor (i.e., the social partners) significantly 
increase all domestic activities, and those with the social partners from other countries decrease 
most of the activities. However, strong ties with NGOs in other countries also work to increase 
participation in domestic collaborative activities. For example, they facilitate information sharing 
                                                 
28 The bivariate relationships are shown for informational purposes and were used to inform the 
construction of the multivariate models. However, due to space limitations the following discussion will 
only focus on the results of the multivariate models.   
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(1.93, p<.10), resource sharing (1.64, p<.05), and common projects (2.19, p<.01). In terms of 
efficacy, the prediction holds for two of the four activity types. Connections with national NGOs 
strongly increase the efficacy of resource sharing (4.28, p<.01), and together with the national 
social partners, strongly increase the effectiveness of common projects (5.01, p<.01; and 3.21, 
p<.01 respectively). Yet when it comes to increasing the effectiveness of sharing information, 
links with NGOs abroad play a strong role (1.71, p<.05). Moreover, in terms of advice sharing, 
interconnectedness with all types of organizations (national, non-national, and EU level) 
increases efficacy. Thus, there is mixed support for the hypothesis that collaborative activity in 
the national arena should be more likely to occur when groups have increasingly strong 
connections with other domestic actors. For some domestic collaborative activities what matters 
is the level of the connection (i.e., domestic, transnational, EU), while for others the type of 
connection matters more (i.e., NGO, business, labor).  
 The same pattern holds broadly when we examine transnational collaboration. Table 7.9 
shows that for two of the four activity types, the level of the connection impacts participation. For 
example, links with actors outside the country level, including EU groups and the social partners 
in other countries, increase the sharing of information among PMR groups across countries (3.07, 
p<.01; and 6.95, p<.01 respectively), as well as the sharing of resources (1.70, p<.10; and 2.66, 
p<.01 respectively). However, the type of connection matters more for the remaining two 
activities. Specifically, stronger ties with other organizations appear to facilitate advice sharing. 
For instance, those with national NGOs increase this activity by a factor of 2.20 (p<.05), and 
those with EU groups increase it by a factor of 3.00 (p<.01). Finally, when it comes to 
collaborating on common projects the odds ratios suggest that the type and level of connection 
matters. In this case, ties with the national social partners increase activity by a factor of 1.92 
(p<.05), with the social partners in other countries by a factor of 2.31 (p<.10), and with EU 
groups by a factor of 1.76 (p<.01). In terms of effectiveness, the level of the connection is 
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important for sharing resources and common projects, whereas both appear to impact the efficacy 
of the remaining activities.    
 Table 7.10 illustrates that when it comes to collaborative activity at the EU level, the 
level of the connection broadly predominates. This lends general support to the hypothesis that 
increasingly strong ties with actors from beyond the national level should make groups more 
likely to engage in supranational collaborative activity. For example, groups with stronger versus 
weaker ties with NGOs in other countries are over twice as likely to exchange advice, resources, 
and embark on common projects with EU groups (2.87, p<.01; 2.87, p<.01; and 2.44, p<.01 
respectively). Moreover, stronger links with the social partners in other countries increase advice 
sharing by a factor of 2.25 (p<.05), resource sharing by a factor of 1.49 (p<.10), and common 
projects by a factor of 1.70 (p<.10). In contrast, connections with the national social partners 
increase information sharing with EU groups by a factor of 2.05 (p<.01). In terms of the efficacy 
of these activities, each is strongly improved by connections with actors beyond the nation-state.  
 Turning to the relational models, Table 7.11 demonstrates how interconnectedness 
impacts the shifting of all cooperative activities from the domestic to the transnational arena. 
Here, strong connections with EU groups robustly influence the choice to turn away from 
cooperation with national actors toward NGOs in other countries. In fact, PMR groups with 
strong ties to EU organizations are over three times as likely to do so compared to PMR groups 
with weaker ties to EU organizations (p<.01). Disaggregating activity by type and turning to the 
supranational level, Table 7.12 shows how group ties influence the choice to cooperate at the EU 
versus the national level. In this case, groups with stronger ties with NGOs in other countries are 
over twice as likely to share information with EU versus national groups (2.76, p<.01), and over 
three times as likely to share advice (3.70, p<.01), resources (3.54, p<.01), and common projects 
(3.70, p<.01) with EU versus national groups. In sum, the results of the relational models lend the 
strongest support to the hypothesis that strong connections with actors from beyond the national 
level should mobilize supranational collaborative activity. When we examine why groups choose 
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to move beyond national-level collaborations, strong ties with others beyond the state explain a 
great deal. I will return to this theme in the conclusion of this chapter.         
Other Findings: The National POS and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness 
The impact of the national POS on collaboration is shown in Tables 7.13 – 7.17. Table 7.13 
shows that only two aspects of the broad POS influence domestic collaboration. First, 
competitiveness of participation works in two different ways. Groups in countries where 
competitiveness of participation is more open are 55% less likely to share advice with other 
domestic groups (p<.10), and are 66% less likely to report this activity as very effective (p<.05). 
Yet at the same time they are 79% more likely to engage in common projects (p<.10). In addition, 
groups based in countries with a greater number of political parties are 78% more likely to share 
resources with other domestic groups than organizations in countries with fewer parties (p<.01). 
In terms of efficacy, groups in countries with a Left-leaning government are 64% more effective 
in sharing advice compared to Rightist governments (p<.10), and are more than twice as likely to 
report that common projects are very effective (2.17, p<.05). In addition, groups based in a 
federal system are also over twice as likely as those in centralized systems to report that common 
projects are very effective (2.80, p<.01). At the same time, however, groups in countries with 
more political parties are 54% less likely to hold the same view (p<.10). 
 When it comes to the issue-specific POS, it has inconsistent effects on domestic 
collaborations. For example, a more favorable national policy context specific to migrants and 
refugees increases advice sharing among domestic groups by a factor of 2.29 (p<.05). Yet at the 
same time, groups that perceive the national policy environment specific to migrants as 
increasingly favorable are 43% less likely to view sharing resources with domestic groups as 
effective (p<.01).     
 Table 7.14 displays the results of the POS on transnational collaboration. The number of 
political parties in the country has a consistent effect on depressing transnational activity. For 
instance, PMR organizations based in countries with more political parties are 97% less likely to 
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share information with NGOs in other countries (p<.10), 68% less likely to share advice (p<.01), 
and 58% less likely to collaborate in common projects (p<.05). In this case, an open national POS 
does decrease the need to collaborate transnationally. However, the broad POS has a much 
stronger effect on shaping effectiveness. For example, being based in a federal versus centralized 
system increases the reported efficacy of sharing information (2.08, p<.05), resources (2.48, 
p<.05), and common projects (1.87, p<.05). Moreover, a Left-leaning government increases the 
efficacy of sharing information (2.54, p<.10), advice (2.23, p<.10), and resources (4.37, p<.05). 
Further, although being based in a country with more political parties appears to depress activity, 
it increases the effectiveness of sharing advice (3.27, p<.01) and resources (2.75, p<.01). Finally, 
groups in countries with greater competitiveness of participation tend to view each transnational 
collaborative activity as not very effective.  
 Turning to the issue-specific POS, a more open national policy context increases the 
reported efficacy of sharing advice with groups based in other countries (1.00, p<.10). Yet, it also 
decreases both resource sharing activities with these groups (.07, p<.05) and its efficacy (.04, 
p<.05). Moreover, more favorable policy perceptions decrease the reported efficacy of sharing 
advice with groups in other countries by 50% (p<.01).  
 When it comes to collaborations with EU groups, Table 7.15 shows that none of the 
broad aspects of the POS mobilizes activity. Rather, a Left-leaning government decreases the 
odds that a group will share advice with an EU organization by 39% (p<.10), and being located in 
a country with more political parties decreases it by 51% (p<.05). Again, an open national POS 
decreases the need to collaborate outside the country level. However, again, it generally has the 
opposite impact on effectiveness. A federal system and a Left-leaning government increase the 
reported efficacy of sharing information with EU groups by a factor of 3.01 (p<.01) and 3.37 
(p<.05) respectively, and of collaborating in common projects with EU groups by a factor of 1.60 
(p<.05) and 2.60 (p<.05) respectively. Moreover, groups in countries with more versus fewer 
parties are over three times as likely to view sharing information as effective (3.89, p<.05). 
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However, at the same time, greater competitiveness of participation depresses the efficacy of 
sharing advice with EU groups by 57% (p<.01) and common projects by 67% (p<.05).   
 In terms of the issue-specific POS, a more favorable national policy context generally 
mobilizes collaboration at the EU level. For example, it increases information sharing with EU 
groups by a factor of 9.24 (p<.05) (but it also decreases its efficacy by 93%, p<.05), advice 
sharing by a factor of 3.93 (p<.01), and common projects by a factor of 8.37 (p<.10). However, 
more favorable policy perceptions appear to have the opposite effect in that they depress EU-level 
collaborations but increase their reported effectiveness. For instance, whereas groups with more 
favorable policy perceptions are 37% less likely to share resources with EU groups (p<.10), they 
are 75% more likely to view sharing information with these groups as effective (p<.10).                 
 Finally, the relational models show that the broad POS has mixed effects on mobilizing 
activity beyond versus within the nation-state. Table 7.16 illustrates that groups in countries with 
more political parties are 73% less likely to collaborate transnationally versus domestically 
(p<.10). Moreover, a Leftist government decreases this tendency by 80% (p<.05), and of sharing 
resources at the EU versus the national level by 56% (p<.05) (Table 7.17). Yet, Table 7.17 also 
shows that groups in a federal system are 78% more likely to share information at the 
supranational versus the national level (p<.05), 56% more likely to share advice (p<.10), and 80% 
more likely to collaborate in common projects with supranational versus national groups (p<.05).     
 The issue-specific POS again has mixed effects. On one hand, more favorable national 
policy perceptions increase the odds of transnational versus domestic collaborative activity by a 
factor of 1.63 (p<.10). However, they also decrease the odds of sharing advice at the EU versus 
the national level by 39% (p<.05). Overall, the results do not fully support the hypothesis that 
when the national POS (in both broad and issue-specific forms) is more open to SMO demands, 
groups become less likely to engage in collaborative activity. Rather, in general an open national 
POS encourages domestic collaboration while discouraging it beyond the state level. However, 
there are several caveats to this pattern which I will discuss further in the conclusion.   
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Group Identity and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness 
Tables 7.18 – 7.22 illustrate the effects of group identity on collaborations. At the national level, 
Table 7.18 shows that services/care organizations (whose goals tend to be less challenging) are 
more likely to collaborate with other domestic NGOs and to report these activities as effective 
than both political/legal and asylum groups. For example, services/care groups are 76% more 
likely to share information (p<.10), 74% more likely to share advice (p<.05), and 45% more 
likely to engage in common projects with other domestic NGOs. They are also over twice as 
likely to report that sharing advice is very effective (2.12, p<.01), and 64% more likely to view 
common projects as very effective in achieving their policy goals (1.64, p<.10). In contrast, being 
a political/legal group decreases the odds of sharing information with other domestic NGOs by 
61% (p<.01), of sharing advice by 46% (p<.05), and of reporting advice sharing very effective by 
41% (p<.10). Similarly, being an asylum organization decreases the odds of collaborating in 
common projects by 36% (p<.10), and of their efficacy by 43% (p<.10). In short, domestic 
collaborative activity is structured in favor of groups with more moderate goals. 
 However, Table 7.19 demonstrates that this pattern changes outside the nation-state. For 
example, when it comes to collaborating on common projects with NGOs based in other 
countries, political/legal groups are over twice as likely as services/care organizations to do so 
(2.16, p<.05). In fact, being a services/care group actually decreases the odds of this type of 
collaboration by 37% (p<.10).  
The findings at the supranational level are very similar. Political/legal groups are over 
twice as likely as services/care organizations to undertake common projects with EU 
organizations (2.21, p<.05). Moreover, they are 94% more likely than services/care groups to 
report these projects as effective in achieving their policy goals (p<.01). In sum, perhaps because 
their goals pose a greater challenge to the national political status quo, asylum and political/legal 
groups tend to collaborate with others beyond the domestic arena.  
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Finally, the relational models are displayed in Tables 7.21 and 7.22. Although identity is 
not a significant mobilizing force when it comes to transnational versus national collaboration 
(Table 7.21), it does affect supranational versus national collaborative activity (Table 7.22). Here, 
services/care groups are 61% more likely than political/legal groups to share information with 
organizations at the EU versus the national level (p<.10). Yet, they are also 46% less likely to 
share resources with EU versus national groups. Consistent with the prior results, being a 
political/legal organization increases the odds of undertaking common projects with EU versus 
national groups by 72% (p<.10). In broad terms, the results support the hypothesis that 
political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to band together with other like-minded groups 
to act in concert, as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by government. 
However, this only tends to be the case outside of the nation-state. In contrast, services/care 
groups are more likely to cooperate at the domestic level.  
Resources and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness 
Tables 7.23 – 7.27 display the effects of organizational resources on collaborations. Although 
resources have little impact in the domestic arena, Table 7.23 shows that groups with more versus 
fewer volunteers are 41% more likely to participate in common projects with other national 
NGOs (p<.10), yet these same groups are 50% less likely to report these activities as effective in 
achieving their policy goals (p<.01). At the same time, however, they are 56% more likely to 
view sharing information as effective (p<.05). Moreover, having a higher versus lower annual 
income increases the reported efficacy of common projects by 79% (p<.05).  
 At the transnational level, Table 7.24 illustrates that a grant from the EU mobilizes 
surprisingly little activity when other factors are controlled. For example, such groups are only 
more likely to share information with NGOs in other countries by a factor of 1.95 (p<.05). 
Groups with an EU grant are also 69% more likely to report that their common projects with 
NGOs in other countries are effective in influencing policy (p<.05), yet they are no more likely 
than others to undertake these projects in the first place. Since “transnationality” is a criterion for 
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receiving EU funding, it is surprising that this does not mobilize more transnational activity. 
Overall, however, the results support the hypothesis that EU funding mobilizes some level of 
transnational collaboration.   
 In addition, older PMR organizations are over twice as likely as younger groups to 
engage in projects with NGOs abroad (2.21, p<.01). Moreover, they are over two-and-a-half 
times as likely to consider sharing information effective (2.53, p<.01), and are 97% more likely to 
view sharing advice (p<.05) with NGOs abroad effective. In contrast, more paid staff decreases 
collaborations with NGOs in other countries. For example, groups with more full time employees 
are 54% less likely to consider sharing information an effective means of policy influence 
(p<.10). In addition, having more part time staff decreases the odds of sharing resources by 54% 
(p<.01) and of reporting this activity effective by 41% (p<.10). Moreover, more volunteers 
decreases the likelihood of sharing advice with groups abroad by 43% (p<.05) (though it 
increases its reported effectiveness by a factor of 1.88, p<.05), and of collaborative projects by 
44% (p<.05). Finally, an increase in income over the past year increases the odds of sharing 
information with groups in other countries by 70% (p<.05), and of sharing advice by a factor of 
2.29 (p<.01).  
 Table 7.25 shows the effects of resources on collaborations at the supranational level. 
Here, PMR groups that have received an EU grant are more likely to share advice and engage in 
projects with EU groups by 49% (p<.10) versus groups without such funding. Yet, an EU grant 
decreases the odds that an organization will share resources with an EU organization by 38% 
(p<.10). In addition, older organizations are over twice as likely as younger groups to share 
information with EU groups (2.72, p<.01), and are over twice as likely to report that sharing 
advice with EU organizations is an effective means of policy influence (2.10, p<.05). Further, the 
effect of volunteers is similar to that at the transnational level. For instance, although groups with 
more versus fewer volunteers are 68% more likely to report that sharing information with EU 
groups is effective (p<.05), they are 50% less likely to undertake common projects.  
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 Tables 7.26 and 7.27 illustrate the effects of resources on transnational versus national 
collaborative activity, and on supranational versus national collaborative activity, respectively. 
Overall, resources do not structure transnational versus domestic collaborations (Table 7.26). 
However, Table 7.27 shows that income is the most consistent resource predictor of EU versus 
national collaborations. For example, PMR groups with higher versus lower annual budgets are 
86% more likely to share resources with EU versus domestic groups (p<.10), and are 71% more 
likely to collaborate in projects with EU versus national groups (p<.10). In addition, having more 
full time employees increases the odds of sharing information with EU versus national groups by 
55% (p<.10). Finally, groups that have received a grant from the EU are 51% less likely to 
exchange resources with EU versus national groups (p<.05), suggesting that EU funding 
ultimately helps to mobilize resources among domestic NGOs. In general, the results support the 
hypotheses that certain resources (i.e., those that are monetary in nature) increase overall 
collaborative activity.             
CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF COLLABORATION 
This chapter found that group ties fare quite well in explaining collaborative activity that takes 
place out of view of visible politics. Compared to the competing explanations, group ties are the 
strongest and most consistent predictors of domestic collaboration, are among the strongest 
predictors of transnational and supranational collaboration, and are the strongest predictors of 
collaborative activities that occur outside versus within the nation-state. In addition, the data 
broadly support this chapter’s interconnectedness hypotheses, with several caveats. First, 
interconnectedness is a strong and significant influence on collaborative activity across levels. 
However, the prediction that stronger connections at each level will increase collaborative 
activity at that level only holds for collaborative activity with EU groups, and for transnational 
and supranational versus national activity. More specifically, increasingly strong ties with NGOs 
and the social partners in other countries significantly increase three types of supranational 
collaborative activity. Moreover, they increase the reported efficacy of all activity types. In 
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addition, in examining the determinants of EU versus national level collaboration as well as 
transnational versus national collaboration, connections with actors beyond the nation-state 
strongly and significantly increase the odds that groups will chose to cooperate outside of the 
country setting.  
 In contrast, it is not simply domestic ties that increase or decrease domestic collaboration, 
but rather the type of connection also matters for certain activity types. For example, although 
increasingly strong ties with the national social partners significantly increase all types of 
domestic collaborative activity, those with NGOs in other countries also increase three of the four 
types. Thus, although domestic connections matter, so do those with other NGOs abroad. 
Moreover, group ties at all levels work to increase the efficacy of domestic cooperation. Thus, 
groups with stronger connections to NGOs in general are more likely to collaborate with domestic 
groups and are more likely to view these acts as an effective means of policy influence.  
 A similar phenomenon exists at the transnational level. Although ties with actors beyond 
the state increase each type of transnational collaborative activity, there is more to the picture. For 
instance, increasingly strong connections with both national and EU groups increase the odds of 
sharing advice with NGOs in other countries. Again, this suggests a kind of “solidarity effect” in 
which connections among PMR organizations across levels serves to increase collaborative 
activity at each level. At the same time, a diversity of group ties matters when it comes to 
collaborating in common projects with NGOs abroad. In this case, increasingly strong 
connections with both the national social partners and those in other countries, as well as with EU 
groups, increase the odds that groups will act in concert across borders. 
 Turning to the other factors that were controlled, the national POS generally creates an 
environment that encourages national-level collaboration. A more open broad and issue-specific 
POS tends to increase collaborations with domestic groups. At the transnational level, both 
aspects of the open POS tend to depress activity. At the supranational level, an open broad POS 
tends to decrease collaborative activity whereas a more open issue-specific policy context 
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encourages it. The effects of the POS on transnational and supranational versus national activity 
are more mixed. A consistent finding is that the presence of political allies at home (in the form 
of a Left-leaning government) tends to decrease activity beyond versus within the nation-state. 
Moreover, the presence of more political parties in the country appears to increase domestic 
collaboration while depressing it beyond the national level, suggesting that when political allies 
exist at home, groups have less of a need to act in concert beyond the state.  
Overall, the broad aspects of the POS in particular exert the most consistent effects not on 
activity, but on efficacy. For example, a federal system increases efficacy across each level, as 
does a Leftist government. The presence of more political parties, while decreasing effectiveness 
at the national level, increases it beyond. Thus, whereas the issue-specific POS has very 
inconsistent effects both on activity and efficacy, several elements of the broad POS are 
indicative of a national environment in which groups perceive their activities to have greater 
efficacy when it comes to influencing policy.              
Identity exhibits interesting effects on collaborative activity across levels. In general, 
services/care groups are more likely than political/legal or asylum groups to cooperate at the 
domestic level. In contrast, the results indicate that political/legal and asylum groups are more 
likely to band together with other like-minded groups to act in concert outside of the nation-state, 
as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by national government. This pattern 
broadly holds across each level, suggesting that domestic collaboration is structured in favor of 
more moderate groups. In turn, the more challenging PMR groups opt to turn beyond the state 
and seek collaborative arrangements elsewhere, implying that their patterns of collaboration are 
shaped by an “isolation effect” in the domestic arena. This pattern suggests that if a global civil 
society is emerging within the migrant inclusion movement, it is likely comprised of slightly 
more radical actors that espouse more challenging goals.  
  Finally, the data indicate that those resources that are monetary in nature tend to 
increase collaborative activity across each level. Moreover, older PMR groups are more likely to 
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act collaboratively beyond the country level and to regard those actions as effective. In addition, 
whereas more volunteers tend to increase domestic collaborative activity, they have the opposite 
effect on activity with others beyond the nation-state. Most interestingly, however, is the effect of 
EU funding on collaborative activity. EU financing does mobilize transnational activity, but very 
little of it. This is surprising given that one aim of EU funding is to encourage transnational 
collaboration among NGOs. Moreover, Table 7.27 shows that groups with an EU grant are more 
likely to exchange resources with other domestic NGOs. Overall, these findings call into question 
the real value added of EU grants in encouraging transnational collaboration.  
In sum, the findings in this chapter begin to address the research questions put forth at the 
beginning. Collaboration with other actors is quite common among PMR groups, and occurs 
across each level of governance. Interconnectedness shapes collaborative activity at each level. In 
addition, the national POS, group identity, and resources also play a role in structuring 
collaborative activity. The following chapter will place these findings, together with those from 
the previous chapters, into a broader context of movement activity and will offer some 
conclusions about the political behavior of the migrant inclusion movement in Europe.          
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Chapter Seven: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 7.1
National Collaborative Activity by Group Identity
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Figure 7.2
Transnational Collaborative Activity by Group Identity
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Figure 7.3
Supranational Collaborative Activity by Group Identity
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Table 7.1       
Collaborative Activities by Level and Type     
Level/Activity   % often % sometimes % very effective 
       
National       
  Share information  84 14 52  
  Share advice/expertise 72 21 33  
  Share resources/personnel 16 31 7  
  Coordinate activities/projects 53 38 36  
       
Transnational      
  Share information  50 30 34  
  Share advice/expertise 37 33 18  
  Share resources/personnel 12 18 9  
  Coordinate activities/projects 27 33 17  
       
Supranational      
  Share information  25 38 28  
  Share advice/expertise 19 26 14  
  Share resources/personnel 7 13 6  
  Coordinate activities/projects 17 22 11  
       
N=114             
Note: Figures are percentages of groups that reported frequently utilizing the given 
collaborative activity to address their primary issues of concern over the past two to three 
years ("often" or "sometimes"), and that reported the activity to be "very effective." 
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Table 7.2       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Domestic Collaborative 
Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national business  .16* .31** .21** .28** 
  national labor  .16* .28** .28** .26** 
  EU groups  -.12 .02 .19** .02 
  non-national NGOs  .08 .11 .30** .22** 
  non-national business -.23** -.15 .08 -.16* 
  non-national labor  -.23** -.14 .13 -.07 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation -.05 .02 -.12 .10 
  federal system  -.17* -.15 -.17* -.07 
  Left chief executive  .04 .07 -.12 .07 
  Left government  .05 .06 -.14 .06 
  number of parties  -.13 .05 .11 .05 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  -.03 .10 -.12 .08 
  long-term residence policy -.02 .10 -.14 .08 
  family reunification policy -.01 .08 -.12 .11 
  naturalization policy  -.02 .08 -.07 .13 
  anti-discrimination policy -.04 .11 -.09 .14 
  immigration policy perception -.03 -.09 .03 .05 
  citizenship policy perception .15 .05 -.04 .07 
  asylum policy perception -.14 -.16* -.11 -.01 
  employment policy perception .00 -.05 .04 .00 
Identity       
  services/care  .12 .17* .14 .19** 
  political/legal  -.21** -.11 .04 -.02 
  asylum   -.13 -.04 .08 -.16* 
Resources      
  EU grant   -.10 .04 .11 -.03 
  group age  .15 -.18* .02 .12 
  full-time staff  -.10 -.01 -.08 -.14 
  part-time staff  .07 .12 -.03 .00 
  volunteers  .07 .10 -.01 .09 
  budget   .04 .05 -.14 -.08 
  income trend  .09 .02 .15 .11 
  members   .06 .09 .05 -.09 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with 
national NGOs are not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those 
NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of domestic 
collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.3       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Domestic 
Collaborative Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs  .29** .35** .36** .36** 
  national business  .21** .32** .19** .18* 
  national labor  .11 .23** .21** .23** 
  EU groups  .02 .09 .16* .14 
  non-national NGOs  .19** .09 .13 .19** 
  non-national business -.03 .04 .09 -.01 
  non-national labor  -.05 -.02 .06 .10 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation .09 .15 -.08 -.05 
  federal system  .11 -.02 -.10 .10 
  Left chief executive  .05 .06 .02 .04 
  Left government  .06 .04 -.01 .02 
  number of parties  -.02 .11 .08 -.12 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  .10 .20** -.06 -.03 
  long-term residence policy .08 .18* -.06 -.02 
  family reunification policy .09 .20** -.08 -.03 
  naturalization policy  .09 .20** -.04 -.03 
  anti-discrimination policy .11 .19** -.08 -.00 
  immigration policy perception -.03 .02 -.07 .02 
  citizenship policy perception -.00 .02 -.05 .04 
  asylum policy perception -.10 -.03 -.09 -.08 
  employment policy perception -.14 -.06 -.01 -.07 
Identity       
  services/care  .04 .05 .00 .04 
  political/legal  -.15 -.16* .02 -.05 
  asylum   -.15 -.07 .00 -.05 
Resources      
  EU grant   -.05 .04 .00 .05 
  group age  .14 .11 .08 .14 
  full-time staff  -.11 -.01 .06 -.01 
  part-time staff  .12 -.03 .08 -.02 
  volunteers  .03 .03 .01 -.08 
  budget   .03 .12 .06 .02 
  income trend  .08 .07 -.01 .00 
  members   -.03 -.01 .05 -.07 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with 
national NGOs are not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those 
NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of domestic 
collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.4       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Transnational 
Collaborative Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs  .24** .31** .17* .17* 
  national business  .16* .23** .12 .17* 
  national labor  .23** .31** .29** .26** 
  EU groups  .40** .43** .40** .44** 
  non-national business .18* .15 .36** .23** 
  non-national labor  .26** .27** .46** .39** 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation -.17* -.09 -.10 -.12 
  federal system  .18* .17* .01 .07 
  Left chief executive  -.24** -.18* -.16* -.16* 
  Left government  -.20** -.16* -.16* -.14 
  number of parties  -.07 -.05 .00 -.09 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  -.14 -.07 -.21** -.19** 
  long-term residence policy -.15 -.08 -.23** -.21** 
  family reunification policy -.12 -.07 -.21** -.16* 
  naturalization policy  -.16* -.10 -.14 -.15 
  anti-discrimination policy -.11 -.04 -.18* -.13 
  immigration policy perception .12 .00 .01 .14 
  citizenship policy perception .13 .00 -.14 .05 
  asylum policy perception .17* .05 .07 .23** 
  employment policy perception .00 -.07 .03 .00 
Identity       
  services/care  -.07 -.06 -.02 -.05 
  political/legal  -.04 -.05 -.00 .09 
  asylum   -.11 -.08 .01 -.03 
Resources      
  EU grant   .21** .25** .24** .20** 
  group age  .10 .15 .05 .13 
  full-time staff  .04 .05 .02 -.06 
  part-time staff  -.02 -.08 -.18* -.10 
  volunteers  -.13 -.20** -.17* -.17* 
  budget   .02 .03 -.07 -.11 
  income trend  .23** .25** .18* .11 
  members   .08 .12 .01 .00 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with 
non-national NGOs are not included in the analyses of transnational collaborative activity 
with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of 
transnational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.5       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of 
Transnational Collaborative Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs  .23** .13 .00 .03 
  national business  .18* .35** .09 .15 
  national labor  .25** .36** .06 .18* 
  EU groups  .41** .33** .20** .37** 
  non-national NGOs  .66** .54** .30** .52** 
  non-national business .19** .23** .22** .24** 
  non-national labor  .24** .31** .13 .24** 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation -.22** -.28** -.19** -.26** 
  federal system  .05 .02 .02 .12 
  Left chief executive  -.21** -.15 -.13 -.19** 
  Left government  -.19** -.26** -.17* -.22** 
  number of parties  .03 .13 .19** .05 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  -.18* -.14 -.20** -.21** 
  long-term residence policy -.19** -.17* -.21** -.25** 
  family reunification policy -.17* -.17* -.24** -.25** 
  naturalization policy  -.17* -.14 -.19** -.24** 
  anti-discrimination policy -.16* -.12 -.19** -.19** 
  immigration policy perception .06 .00 .05 .13 
  citizenship policy perception -.03 -.16* -.20** -.12 
  asylum policy perception .06 .11 .15 .21** 
  employment policy perception .06 .03 .06 .05 
Identity       
  services/care  -.00 .03 .06 -.01 
  political/legal  .09 .03 .00 .07 
  asylum   .03 .02 .04 .04 
Resources      
  EU grant   .21** .30** .12 .37** 
  group age  .09 .09 -.05 .01 
  full-time staff  -.03 .08 .13 .13 
  part-time staff  -.04 .02 -.07 .01 
  volunteers  -.09 -.03 .00 -.07 
  budget   -.01 .02 .04 .00 
  income trend  .06 .11 .00 .08 
  members   .02 .06 .02 -.10 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with 
non-national NGOs are not included in the analyses of transnational collaborative activity 
with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of 
transnational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.6       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Supranational 
Collaborative Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs  .02 .12 .05 .05 
  national business  .20** .25** .18** .23** 
  national labor  .22** .31** .30** .28** 
  non-national NGOs  .37** .50** .43** .45** 
  non-national business .20** .26** .31** .26** 
  non-national labor  .22** .30** .40** .32** 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation -.13 -.10 -.01 -.00 
  federal system  .14 .17* .03 .17* 
  Left chief executive  -.26** -.27** -.14 -.17* 
  Left government  -.25** -.24** -.17* -.17* 
  number of parties  .04 -.04 .08 .04 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  -.06 -.09 -.05 -.02 
  long-term residence policy -.08 -.11 -.09 -.04 
  family reunification policy -.06 -.09 -.06 -.01 
  naturalization policy  -.07 -.11 -.00 -.00 
  anti-discrimination policy -.06 -.06 -.02 .02 
  immigration policy perception .05 -.02 -.10 -.03 
  citizenship policy perception .16 .06 -.10 -.00 
  asylum policy perception .09 .05 -.01 -.01 
  employment policy perception .09 .01 -.01 .00 
Identity       
  services/care  .02 .07 .02 .04 
  political/legal  .16* .14 .16* .26** 
  asylum   .13 .12 .12 .19** 
Resources      
  EU grant   .22** .30** .26** .32** 
  group age  .04 .11 .05 .11 
  full-time staff  .08 .15 .18* .09 
  part-time staff  -.15* -.09 -.10 -.09 
  volunteers  -.09 -.14 -.09 -.22** 
  budget   .03 .12 .09 .09 
  income trend  .12 .15 .07 .07 
  members   -.14 -.08 .01 -.06 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with EU 
groups are not included in the analyses of supranational collaborative activity with those 
groups. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of 
supranational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.7       
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of 
Supranational Collaborative Activity 
Variable     Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures      
  national NGOs  .02 .11 .07 .02 
  national business  .16* .31** .07 .12 
  national labor  .25** .31** .10 .18* 
  EU groups  .36** .39** .16* .25** 
  non-national NGOs  .36** .46** .21** .28** 
  non-national business .26** .26** .15 .19** 
  non-national labor  .34** .30** .16* .23** 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of participation .08 -.12 -.01 .01 
  federal system  .18* .15 .04 .20** 
  Left chief executive  -.11 -.16* -.00 .10 
  Left government  -.09 -.22** -.04 .04 
  number of parties  .10 .07 .09 -.04 
Issue-Specific POS      
  labor market policy  .05 -.09 -.01 .03 
  long-term residence policy .04 -.11 -.04 .03 
  family reunification policy .06 -.12 -.06 .01 
  naturalization policy  .05 -.10 -.04 .01 
  anti-discrimination policy .06 -.06 .03 .05 
  immigration policy perception .13 .04 -.06 -.09 
  citizenship policy perception .04 -.09 -.12 -.05 
  asylum policy perception .20** .16* .05 .07 
  employment policy perception .10 .05 -.01 -.05 
Identity       
  services/care  .06 .06 .07 .13 
  political/legal  .16* .03 -.07 .11 
  asylum   .05 -.08 -.04 .04 
Resources      
  EU grant   .22** .22** .05 .09 
  group age  .18* .14 .01 .01 
  full-time staff  -.06 .10 .04 .01 
  part-time staff  -.05 -.10 -.15 -.12 
  volunteers  -.06 -.07 .04 -.05 
  budget   -.03 .04 .04 -.06 
  income trend  -.04 .16* -.10 .06 
  members   .03 .13 -.04 -.13 
Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with EU 
groups are not included in the analyses of supranational collaborative activity with those 
groups. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of 
supranational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10. 
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Table 7.8          
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Domestic Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor   Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Network 
Structures         
  national NGOs --- 1.21 --- 2.28*** --- 4.28*** --- 5.01*** 
   (.34)  (.89)  (1.55)  (2.23) 
  national social   
  partners 2.91*** 1.25 2.76*** 1.45 1.45* 1.23 1.97** 3.21*** 
  (1.48) (.32) (.93) (.47) (.40) (.50) (.66) (1.52) 
  EU groups .64 1.18 .96 1.85** 1.15 1.46 .78 .81 
  (.37) (.32) (.33) (.56) (.32) (.48) (.21) (.34) 
  non-national   
  NGOs 1.93* 1.71** 1.32 1.63** 1.64** 1.02 2.19*** 1.20 
  (.96) (.52) (.44) (.45) (.49) (.37) (.75) (.47) 
  non-national  
  social partners .33*** .79 .52** .72 1.04 1.10 .55** .64 
  (.15) (.20) (.20) (.24) (.26) (.43) (.17) (.44) 
N=   108 108 108 102 108 108 109 109 
Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from 
binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with changes 
in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic regression, 
where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which 
odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 
0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is 
"very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not 
at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is 
"generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative 
effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.9         
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Transnational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Network Structures        
  national NGOs 1.61 1.74* 2.20** .47** 1.48 1.45 1.36 .75 
  (.63) (.61) (.81) (.18) (.51) (.55) (.44) (.27) 
  national social  
  partners .76 1.32 1.40 3.85*** 1.12 .62 1.92** .82 
  (.32) (.51) (.56) (1.88) (.54) (.29) (.66) (.31) 
  EU groups 3.07*** 5.36*** 3.00*** 1.47 1.70* 1.29 1.76** 1.95** 
  (1.23) (2.28) (.82) (.61) (.57) (.43) (.56) (.66) 
  non-national 
NGOs --- --- --- 7.93*** --- 3.48*** --- 5.49*** 
     (3.79)  (1.86)  (2.52) 
  non-national social  
  partners 6.95*** 2.53* 1.74 1.35 2.66*** 2.04** 2.31* .85 
  (5.46) (1.63) (.77) (.92) (1.22) (.78) (1.24) (.29) 
N=   109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries 
for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not 
effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.10         
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Supranational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Network Structures        
  national NGOs 1.18 .56* .88 .81 .80 .97 1.35 .91 
  (.39) (.20) (.27) (.26) (.34) (.44) (.61) (.31) 
  national social  
  partners 2.05*** .77 1.20 1.27 1.27 .73 1.09 .77 
  (.59) (.33) (.36) (.56) (.46) (.30) (.29) (.27) 
  EU groups --- 5.78*** --- 3.61*** --- 2.16*** --- 2.08*** 
   (2.80)  (1.43)  (.61)  (.65) 
  non-national NGOs 1.41 2.28*** 2.87*** 2.00** 2.87*** 3.08*** 2.39*** 2.44*** 
  (.44) (.72) (.87) (.70) (1.18) (1.16) (.92) (.87) 
  non-national social  
  partners 1.17 3.63*** 2.25** 2.37 1.49* 1.88** 1.70* 1.65* 
  (.34) (4.54) (.86) (1.80) (.45) (.72) (.65) (.63) 
N=   106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries 
for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not 
effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
Table 7.11     
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Transnational versus Domestic 
Collaborative Activity 
Predictor     Odds     
Network Structures    
  national NGOs  ---   
      
  national social partners 1.72   
   (.81)   
  EU groups  3.26***   
   (1.29)   
  non-national NGOs ---   
      
  non-national social partners 2.04   
   ('1.70)   
N=     111     
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus 
national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.12      
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Supranational versus Domestic 
Collaborative Activity 
       
Predictor   Information Advice Resources Projects 
Network Structures     
  national NGOs --- --- --- --- 
       
  national social partners 1.06 1.22 1.35 1.15 
   (.40) (.42) (.44) (.42) 
  EU groups  --- --- --- --- 
       
  non-national NGOs 2.76*** 3.70*** 3.54*** 3.54*** 
   (.88) (1.36) (1.63) (1.30) 
  non-national social partners .94 .79 1.08 1.07 
   (.26) (.23) (.27) (.44) 
N=     111 111 108 111 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national 
level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.13         
Multivariate Results for POS and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness 
 Information  Advice Resources  Projects 
Predictor  A E  A          E A          E  A E  
Broad POS         
      
competitiveness  
  of  
  participation .81 .92 .45* .34** .71 .42 1.79* .51 
 (.52) (.40) (.26) (.17) (.37) (.30) (.77) (.43)  
  federal system .76 1.41 .85 .95 .78 1.16 .96 2.80*** 
 (.27) (.40) (.21) (.33) (.23) (.48) (.25) (1.24)  
  Left 
government 1.24 1.19 1.75 1.64* .99 1.95 .76 2.17** 
 (.86) (.39) (.86) (.61) (.39) (1.07) (.32) (.98)  
  number of    
  parties .99 1.26 1.28 1.08 1.78*** .90 1.33 .46* 
 (.43) (.40) (.44) (.51) (.47)  (.26) (.47) (.22)  
Issue-Specific 
POS         
  policy context   
  index 1.99 1.22 2.29** 2.07 .44  .21 .84 1.75 
 (4.58) (1.37) (3.35) (3.22) (.47)  (.29) (1.11) (2.68)  
  policy  
  perceptions  
  index 1.30 .91 .75 .90 .99  .57*** 1.15 .91 
 (.43) (.23) (.18) (.30) (.23)  (.15) (.27) (.27)  
N= 108 108 108 102 108  108 109 109  
Note: A=Activity, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing 
Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. 
These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or 
decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are 
from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or 
decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are 
from binary logistic regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as 
the degree to which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or 
decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are 
from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are 
interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" 
increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent 
positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.14         
Multivariate Results for POS and Transnational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor A E A E A E A E 
Broad POS         
  competitiveness of  
  participation --- .25** 1.41 .18*** 1.32 .33* .46 .43** 
   (.18) (.79) (.11) (.74) (.26) (.30) (.22) 
  federal system 1.36 2.08** 1.15 1.66 1.30 2.48** 1.60 1.87**
  (.55) (.90) (.46) (.85) (.45) (1.04) (.65) (.55) 
  Left government .61 2.54* .65 2.23* 1.35 4.37** 1.29 1.68 
  (.33) (1.52) (.27) (1.20) (.67) (3.15) (.56) (.75) 
  number of parties .63* 1.31 .32*** 3.27*** 1.12 2.75*** .42** .169 
  (.22) (.69) (.16) (1.64) (.44) (1.22) (.17) (.76) 
Issue-Specific POS        
  policy context index 2.37 .30 2.10 1.00* .07** .04** .50 .38 
  (3.71) (.50) (3.44) (.14) (.10) (.06) (.78) (.53) 
  policy perceptions index 1.32 .78 .91 .50*** .91 .85 1.26 .89 
  (.46) (.27) (.24) (.14) (.27) (.23) (.43) (.27) 
N=   109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: A=Activity, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, 
where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to 
which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in 
the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at 
all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity 
as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 272
 
Table 7.15         
Multivariate Results for POS and Supranational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor A E A E A E A E 
Broad POS         
  competitiveness of  
  participation .75 .44 1.15 .43* 1.17 .67 1.25 .33** 
  (.38) (.31) (.63) (.28) (.67) (.35) (.60) (.20) 
  federal system 1.23 3.01** .95 1.29 .81 (.85) 1.11 1.60**
  (.38) (1.72) (.31) (.69) (.25) (.24) (.43) (.43) 
  Left government .74 3.37** .61* .88 .60 1.32 .81 2.60**
  (.29) (2.43) (.22) (.41) (.27) (.63) (.30) (1.17) 
  number of parties .80 3.89** .49** 1.24 1.30 1.39 .89 1.27 
  (.29) (2.41) (.17) (.59) (.51) (.43) (.30) (.54) 
Issue-Specific POS        
  policy context index 9.24** .07** 3.93*** .62 1.20 .88 8.37* .53 
  (1.49) (.11) (6.05) (1.11) (1.71) (1.19) (1.36) (.67) 
  policy perceptions index 1.20 1.75* 1.08 .96 .63* .74 .74 1.14 
  (.32) (.69) (.31) (.29) (.20) (.25) (.23) (.32) 
N=   106 106 016 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: A=Activities, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, 
where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to 
which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in 
the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not 
at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the 
activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes 
in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.16     
Multivariate Results for POS and Transnational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity 
      
Predictor     Odds     
Broad POS     
  competitiveness of participation ---   
      
  federal system  .64   
   (.32)   
  Left government  .20**   
   (.18)   
  number of parties .27*   
   (.23)   
Issue-Specific POS    
  policy context index 9.74   
   (2.32)   
  policy perceptions index 1.63*   
   (.48)   
N=     111     
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus 
national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
Table 7.17      
Multivariate Results for POS and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity 
       
Predictor   Information Advice Resources Projects 
Broad POS      
  competitiveness of  
  participation --- --- 1.32 --- 
     (.79)  
  federal system 1.78** 1.56* 1.08 1.80** 
   (.54) (.45) (.27) (.52) 
  Left government 1.28 .84 .44** .82 
   (.45) (.34) (.20) (.32) 
  number of parties .62 .88 1.51 1.11 
   (.24) (.33) (.51) (.35) 
Issue-Specific POS     
  policy context index .63 1.76 .47 1.57 
   (1.05) (2.55) (.59) (2.35) 
  policy perceptions index 1.01 .61** .77 1.07 
   (.26) (.17) (.22) (.39) 
N=     111 111 108 111 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national 
level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.18         
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Domestic Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor   Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Identity          
  services/care 1.76* 1.02 1.74** 2.12*** 1.32 1.14 1.45* 1.64* 
  (.64) (.26) (.59) (.58) (.36) (.31) (.42) (.55) 
  political/legal .39*** .82 .54** .59* .77 1.08 --- --- 
  (.16) (.21) (.19) (.19) (.21) (.30)   
  asylum  --- --- --- --- --- --- .64* .57* 
        (.18) (.23) 
N=   108 108 108 102 108 108 109 109 
Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios 
from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted 
as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along 
with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary 
logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as 
the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with 
changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic 
regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to 
which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along 
with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary 
logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted 
as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase 
or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive 
effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
Table 7.19         
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Transnational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects  
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Identity          
  services/care .76 .89 .95 1.55 .88 1.45 .63* .87 
  (.37) (.30) (.39) (.58) (.28) (.63) (.19) (.27) 
  political/legal 1.25 1.24 1.04 .97 1.08 1.19 2.16** 1.43 
  (.65) (.50) (.37) (.40) (.37) (.39) (.78) (.47) 
  asylum --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
N=   109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. 
Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 
1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally 
effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = 
unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.20         
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Supranational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy 
Identity         
   
  services/care .70 1.30 1.41 1.37 .87 .99 1.01 1.19 
  .22 (.51) (.54) (.45) (.30) (.35) (.43) (.33) 
     
  political/legal 1.35 1.68 1.27 .82 1.14 1.20 2.21** 1.94*** 
  (.28) (.76) (.34) (.28) (.36) (.34) (.80) (.58) 
  asylum --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
N=   106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. 
Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 
1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally 
effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent 
variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = 
unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
Table 7.21    
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Transnational versus Domestic Collaborative 
Activity  
     
Predictor  Odds   
Identity     
  services/care .92   
  (.36)  
  political/legal 1.17   
  (.48)  
  asylum  ---   
     
N=  111     
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus 
national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.22      
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative 
Activity 
       
Predictor   Information Advice Resources Projects 
Identity      
  services/care 1.61* 1.13 .54* .84 
   (.59) (.40) (.22) (.31) 
  political/legal 1.04 1.21 1.16 1.72* 
   (.37) (.46) (.40) (.59) 
  asylum  --- --- --- --- 
       
N=     111 111 108 111 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national 
level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
       
 
Table 7.23         
Multivariate Results for Resources and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor   Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Resources         
  EU grant  1.05 .97 .99 1.14 .79 .70 1.10 1.17 
  (.43) (.26) (.29) (.35) (.21) (.22) (.31) (.44) 
  group age .93 1.02 1.20 .84 1.00 .90 1.04 1.08 
  (.42) (.25) (.38) (.27) (.25) (.26) (.29) (.35) 
  full-time staff .81 .96 .89 .95 1.09 .76 .77 .72 
  (.37) (.24) (.27) (.31) (.27) (.23) (.21) (.22) 
  volunteers .90 1.56** --- --- 1.06 .74 1.41* .50*** 
  (.37) (.38)   (.23) (.20) (.36) (.14) 
  budget  1.13 1.04 1.22 1.01 .84 1.19 1.12 1.79** 
  (.34) (.25) (.32) (.36) (.24) (.31) (.32) (.61) 
  members --- --- --- --- 1.19 --- .86 1.03 
      (.21)  (.18) (.30) 
N=   108 108 108 102 108 108 109 109 
Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from 
binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with 
changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic 
regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree 
to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in 
the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, 
where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the 
activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the 
independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 
0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds 
of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes 
in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent 
negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.24         
Multivariate Results for Resources and Transnational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects  
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy
Resources         
  EU grant 1.95** 1.20 1.32 .79 1.11 1.53 1.07 1.69** 
  (.72) (.35) (.46) (.31) (.38) (.54) (.32) (.48) 
  group age 1.41 2.53*** 1.44 1.97** 1.06 .72 2.21*** .90 
  (.54) (1.01) (.50) (.71) (.35) (.26) (.75) (.28) 
  full-time staff .84 .54* 1.42 1.33 --- --- --- --- 
  (.33) (.22) (.72) (.52)     
  part-time staff --- --- --- --- .46*** .59* 1.31 .98 
      (.15) (.23) (.45) (.31) 
  volunteers .78 1.01 .57** 1.88** .79 .67 .56** 1.39 
  (.25) (.30) (.19) (.70) (.22) (.33) (.17) (.38) 
  income trend 1.70** .84 2.29*** 1.05 1.36 .84 1.24 .72 
  (.54) (.25) (.68) (.40) (.42) (.26) (.36) (.21) 
  members --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
N=   109 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. 
Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very 
effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus 
"generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.25         
Multivariate Results for Resources and Supranational Collaborative Activity and 
Effectiveness 
  Information Advice  Resources Projects 
Predictor Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy Activity Efficacy 
Resources         
  EU grant 1.30 1.55 1.49* 1.05 .62* .87 1.49* 1.02 
  (.35) (.64) (.45) (.35) (.21) (.34) (.42) (.29) 
  group age .77 2.72*** .89 2.10** .90 .94 1.07 1.23 
  (.21) (.96) (.24) (.71) (.33) (.32) (.34) (.35) 
  full-time staff --- --- --- --- 1.29 .97 1.13 .87 
      (.44) (.32) (.28) (.25) 
  part-time staff .74 1.63 .93 1.32 --- --- --- --- 
  (.19) (.69) (.25) (.42)     
  volunteers .81 1.68** .69 1.24 .94 1.32 .50** 1.02 
  (.22) (.51) (.24) (.43) (.32) (.45) (.20) (.24) 
  income trend .89 .77 1.29 1.47 1.04 .62* 1.18 .91 
  (.23) (.27) (.41) (.53) (.40) (.20) (.31) (.24) 
  members --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
N=   106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 
0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating 
"frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. 
Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very 
effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus 
"generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 7.26     
Multivariate Results for Resources and Transnational versus Domestic Activity 
      
Predictor  Odds     
Resources     
  EU grant  1.38    
  (.49)   
  group age 1.15    
  (.50)   
  full-time staff .81    
  (.25)   
  part-time staff ---    
      
  volunteers .68    
  (.29)   
  income   1.07    
  (.32)   
N=  111       
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus 
national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater 
than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
 
Table 7.27      
Multivariate Results for Resources and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative 
Activity 
       
Predictor   Information Advice Resources Projects 
Resources      
  EU grant  .90 .66 .49** .95 
   (.29) (.24) (.20) (.33) 
  group age  1.05 1.18 .60 .69 
   (.33) (.43) (.28) (.26) 
  full-time staff  1.55* 1.45 1.29 1.39 
   (.52) (.49) (.35) (.41) 
  volunteers  .84 --- --- 1.06 
   (.26)   (.45) 
  income   1.16 1.21 1.86* 1.71* 
   (.40) (.43) (.75) (.56) 
N=     111 111 108 111 
Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the 
degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national 
level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 
represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion: The Politics of Migrant Inclusion in Europe 
“…a progressive movement towards a multi-leveled and multi-spatial participation and 
representation of migrants does appear to be already underway,” Gaia Danese, 1998, p. 730. 
 
 
This study treats pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) advocacy groups as central to the study of the 
larger migrant inclusion movement. PMR organizations are the main policy channels of the 
movement, and represent citizens concerned about migrant inclusion as well as broader human 
rights, anti-discrimination, and social tolerance issues. Across the European Union (EU), these 
groups are becoming visible actors in the policy process. They hold meetings with European 
Parliamentarians, provide policy advice to the European Commission, meet with government 
ministers, organize public demonstrations, and pressure political parties on immigration matters. 
Through their activities, these organizations help define the meaning of migrant inclusion. Thus, 
the study of PMR interest group behavior helps us to understand the nature of the migrant 
inclusion movement in Europe; their behavior is a symptom of the broader political changes 
taking place in advanced democracies.    
In the 1980s immigration issues surfaced in the public debate in many European 
countries, and in the 1990s these issues emerged onto the political stage throughout the EU, 
where they remain today. In this study I have documented that a popular base for migrant 
inclusion exists in most European countries (Chapter 4) in response to many aspects of societal 
intolerance toward migrants. Although the church sit-ins and hunger strikes that received much 
media attention in the 1990s portrayed migrant inclusion issues as being of interest mainly to the 
fringe of society, organized interests now lobby various levels of government at different stages 
of the policy process to ensure as much as possible that migrant inclusion issues are factored into 
policy decisions. Moreover, they use the media to raise public awareness of these issues among 
individuals in European societies. Overall, PMR organizations are making some progress toward 
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fashioning a more inclusive Europe, although meaningful change is inevitably slow and 
incremental. The purpose of this concluding chapter is thus to discuss the main themes of this 
study and summarize its key findings in relation to this progress.   
There is no doubt that migrant inclusion remains an uphill battle and much work remains 
to be done. For example, organizations must continue to work to integrate these issues into the 
regular policy process of all EU democracies. Moreover, they must play a larger and more direct 
role in policy negotiations at the European level (Tyson 2001). Yet at the same time, over the past 
decade there has been important legislation at both the national and European levels dealing with 
migrant and refugee problems (CEC 1985, 1995a, 1995b). At the national level, specialized 
national bodies have been established in every EU country to monitor anti-discrimination. 
However, the struggle has become more difficult recently with the rise of many center-right 
governments throughout Europe, which tend to be less sympathetic to migrant inclusion issues. 
Yet many organizations are nonetheless attempting to influence policy by targeting sympathetic 
members of parliament and taking advantage of opportunities in member states that want to be 
seen as intolerant of racism and discrimination.  
At the European level, expanding networks and strategic access points in the decision-
making structure are resulting in increasing attention being paid to migrant inclusion issues as 
well as concrete policy outcomes. For example, the Commission unit DGV sponsored the 
proposal to designate 1997 the European Year Against Racism, with a budget of ECU 4.76 
million to go to a range of activities at the local, national, and European levels (CEC 1995a). Out 
of this initiative rose one important umbrella organization (the ENAR) representing a network of 
pro-migrant NGOs across Europe. Moreover, the Starting Line Group, founded in 1992 by a 
group of independent experts from six member states, lobbied for the inclusion of the anti-
discrimination provision known as Article 13 to the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 13 brought about 
an “unprecedented requirement” under EU law requiring national governments to establish a 
designated body to monitor anti-discrimination. In a personal interview, one European 
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Commission official remarked that “an anti-discrimination industry” was born out of the 
inclusion of Article 13. Since 1997, the EU has probably introduced more migrant inclusion 
legislation than in any other time period. This is indicated by Commission proposals on 
temporary protection for refugees, the rights of third country nationals, the action plan on free 
movement, immigration and asylum, and discussion of extended anti-discrimination 
competencies (CEC 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998a). 
In addition to these indications of the growing importance of migrant inclusion issues, 
this study has documented the institutional and political development of the migrant inclusion 
movement. Starting with a fairly small organizational base in the 1970s and 80s, the movement 
has grown in scale and complexity since the mid-1980s (Chapter 4). Moreover, diverse elements 
of PMR organizations exist, as was shown throughout this study. For instance, services/care-
giving groups mobilize public support for social concerns such as anti-discrimination, 
intolerance, education, and housing. Political/legal groups have expanded the scope of the 
movement to include the emerging political and legal problems associated with immigration; they 
critique the legal, social, and political structures that contribute to these problems. Finally, asylum 
groups continue to mobilize support for improving the conditions of asylum detainees and for the 
human rights principles that serve as the foundation for admitting asylum-seekers into Europe.  
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
In addition to documenting the range of political activities that PMR groups engage in, this study 
used two broad questions to guide its analyses: What factors influence the choice of activity 
among PMR groups? Why do they choose certain activities or levels of governance over others? 
The results of this research show that interconnectedness significantly and robustly influences 
participation in certain strategies, the choice of one strategy over another, as well as the arena 
where activity is targeted. In other words, groups with similar grievances working toward similar 
goals and located in similar countries undertake different political activities based in part on the 
nature and strength of the ties they maintain. When the nature of a group’s connections changes – 
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in terms of who it includes among its strongest ties – its activity patterns will also change. This 
suggests that PMR organizations, like other social movement groups, have many activities to 
choose from in their action repertoires, and this choice (at each level of governance) is 
significantly influenced by the nature of their group ties. When those ties change, the likelihood 
of participation in a given activity also changes. This study thus contributes to filling a gap in the 
literature in that it offers an explanation of how groups move from simply having grievances to 
choosing political activities to address those grievances. In explaining why similar groups based 
in similar countries working toward similar goals choose to engage in different activity patterns, a 
focus on an organization’s interconnectedness goes a long way.       
 Group ties, however, are not the full story. The advantage of employing an integrative 
model of behavior is that it allows one to isolate the effects of a specific factor while controlling 
for competing explanations. In this study, those competing explanations include the political 
opportunity structure (POS), group identity, and group resources. While these factors served a 
function as controls, I was also interested in how they contribute to an integrative or multi-faceted 
explanation of movement behavior in and of themselves.  
 In the following paragraphs, I will draw conclusions from the previous chapters and 
explain the ways in which this study has added to broader knowledge in the fields of comparative 
politics and interest group/social movement studies. This study’s novelty and its implications 
beyond migrant inclusion politics is in part defined by its focus on group ties. In addition, its 
methodological design which allows an assessment of the choice of one activity type or arena of 
activity versus another contributes to its uniqueness. By asking how interconnectedness shapes 
the choice of one activity over another, and activity at one level of governance versus another, I 
incorporated a relational and explicitly comparative element into the analyses that is often absent 
in social movement research. By examining groups across as many EU countries as possible, 
including the new member states, I am able to generalize beyond one or two countries and obtain 
a more complete picture of how the migrant inclusion movement writ large behaves.  
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  In Chapter 1 of this study, I put forth a set of guiding research questions that informed 
the analyses which followed. First, I asked what political activities PMR groups engage in at 
different levels of governance. At each level, lobbying activities reflect the majority of groups’ 
visible political efforts, while confrontational tactics are always secondary. Moreover, a major 
finding of this study is that much of the activity that PMR organizations undertake is less visible, 
“behind the scenes” activity. The data in Chapter 7 show that actions that groups take 
collaboratively with one another away from the visible political spotlight comprise the largest 
proportion of all activities. The implication is that in moving toward a more complete 
understanding of organizations’ activity patterns, research needs to focus not only on the visible 
displays, such as lobbying and protest, but also on less visible action that occurs among groups, 
such as sharing information and exchanging resources. While some studies do focus on these 
types of activities (Dalton et al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002), it is far from common 
practice. Yet, the implication of excluding these activities from analyses of movement political 
behavior is that we are left with only a partial and incomplete understanding of the actions 
organizations take to achieve their policy goals.  
 Chapter 2 put this study in context by situating it in the migrant inclusion literature. It 
showed that this study’s focus on organized migrant inclusion interests developed from a long 
history of research on immigration and asylum issues. It also illustrated that over time, migrant 
inclusion research has become more systematic and comparative. This research adds to this body 
of work both in its scope and comparative nature. First, this study spans 20 of the 25 current EU 
member states, which allows a more complete picture of the migrant inclusion movement across 
Europe as a whole, rather than within a specific country or region of Europe. Although the 
movement is relatively less developed in the new member states, I nonetheless include them in 
this study in order to construct an image of how the movement as a whole functions. Moreover, 
rather than the standard approach of comparing across countries as is common practice in 
comparative research, this study offers a unique contribution in that it explicitly compares 
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movement activity across levels of governance. It also compares the choice of tactics themselves. 
The implications are relevant to both comparative politics and EU studies; the findings presented 
here add to our understanding of the interplay between the national, supranational and 
transnational spheres, and how organized interests use these different levels to their advantage. In 
addition, comparing the use of different tactics adds to our understanding of social movement 
politics by assessing the conditions under which groups will select one type of tactic over another.          
 The other guiding research questions posited in the introductory chapter ask: What 
factors influence participation in different activities? Why do groups choose certain political 
activities or levels of governance over others? Chapter 3 set the stage for answering these 
questions by elaborating an integrative model of movement behavior with a focus on 
interconnectedness. The model it advanced proposed a unique set of expectations regarding the 
ways in which group ties shape political strategies at each level. Although both social movement 
and migrant inclusion research treat strong relationships with alliances as important factors in 
political behavior, there have been no attempts at compiling the existing work into a model that 
can be used to explain movement activity. That was the primary goal of Chapter 3.  
In order to assess the performance of group ties as predictors of activity, however, one 
must also control for other factors that have been shown to be relevant. Thus, the integrative 
model also includes POS, group identity, and resource variables. Rather than treating these 
competing factors strictly as controls, however, I hypothesized that they also structured activity in 
important ways. To that end, Chapter 3 also builds on and contributes to more traditional social 
movement theories. To the POS it adds an “issue-specific” focus; to identity research it adds 
dimensions of organizational identity; and to resource mobilization it adds a supranational 
element by focusing on the EU as a source of funding. The ensuing theoretical model was used as 
the basis for answering the research questions. 
          Before those questions could be answered, however, Chapter 4 provided more information 
on the sample of organizations included in this study. It showed that the sample is relatively 
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representative of the overall population of PMR groups in Europe. That is, the proportion of 
younger versus older organizations as well as the relative size of organizations in the sample 
roughly mirrors that of the overall population. However, it was also shown that political/legal 
groups are slightly over-represented in the sample compared to their presence in the population. 
Because political/legal groups are relatively more challenging, the implications for this study 
were that to some degree it was predisposed to finding evidence in favor of more confrontational 
activities. However, I did not find that the data collected through the surveys were skewed toward 
any one activity, and I did not find systematic over-reporting of contentious activity based on a 
group’s political/legal identity. The fact that challenging activities were found to comprise a 
relatively minor part of groups’ political repertoires across levels despite the over-representation 
of political/legal groups lends confidence to the claim that groups prefer to work inside 
established channels whenever possible. This chapter has implications for future movement 
research by explicitly assessing the representativeness of the sample against the broader 
population rather than taking the characteristics of the sample at face value as has been done in 
past research. After assessing these sample characteristics, the chapters proceeded to test several 
hypotheses related to the political behavior of PMR groups across each level of governance. 
  Although it would be incorrect to claim on the basis of this study that interconnectedness 
influences organizational political behavior across all cases in all countries, this research 
constitutes a step toward formally incorporating a model of group ties into explanations of 
organizations’ political activities and generating testable hypotheses based on that model. The 
research presented in Chapter 5 through Chapter 7 produces some initial level of theory 
generation and empirical evidence related to the connection between PMR political behavior and 
group ties (as well as the POS, identity, and resources).  
In Chapter 5, I examined the impact of connections with other national NGOs as well as 
with national business associations and labor unions on political activity. The findings highlight 
unique patterns of behavior among PMR groups that have broader implications for movement 
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research. I found that interconnectedness has a marked impact on the national-level activities of 
the groups included in this study. In general, I found that simply maintaining a strong tie with any 
actor at the national level produced a moderation of tactics. In contrast, more isolated groups 
were more likely to act confrontationally against their governments. This implies that simply 
being better connected to other relevant actors within the home country not only increases the 
likelihood of activity, but also has a moderating effect in that it renders that activity less 
confrontational. I also found that when groups maintain strong ties with actors beyond the nation-
state, the likelihood that they will act at all in the domestic arena decreases. The importance of 
domestic connections to social group action may extend beyond PMR organizations to other 
movement groups, and is something that should be tested in future research. Overall, strong group 
ties with domestic actors, regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while those with non-
domestic actors depress it. Moreover, interconnectedness in general tends to increase policy 
effectiveness. 
Chapter 6 continued to explore the impact of interconnectedness on political behavior by 
examining how it shapes activity directed toward the European Union as opposed to the nation-
state. This chapter moved beyond previous studies which ask how groups act at the level of the 
EU by asking what factors shape activity at this level. It examined both activities directed at 
specific EU institutions, as well as at the EU versus the national government. Overall, the 
evidence showed strong support for the theoretical model put forth in Chapter 3. In general, I 
found that PMR groups with strong ties to domestic actors are less likely to act at the level of the 
EU. Rather, both EU lobbying as well as challenges mounted against the EU are strongly 
mobilized by connections that exist outside of the state, including with EU organizations, NGOs 
in other countries, and business and labor in other countries. In addition, these types of ties 
increase the likelihood that PMR groups will act beyond versus strictly within their nation-states. 
Interestingly, the one exception to this rule is connections with national NGOs, which increase 
the odds of protest directed against the EU. Together with the findings from Chapter 5, this 
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suggests that when pro-migrant groups are part of a strong network with other NGOs in their 
home country, they attempt to penalize the EU rather than their national governments for their 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Unlike at the national level where isolation produced protest, 
the more “connected” groups endure the added costs of mounting challenges against the EU. This 
pattern may apply to other social groups as well and should be tested in future research. In 
addition, these findings highlight that future work on European movements cannot plausibly be 
confined to the national level; the EU is a major arena of action that also must be considered.     
Turning beyond lobbying and protest, Chapter 7 examined acts of collaboration among 
groups across various levels. At the national level, the data showed that strong links with national 
business and labor increase collaboration among groups. Moreover, I found evidence of a 
“solidarity effect” whereby NGO connections across levels increase the odds of collaborative 
activity at home, suggesting that groups with stronger connections to NGOs in general are more 
likely to act in concert with domestic groups. In addition, this chapter found that, consistent with 
the model, ties with actors beyond the nation-state increase the likelihood that groups will 
cooperate outside of the country setting. More specifically, these types of links lead to EU as well 
as transnational collaboration versus that at the national level. When it comes to engaging in 
“behind the scenes” activity with others, such as sharing information and advice, I again found 
evidence of a solidarity effect produced by connections to other organizations. In other words, 
there is something special about maintaining ties to other NGOs at different levels. Where these 
connections exist, the likelihood of transnational collaboration in less visible activities increases. 
In addition, simply being connected to other relevant stakeholders across levels increases the odds 
of undertaking common projects transnationally. The results related to the solidarity effect and 
interconnectedness in general add to the fields of comparative politics and social movement 
studies by providing new theories to test in future research.   
OTHER FINDINGS 
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Although the most unique aspect of this research is its treatment of interconnectedness, other 
factors were also found to influence the political behavior of PMR groups. The following 
paragraphs discuss the other interesting findings that emerged from this study. 
The National POS 
First, the data show that at the national level, it is actually the issue-specific rather than the broad 
POS that mobilizes activity. In other words, where the issue-specific policy context surrounding 
migrant and refugee issues is relatively open, groups are more likely to interact with national 
policymakers. In contrast, where the broad POS is relatively open, groups are less likely to act at 
all. This finding has implications for other social movement research as well, in that groups tend 
to be less active when the broad institutional arrangements present in the country are open to the 
movement’s goals. In other words, it is not enough to have a federal system or political allies in a 
position of power when it comes to mobilizing activity. Rather, groups become mobilized to act 
in the context of more open institutions that directly pertain to their specific policy goals. This 
suggests that groups are more active within their country if that country has relatively liberal 
labor market, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination 
policies. It is also interesting that a more open rather than restrictive POS increases the odds of 
activity, implying that groups do not tend to mobilize in response to being shut out from the 
political process, but rather when there is some level of public or political support for their policy 
goals. These findings underscore the need for future work to consider both aspects of the POS.         
At the EU level, however, the situation changes insofar as the broad POS has the most 
pronounced effects on political behavior. An open POS in its broad form mobilizes a range of 
supranational activity. Moreover, it also makes groups more likely to target the EU versus act 
exclusively at the national level. Again, this suggests that mobilization proceeds not from being 
relatively excluded from political processes, but rather by a sense of being able to affect them.  
A similar pattern emerges in examining collaborations among groups across levels. At 
the national level, groups are more likely to collaborate when they face a more open POS in both 
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broad and issue-specific forms. However, this changes as we move beyond the state setting. 
Groups are less likely to act in concert transnationally when the national POS in both forms is 
relatively open. Moreover, when it comes to collaborating with EU groups, PMR organizations 
are more likely to do so when the issue-specific POS is relatively open. Overall, these patterns 
suggest that when it comes to lobbying policymakers, an open POS mobilizes activity. At the 
national level it is the issue-specific POS that does so, whereas at the EU level the broad POS 
tends to produce these effects. When it comes to collaborating with others at home, an open POS 
similarly mobilizes activity, but has more mixed effects when we move beyond the national level.    
Group Identity 
This study has shown that groups’ activities are significantly shaped by their organizational 
identity in very clear and interesting patterns. At the national level, I found that services/care 
groups (more moderate) are the most likely to utilize a broad range of tactics, whereas 
political/legal and asylum groups (more challenging) are more likely to challenge the government 
rather than lobby.  
The picture becomes a bit more complex, however, as we move beyond the state setting. 
At the EU level, the more challenging groups are not shut out from the policy process as one 
might expect based on the structure of EU institutions. At the same time, however, they do not 
tend to lobby the major institutions, such as the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European 
Parliament. Rather, the findings show that they devise “back door” strategies aimed at influencing 
the EU policy process whereby these groups tend to interact with the less visible bodies such as 
the Economic and Social Committee and Coreper. The cleverest of these strategies reflects that 
although the more challenging groups are not likely to interact with the Council of Ministers 
directly, they are likely to target Coreper, the body that prepares items to appear on the agenda of 
Council meetings. This suggests that rather than lobbying the high level national ministers of the 
Council (which they do not tend to do at the national level anyway), they attempt to wield 
influence indirectly through the relatively lower-level civil servants in Coreper. Future social 
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movement research should devise similar tests based on organizational identity, as the back door 
model may apply to other social groups as well.     
When it comes to group collaborations, I found evidence of an “isolation effect” in the 
domestic arena that has implications for collaborative activity across levels. Services/care 
organizations are the most likely to act in concert with others at the national level. In contrast, 
political/legal and asylum organizations tend to collaborate outside of the national setting. This 
finding suggests that domestic collaboration is structured in favor of more moderate groups. In 
turn, the more challenging groups must look beyond the state for similar opportunities, implying 
that their patterns of collaboration are shaped by their isolation at the national level. This finding 
holds interesting implications for the claim that a transnational civil society is emerging. If other 
movement studies find a similar isolation effect, then these transnational actors are likely to be 
slightly more radical and push for policy reforms considered by national governments to be more 
challenging.   
Organizational Resources 
This study found that older groups are more likely to challenge their national governments than 
younger organizations. This contradicts theoretical arguments that with time groups become more 
moderate as they learn to develop strategic political relationships and to work within established 
channels of participation. I suggested that groups established before 1990 may experience some 
degree of path dependency in terms of their political strategies. In the migrant inclusion 
movement, it was not until the 1990s that migrant and refugee issues assumed a prominent place 
in the public debate in most West European countries. Before that time, PMR organizations may 
have relied mainly on challenging tactics because they faced few options for influence via 
institutional means. As policy debates evolved over time, groups became more likely to find 
political allies within government. However, older groups may simply be more apt to include 
protest in their political repertoires because it was an essential tactic at one point in time, and 
served to draw public attention to their causes.    
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One aim of this study was to assess how the supranational source of group resources 
shapes political behavior across levels. Interestingly, I found that groups that receive EU funding 
are far more likely to act confrontationally against their national governments rather than lobby 
them. In addition, this study has shown that EU financing does mobilize transnational activity, 
but very little of it. Because a stated aim of Commission grants to civil society organizations is to 
increase transnationalism, it is unexpected that they do not significantly increase the likelihood of 
collaborative activities and projects among groups in different countries when controlling for 
other factors. In contrast, I found that groups with an EU grant are more likely to exchange 
resources with other domestic NGOs. Overall, these findings call into question the real value 
added of EU grants in encouraging transnational collaboration.  
In sum, in comparing activity across levels rather than across countries, I found that PMR 
groups are active at each level and only in isolated circumstances do groups use one level as an 
alternative to another. Rather, this study has shown that activity occurs in each arena because they 
all serve an important function in working toward the goals of the movement. Moreover, although 
interconnectedness is often the strongest predictor of activity across levels, each set of factors 
exhibits some influence in shaping the behavior of PMR groups.  
 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Several broad elements of this study warrant further attention in future research. First, the number 
of included organizations should be expanded so that research can continue to develop and refine 
theories about the different activity patterns of social movements. Such theories should go beyond 
the simple distinction between conventional and challenging action to capture increasingly 
distinct modes of activity. Adding more cases to the analyses would increase the reliability of the 
findings and the conclusions drawn from them. That being said, however, the number of cases in 
this study is sufficient to perform complex statistical analyses and subsequently draw inferences.  
 Taken together, the results presented here show that the best possible contextual situation 
occurs when pro-migrant organizations are well-connected across levels of governance, operate in 
 293
an open issue-specific national policy context, pursue more moderate as opposed to radical policy 
goals, and have high or increasing levels of resources at their disposal in order to undertake a 
broad range of activity. Given this ideal, a promising avenue for future studies would be to 
explicitly model the interaction effects among these sets of variables. Such conditional effects 
represent an under-explored topic in social movement studies yet are important for theory 
building. For example, do resources mediate the effects of group ties in predicting participation in 
various activity modes at different levels of governance? Does the POS interact with the group 
characteristics variables to structure interconnectedness? Do different types of group ties mediate 
the effect of group ideology on activity patterns? In exploring the interactions between group ties 
and more common social movement variables, research can begin to extend and refine the 
network model developed in this study.      
 In addition, the social movement literature is lacking in terms of comparative studies of 
movements. Thus, an interesting avenue for future research would be to compare the activities of 
the migrant inclusion movement with other social movements, such as environmentalism or the 
women’s movement. For example, it would be informative to investigate how organizational 
identity structures the activity patterns of environmental groups compared to migrant inclusion 
actors. Do environmental groups experience a similar “isolation effect” at the domestic level 
based on their ideology? Do certain types of groups devise comparable “back door” strategies 
when it comes to influencing the EU? Does EU funding shape the activities of women’s lobbies 
in ways similar to the migrant inclusion movement? Moreover, the findings of this study as they 
pertain to the interconnectedness variables would be strengthened if research showed that group 
ties shape the activities of other movements in similar ways.    
 This study could be improved in three main ways. First, this research project would 
greatly benefit by collecting survey data over time. Rather than providing a snapshot of group 
activity, longitudinal data would enable an investigation of changes in activity patterns at various 
levels, and the factors that influence them. In general, very little of the social movement literature 
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examines action repertoires over time. Thus, future waves of the survey should be planned and 
executed. The data for this study was collected from 2004-2006. It would be logical for the next 
wave of the survey to span 2007-2008.  
 A second wave of the survey would also be useful in addressing issues of causal ordering 
that this study, by nature of its design and limited scope, cannot speak to. While this study 
conceptualizes interconnections among groups as independent variables that affect political 
behavior, group ties may also be important outcomes of social movements in and of themselves. 
Another wave of survey data would allow analysis of the over time reciprocal effects of group 
ties by, for example, identifying the leading organizations in this policy area and charting their 
interconnections and political tactics over time. As this study relies on cross-sectional data, it 
cannot determine if a reciprocal relationship exists. Thus, while this research establishes a 
relationship between interconnectedness and activity, longitudinal survey data is needed to further 
test the causal ordering of this relationship.    
 Secondly, the findings presented here would be even more robust if more organizations 
had been included in the study. Although I targeted approximately 600 groups, only a fraction of 
them chose to participate. Future rounds of the survey should devise a means of increasing the 
response rate so that a larger sample can be assessed. One way to accomplish this would be to 
increase the number of groups that are initially targeted, perhaps from 600 to 1600. A second 
avenue would be to expand the number of countries included, a point which I address below.      
Finally, it would be useful to increase the number of countries in the study to include all 
25 current member states, and perhaps even expand the project beyond the EU. In addition to 
representing a viable strategy for increasing the sample size, this would also allow for the analysis 
of specific country or regional effects. The analyses of this study relied on pooled models, which 
aggregated responses from each country into a sample of PMR group actors.29 Although this 
                                                 
29 However, the analyses in this study do include a regional control variable. The inclusion of individual 
country control variables was not possible due to the significant loss of degrees of freedom.  
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strategy was appropriate given the aims of this study and considering that it was limited to the EU 
member states, it may not be the best method for future analyses that extend beyond the EU. For 
example, disaggregating by country (or at least including country control variables) would shed 
light on country-specific effects that could impact group activity. More importantly, it would 
allow us to discern whether patterns exist in specific countries or regions. This could be an 
important step in building theory about how specific national or regional environments impact 
group activity. In order to accomplish this, I would have to greatly increase the number of groups 
surveyed within many of the countries included here. This also represents a task for future 
research.  
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY: MIGRANT INCLUSION INTERESTS AND 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN EUROPE 
Finally, the findings of this study have implications not only for PMR interest groups, but also for 
politics in advanced democracies. This research has identified the migrant inclusion movement as 
an important and growing development for the EU and its member states. Yet, the significance of 
the movement goes further. Pro-migrant lobbies are more than just relatively new actors on the 
political stage; migrant inclusion and other new social movements illustrate the broader political 
changes that are causing a transformation of the political process in advanced democracies. Taken 
together, migrant inclusion and other new social movement politics may be an indicator of 
political developments to come.  
  As others have argued (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Dalton 1994), new social movements 
represent a distinct, albeit not revolutionary, challenge to the political establishment of advanced 
democracies. Pro-migrant lobbies do not seek to destroy the existing legal system that restricts 
migrant entry, free movement, and access to citizenship; nor do they want to topple the 
democratic political process that provides an outlet for sometimes negative public opinion. 
Although the media tends to focus on the more radical elements of the movement, such groups do 
not represent the norm. Rather, the migrant inclusion movement, like other social movements, 
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mainly promotes a reformist challenge to contemporary politics in advanced democracies. Groups 
press for political reform in a range of venues, and often request simply that European leaders and 
societies cast migrant inclusion in a more balanced light in the public debate.    
 Perhaps most significantly, the migrant inclusion movement typifies the expansion of the 
political agenda to include non-economic issues as primary political concerns. European citizens 
must increasingly concern themselves with better integrating the migrants living in their societies 
in order to prevent social unrest. National and European policymakers are beginning to 
incorporate migrant inclusion considerations into their legislation; this need will only increase 
with time as problems of migrant integration become more visible and pressing. Furthermore, 
migrant inclusion issues are part of broader quality-of-life concerns, such as environmentalism, 
life-style choices, and women’s rights. Rather than superseding the traditional economic interests 
of advanced democracies, these new issue interests add a new political dimension (Inglehart 
1990). Others have argued that this new dimension “competes with and potentially contradicts 
established lines of political division,” (Dalton 1994: 256; see also Dalton et al. 1984).     
 Migrant inclusion, like other social movements, also illustrates a broader change in the 
character of European interest group politics. Across Europe, most business organizations, labor 
unions, and other economic interests abide by the neocorporatist model whereby different 
interests are united under an umbrella organization. However, migrant inclusion interests, like 
other social groups, are characterized by organizational diversity, which encourages groups to 
compete for membership, finances, and political influence. Even the umbrella groups within the 
movement act more as coordinating and networking bodies rather than authorities claiming to 
speak for the movement.  
   The political style of the migrant inclusion movement is also somewhat distinct from the 
routine patterns of conventional interest group lobbying. Many pro-migrant lobbies have 
established close ties with government agencies across levels of governance. At the same time, 
however, challenging behavior remains a key component of the political repertoire of some PMR 
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groups (although it is not as common as the media suggest). Thus, the migrant inclusion 
movement combines practical activities with protest politics. Moreover, this study finds that, in 
contrast to other movements, pro-migrant groups do not tend to moderate their tactics with time; 
thus, it is unlikely that the movement will completely forego the use of unconventional methods. 
The co-existence of protest and more conventional groups highlights that, unlike neocorporatist 
systems, there is no monopoly of representation in the movement. The challenging identity of the 
movement, together with the need to mobilize support and communicate with the mass base, 
gives rise to the use of direct action tactics. In general, this mixture of political strategies 
highlights another identifying characteristic of new social movement politics. 
 The fact that there is no single notion of migrant inclusion, and that groups pursue social 
change through a variety of methods, suggests that policymakers are dealing with a competitive 
and flexible form of interest representation. This implies that the arenas for decision-making are 
likely to remain broad, from local governments to national parliaments and courts to European 
institutions to international bodies. It also suggests that, together with other social movements, the 
migrant inclusion movement may be helping to reshape the character of democratic political 
processes across Europe.     
 There is evidence that the movement is impacting policy reform in incremental ways and 
is at least setting the terms for reform of the policy process. For example, MRAX and European 
Coordination for a Foreigner’s Right to Family Life campaigned to include specific statements 
about anti-racism in the (now stalled) draft constitution of the EU, which ended up being adopted. 
Moreover, many migrant inclusion networks, along with the European Parliament (EP), 
campaigned for the President of the EP to request a withdrawal of the unpopular Family 
Reunification Directive. Ultimately, the ECJ ruled to withdraw it. Finally, on November 19th, 
2004 the Council produced the Common Basic Principles on Integration, which was approved by 
all member states. Importantly, this gives the EU the tools to continue taking measures at the EU 
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level and to establish a firmer foundation in this policy area.30 In terms of reforming the policy 
process, most groups would like to see migration and asylum issues included in the open method 
of coordination31 within the EU; the Commission even issued a communication on this matter. At 
present, however, groups have been unable to realize this goal.  
In general, the migrant inclusion movement is working to become an instrument for 
social change. In order to make progress, groups consider what is feasible to accomplish in 
addition to what may be ideal. Organizing seminars on migration, arranging workshops on best 
practice, and creating steering committees may not transform the political landscape, but may 
constitute a small step toward influencing reform, particularly insofar as these activities promote 
interconnectedness and network-building. One group representative summarized this logic in 
stating that “it’s difficult, but little by little, things are taking shape.” This statement implies that, 
although the ultimate goals of reform legislation and reform of the policy process may not be easy 
to attain, groups can work in much smaller ways to shape the public debate, bring stakeholders 
together in common venues, and influence policymakers. The future is likely to see a continuation 
of this pattern of incremental progress interspersed with occasional setbacks.  
At the same time, however, social unrest among those most affected by exclusionary or 
stringent migrant integration policies is also likely to continue, and may even worsen. The 
sustained suburban rioting in France in November 2005, for example, typifies a sense of 
frustration, hopelessness, and separation from mainstream society among young migrant and 
ethnic minority populations. Because of the divisive effects on society, governments are 
                                                 
30 However, many groups saw this as a defeat, since civil society was not involved in the drafting of this 
document. 
31 The open method of coordination is a term for a specific type of policy influence. If there is an area in 
which the EU lacks competence, it can exert influence not through laws but through other measures. The 
Commission proposes guidelines for the member states in a given area. These are then adopted by the 
Council. The member states must report bi-annually on their progress towards achieving those guidelines as 
well as outline plans for their future attainment (these are called National Action Plans). The Commission 
reads these National Action Plans and issues an opinion on how each member state is performing. It gives 
individual recommendations to each member state, and rank orders them in terms of their performance. It 
then creates a synthesis report containing this information, which is then adopted by the Council. The idea 
behind this strategy is peer pressure and embarrassment of those member states that lag behind others. The 
European Employment Strategy, for example, uses this method. 
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increasingly forced to examine remedies to discrimination and methods of reducing barriers to 
integration. This situation, together with the developments that migrant inclusion lobbies have 
already achieved, underlies a genuine potential for substantive policy change in the near future.  
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• Analyze data to produce custom reports for Fortune 500 executives 
• Perform full range of statistical analyses for annual meeting series 
 
Visiting Fulbright Researcher, Institute for European Studies 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University), Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium 
 
Key Duties: Received Fulbright research grant to carry out large-scale survey research project 
on pro-migrant and refugee interest groups in the European Union. Wrote and administered 
original survey to interest groups and political actors across Europe. Compiled and evaluated 
  
survey and interview data, statistically analyzed data, wrote reports, and presented research 
findings. Performed full range of administration, implementation, and data analysis duties. 
 
Key Accomplishments: 
• Conceptualized, wrote and administered five-part survey questionnaire targeting over 
1,000 migrant and refugee organizations throughout 20 countries of the European Union 
• Organized and conducted in-person, semi-structured interviews with over 35 
representatives of migrant and refugee organizations in Belgium, and with over 20 
representatives of the European Commission and European Parliamentarians 
• Created/managed large statistical database, developed coding criteria, and coded survey 
responses  
• Analyzed data using full range of statistical techniques including: factor analysis, 
multiple regression, analysis of variance, and tests of significance 
• Wrote reports of findings and presented research to management, board of directors, and 
colleagues    
 
Project Assistant, The Views of European Parliamentarians on European Integration Project  
The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Transatlantic Center, Residence Palace Bloc C, 
Rue de la Loi 155, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium 
 
Key Duties: Responsible for all aspects of data collection and project management involving an 
original statistical survey research project of European Parliamentarians’ attitudes toward 
European integration. 
 
Key Accomplishments: 
• Planned and designed applied research to probe elite opinion on European Union 
integration 
• Assisted in conceptualization and drafting of 11-page survey questionnaire and codebook 
• Organized and conducted structured elite interviews with over 70 European 
Parliamentarians from eight countries 
• Created and managed large statistical database of survey responses 
• Applied descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to survey data using STATA 
statistical software program 
 
Research Assistant, Professor Robert Rohrschneider 
Indiana University, 1100 E. 7PthP St., Bloomington, IN 47405, USA 
 
Key Duties: Assisted in organizing conference on Public Opinion about the European Union in 
Post Communist Europe, and edited book manuscript based on conference for Indiana University 
and Oxford University professors. Served as literature consultant for project on Survey of 
Minority Rights and Political Tolerance to be submitted for publication.  
 
Key Accomplishments: 
• Helped manage event planning and assisted conference sponsors as needed for Public 
Opinion about the EU in Post-Communist Eastern Europe Conference, Indiana University, 
April 2-3, 2004, Bloomington, IN.  
• Read and evaluated 14 chapters of edited volume of public opinion studies based on 
above conference to be published by Berghahn Books 
• Implemented appropriate stylistic, methodological and grammatical editing changes to 
text 
  
• Assessed current debates and themes in ethnic minorities and political tolerance 
literatures 
• Drafted 10-page literature review to Principal Investigators for use in public opinion 
project on Minority Rights and Political Tolerance, based on European Social Survey 
data 
• Achieved place as third author for Minority Rights and Political Tolerance research paper 
to be submitted to peer-reviewed academic journal in 2006 
   
Instructor, Social Movements and Protest in Democracies  
Indiana University, Political Science Department, 210 Woodburn Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405, 
USA 
  
Key Duties: Conceptualized, designed, and taught new undergraduate course on social 
movements. Supervised one teaching assistant and oversaw course administration.  
 
Key Accomplishments: 
• Researched, wrote and delivered bi-weekly lectures on social movement theory and 7 
case studies   
• Delegated and oversaw administrative duties of teaching assistant 
• Evaluated students’ written assignments and managed large database of over 80 students  
• Served as Associate Instructor for 7 additional courses in collaboration with full 
professors 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
“Getting By With a Little Help From Their Friends: NGO Cooperation and Participation in Multi-
level Policy Processes,” (2006, forthcoming). Institute for European Studies Working Paper 
Series. 
 
“Creating Networks from Diversity in the Pro-Migrant and Refugee Movement,” (2005). One 
Europe Magazine. Special issue on Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations. 
 
RESEARCH/CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
• Guest lecture, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels, Belgium, March 11, 2006. 
“Migrant Inclusion Interest Representation in the European Union.”  
• Best Practices Symposium on Immigration and Ethnic Relations in European and North 
American Cities, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, January 26-28, 2006. “Pro-
Migrant Networks and a Multi-level Strategy for Migrant Inclusion.” 
• American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 
September 1-4, 2005. “Penetrating the Fortress? The Role and Impact of Pro-Migrant 
NGO Coalitions on the Anti-Discrimination Policy Agenda in the European Union.” 
• Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 7-10, 
2005. “Networking among Pro-Migrant NGOs: Coalitions and their Influence on Policy 
Effectiveness.” 
• Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, January 8-
10, 2004. Panel Chair: “Immigration, Attitude Formation, and Problems of Collective 
Action.” 
• Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 3-6, 2003. 
“East-West Migration: Perceptions of Economic Reform, Political Reform, and Support 
for the EU.” 
  
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
 
American Political Science Association Midwest Political Science Association 
International Leadership Association European Consortium for Political Research 
Phi Beta Kappa National Honor Society Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society 
Golden Key National Honor Society  Pi Delta Phi French National Honor Society 
  
HONORS AND AWARDS 
 
• Fulbright Grant Recipient to the European Union, International Institute of Education, the 
IIE-Fulbright Program, 9/2005-6/2006. 
• Nominated for American Political Science Association 2006 prize for best paper on 
European Politics and Society 
• Academic biography published by select invitation in The Chancellor’s List, 2005-2006. 
• Nomination for the Instructor of the Year Award, Indiana University (IU) Political 
Science Department, 4/2005.  
• Certificate of Appreciation for Distinguished Service to the Graduate Studies Program in 
the Department of Political Science, 4/2005.  
• First IU Foundation Scholarship, 5/24/2004. 
• Graduate Fellowship for Dissertation Writing, IU Political Science Department, 
4/23/2004. 
• Best International Relations Research Paper (won two consecutive years), IU Political 
Science Department Annual Graduate Student Conference, 4/9/2004 and 3/7/2003. 
• FLAS (Foreign Language and Area Studies) Fellowship, Hungarian, IU, 6-8/2003. 
• FLAS Fellowship, Romanian, IU, 6-8/2002. 
• FLAS Fellowship, Arabic, IU Center for the Study of Global Change, 8/2001-5/2002. 
• Associate Instructorship and Academic Scholarship, IU Political Science, 9/2000-5/2004. 
 
COMPUTER, RESEARCH, AND METHODS SKILLS 
 
• Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Excel, PowerPoint 
• Statistical software applications including STATA and SPSS 
• Informational databases including: Internet, Lexis-Nexis, ABI Inform, EBSCO, and 
standard hard copy sources 
• Research design, quantitative/qualitative research methods, and statistical techniques 
including:  
bivariate and multiple regression, time series, event count techniques, categorical 
data analysis, binary logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression, survey data 
analysis, factor analysis, sampling, sampling error, analysis of variance, significance 
tests, content analysis, structured and semi-structured interviews 
 
LANGUAGE SKILLS 
 
• French (extensive reading, writing, and speaking proficiency) 
• Hungarian (basic reading and speaking proficiency) 
• Romanian  (basic reading and speaking proficiency) 
• Arabic (basic reading, writing, and speaking proficiency 
 
 
